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ABSTRACT 
 
With the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s grand strategic behaviour gradually shifted 
from isolationism and reluctance to activism. This thesis primarily focuses on the peak 
period of this activism under the Justice and Development Party governments, 
covering a period from 2002 (the JDP’s first election victory) up to late 2016.  
This thesis explores the motivations behind Turkey’s grand strategic activism 
and why the JDP era witnessed its zenith. I argue that fluctuations in Turkey’s relative 
power position in response to the changes at the international level stand out as key 
factors in making sense of this shift, while domestic transformations enabled the 
country to pursue an activist grand strategy more effectively. The thesis positions 
itself against primordialist accounts—which attribute this shift to ideological and 
ethno-religious motivations in the form of “Islamism” or “Neo-Ottomanism”. At the 
same time, it also rejects strict “third image” theoretical approaches such as Waltzian 
realism and incorporates the domestic level into its realist analysis. Taking a 
neoclassical realist approach, international and domestic levels are investigated in 
terms of their effects on the configuration and implementation of Turkey’s new grand 
strategy.  
In order to explore and evaluate the primary catalysts behind the behaviour 
reflecting Turkey’s grand strategic shift, three case studies will be analysed in this 
thesis: the Turkish-Iranian, Turkish-Israeli and Turkish-EU relationships. These 
particular cases, which are more usually analysed through primordialist lenses, act as 
useful battlefields on which to compare the explanatory powers of primordialism and 
neoclassical realism (NCR). This thesis is expected to open up a significant area for 
future research on the concept of grand strategy, theoretical approaches to it and the 
explanatory power of NCR within the context of rising powers and Turkish foreign 
policy. In theoretical terms, the thesis not only offers a comprehensive approach to 
NCR itself (which is currently an amalgam of several different approaches) but also 
extends NCR’s empirical reach and offers a middle ground between realist analysis 
and culturalist readings of Turkey and its grand strategy.  
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Chapter 1: The Phenomenon of the “New Turkey” and its Grand 
Strategy 
 
Since the Cold War, the number of studies on Turkey and its changing policy line has 
gradually increased, reaching its zenith in the post-2002 era. This is mainly due to 
Turkey’s pursuit of a more engagement-oriented foreign policy and economic 
approach,1 which has attracted a great deal of international attention after decades of 
limited manoeuvrability during the Cold War. 2   
In the Cold War era, Turkey’s international profile was largely shaped by the 
rigid bipolar power structure of the international system, which forced Turkey to 
adopt a policy line that followed the policy preferences of the US-led bloc in order to 
defy potential Soviet aggression. Given Soviet demands in 1945 in return for 
renewing its 1920 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey—which included ceding the cities 
of Kars and Ardahan to Russia and the construction of Soviet bases in the Straits for 
joint control of the waterway—this concern does not seem unfounded.3 Turkey also 
avoided any actions that may have triggered inter-bloc tensions. As a member of 
NATO, Turkey kept some 24 Soviet divisions occupied and provided “important 
                                                          
1 In this thesis, activism in grand strategic behaviour and foreign policy-making is used to refer to 
proactive policies resulting from increasing relative power capabilities which are intended to 
maximise Turkey’s power and influence abroad. The term implies engagement rather than isolation, 
participation rather than absence, and taking initiatives rather than remaining aloof. Activism 
enables Turkey to produce its own policy options rather than simply reacting to surrounding 
geopolitical developments or complying with the policies of others.  
2 For Morgenthau’s views on the loss of the manoeuvrability of the “lesser powers” during the Cold 
War, see Richard Little, “The Balance of Power in Politics Among Nations” in Williams, 2010, p.154–
155. On this point see also Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p.136. They both argue that in order to secure their 
position, lesser powers found themselves in a situation where they felt obliged to “lend allegiance” 
to one or the other of the leaders, thus losing their ability to manoeuvre in line with their own 
calculations. 
3 These demands were characterised as “inappropriate and incorrect statements” by the Soviet 
President Podgorny in 1965. See Meliha Benli Altunışık & Özlem Tür, Turkey: Challenges of 
Continuity and Change (Oxon: Routledge Curzon, 2005), p. 102-103. Also see William Hale, Turkish 
Foreign Policy since 1774 (3rd. edition) (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), p. 80. 
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bases and facilities for the forward deployment of nuclear weapons and the monitoring 
of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements”.4  
With the end of the Cold War, “the well-known parameters of Turkish foreign 
policy”5 changed, and Turkey saw the emergence of new windows of opportunity. It 
strove eagerly to become more deeply engaged with its environs in order to raise its 
own regional and global profile by making the most of fluctuations in its relative 
power position. However, Turkey’s journey from what Kirişçi called “post-Cold War 
warrior”,6 fostering disagreements with almost all of its neighbours in the immediate 
post-Cold War years, to a more engagement-minded approach was not an easy one in 
any respect. The shift in Turkey’s grand strategy that I analyse in this thesis was first 
attempted by Turgut Özal, who, according Cengiz Çandar, was “the man who carried 
Turkey from the twentieth century into the twenty-first century”; during a period that 
coincided with the late Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War eras (1983–1993). 
This policy line was to some extent followed by former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ismail Cem between 1997 and 2002.7 He strove to settle Turkey’s problems with its 
neighbours and achieve greater engagement with these regions with a win-win 
approach, allowing the JDP to use this policy line as a launching pad for further 
activism and a deeper engagement with Turkey’s surroundings.8  
Park refers to this emerging grand strategic attitude under the JDP rule as a 
departure from the “somewhat cautious, regionally aloof, occasionally ‘hard’, and 
one-dimensionally West-inclined foreign policy attributed to the Turkish Republic’s 
                                                          
4 F. Stephen Larrabee & Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2003), p. 1. 
5 Altunışık & Tür, p. 113. 
6 Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East”, Insight 
Turkey 13:2 (2011), pp. 33–55, p. 43. 
7 Pınar Bilgin and Ali Bilgiç, “Turkey's ‘New’ Foreign Policy toward Eurasia”, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics 52:2 (2011), pp. 173–195, p. 192. 
8 Özlem Tür, personal communication, 28/4/2016. 
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Kemalist past.”9 The era under JDP rule is regarded as the zenith of the decades-old 
effort to pursue this activist grand strategic attitude, and marked a time in which 
Turkey’s new grand strategic policy line reflected increasing “self-confidence” and 
the “rediscovery” of its surroundings in both political and economic terms.10 The 
former PM Ahmet Davutoğlu11 defined this new grand strategic approach as “...zero 
problems with neighbours, a multidimensional foreign policy, a pro-active regional 
foreign policy, an altogether new diplomatic style and rhythmic diplomacy”.12  
Several key developments and processes underline Turkey’s activist grand 
strategy. The number of mediation efforts Turkey made in the Middle East has 
increased, from early efforts between Syria and Israel to its efforts to mediate between 
the West and Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.13 Turkey’s ambition to act as 
an energy corridor, transferring Caspian oil and gas to the West via cross-country 
pipelines, has been greater than ever.14 Turkey has also developed working 
relationships with other powerful actors in neighbouring regions, including Russia and 
Iran, although realpolitik limits to these relationships have been set by clashing views 
over the future of Syria following the start of the Syrian Civil War. Levels of 
diplomatic representation (as measured by the booming number of new diplomatic 
                                                          
9 Bill Park, “Turkey's ‘New’ Foreign Policy: Newly Influential or Just Over-active?”, Mediterranean 
Politics, 19:2 (2014), pp. 161–164, p. 161. 
10 Svante E. Cornell, "What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy", Middle East Quarterly 19:1(2012), pp. 13–
24. 
11 Ahmet Davutoğlu, a professor of International Relations, served as the Chief Advisor to the Prime 
Minister since 2002, then as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2009 and 2014. Between August 
2014 and May 2016, he served as the Prime Minister of Turkey. 
12 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Zero problems in a New Era”, Foreign Policy Magazine (USA), March 21, 2013. 
13 See İlker Aytürk, “The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish-Israeli Relations since 2002”, Turkish Studies 
12:4 (2011); and Aylin Gürzel, “Turkey's Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue”, The Washington 
Quarterly, 35:3 (2012), pp. 141–152. 
14 See Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams, Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus—The European 
Union, Russia and Turkey (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke: 2011; Katinka Barysch, “Turkey’s Role in 
European Energy Security”, Centre for European Reform Essays (2007); Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey’s 
Eurasian Agenda”, The Washington Quarterly, 34:1 (2011), pp. 103–120; Gareth Winrow, “Turkish 
National Interests” in Yelena Kalyuzhnova, Amy Myers Jaffe, Dov Lynch, Robin C. Sickles (eds.), 
Energy in the Caspian Region: Present and Future, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 234–
250; Gökhan Bacık, “Turkey and the Pipeline Politics”, Turkish Studies, 7:2 (2006), pp. 293–306 
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missions) and economic activity (as measured by unprecedented levels of trade in both 
the Caribbean and Africa) have also dramatically increased.15 In these regions, Turkey 
had no previous record of interaction, negligible diplomatic representation and little 
economic presence. 
Davutoğlu, widely believed to be one of the key masterminds behind Turkey’s 
activism during the JDP era, formulated this activist theme as the doctrine of 
“strategic depth”.16 His activist policy line brought some important achievements, but 
Turkey gradually came to realise—especially with the internationalisation of the 
Syrian civil war—that the “zero problems policy with neighbours” aspect of this 
doctrine seemed destined to fail in a region where almost all actors experience tension, 
crises or conflict with other important players.  
This thesis primarily aims at addressing theoretical debates on the motivations 
behind Turkey’s changing grand strategic attitude over time. Existing explanations 
will be challenged and new causal explanations will be presented and tested. The 
following section will engage more fully with the concept behind this research puzzle. 
 
Research Puzzle: Motivations behind Turkey’s New Grand Strategic Behaviour 
and Theoretical Debate 
 
 
Analysing a shift or shifts in the attitude of people, communities or states requires an 
investigation of the factors, motivations, and actors that shape and re-shape such 
shifts. As such, grand strategic shifts undergone by a state over time require a 
                                                          
15 See Foreign Ministry’s briefs, “Turkey´s relations with the Latin American and the Caribbean 
Countries” at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-relations-with-the-latin-american-and-the-
caribbean-countries.en.mfa> and “Turkey-Africa Relations” at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-
relations.en.mfa, (accessed 30/06/2014.) 
16 The policy was named after his eponymous book Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth], İstanbul: Küre 
Yayınları. 
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thorough analysis in order to identify the most influential factors, and to make sense 
of the resulting changes and their knock-on effects. There are usually several 
conflicting lines of argument presented with respect to any particular case, which 
means that identifying these conflicting approaches and evaluating their explanatory 
power is an important component of the effort to make sense of changing attitudes. 
The grand strategic shifts any state experiences, and an analysis of these shifts, offers 
insights not only into that state’s changing external and internal settings which have 
engendered the grand strategic shift, but also into comparable shifts experienced in 
similar cases.  
In order to analyse grand strategy and alterations to it, it is firstly necessary to 
define and engage with the concept of “grand strategy”. There are basically two 
approaches. The first is a militarist approach which limits the concept to a wartime 
context and defines it only in terms of wartime goals. The second is a more holistic 
approach which sees the concept as a broader long-term political strategy that may or 
may not include wartime scenarios. According to this latter approach, the goal of 
raising a state’s profile can be achieved by utilising all possible international and 
domestic shifts and developments. As an important defender of the term’s militaristic 
definition, Sir Michael Howard refers to grand strategy only as a strategic endeavour 
directed towards wartime achievements within a limited time frame: 
 
Grand Strategy… consisted basically in the mobilisation and deployment 
of national resources of wealth, manpower and industrial capacity, 
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together with those of allied and where feasible, of neutral powers, for the 
purpose of achieving the goals of policy in wartime.17 
 
I consider this militarist definition to be too narrow in scope, and will instead embrace 
a more comprehensive version of the concept of grand strategy in this thesis. 
Morgenthau’s denouncement of war as an irrational foreign policy instrument in 
contemporary world affairs18 supports the idea that any grand strategy needs to be re-
evaluated in the light of the relationship between political ends and military means, 
and should move beyond war-oriented calculations. As such, limiting the scope of 
grand strategy to wartime seems outmoded and simplistic in terms of analysing the 
components of a state’s power and the scope of its strategies.  
In line with such an approach, Captain Liddle Hart states that grand strategy is a 
concept that refers to the long-term use of any tool a state possesses in order to 
advance its interests.19 Mark Brawley shares this assumption, and argues that the 
concept refers to the use of all possible means in order to advance state interests at 
home and abroad during peacetime as well as wartime.20  
In this thesis, the concept of grand strategy is defined as an overall effort to use 
all assets—including day-to-day or long-term foreign policy choices, economic 
devices and extraction and mobilisation capacities—at the disposal of any state, with 
                                                          
17 Sir Michael Howard, “Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century”, Defence Studies 1:1 (Spring 2001), 
pp.1–10, p.1. 
18 Chris Brown, “The Twilight of International Morality’? Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt on the 
end of Jus Publicum Europeaum” in Michael C. Williams, ed., Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of 
Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 42–62, at 
p.52; Hans Morgenthau, “Power Politics”, in Freda Kirchway, ed., The Atomic Era – Can it Bring 
Peace and Abundance?, New York: Medill McBride, 1950, p.37. 
19 Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand 
Strategy Formation”, Review of International Studies, 36:1 (2010), pp. 117–143, p. 120. 
20 Mark R. Brawley, Political Economy and Grand Strategy: A Neoclassical Realist View  
  (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 3. 
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the ultimate goal of power-maximisation. This definition includes not only keeping 
regimes and structures in place with a survival-centred focus, but also projecting state 
power abroad in order to pursue more ambitious goals. Drawing from this holistic 
approach to grand strategy and the external and internal factors that engender and 
reshape it, the question this research will address is whether changes in Turkey’s 
grand strategy have come about as a result of religious revivalism (as simplistic 
culturalist and/or ideology-driven accounts argue) or (as realists would argue) a by-
product of changing power- and interest-driven calculations.  
Primordialist accounts regard grand strategic shifts as a result of state changes in 
ideological and value-driven preferences that shape their alliances and rivalries. If the 
ruling elite are replaced by another group of elite with different ideological 
preferences, then grand strategic choices as well as particular foreign policy moves 
will undergo significant changes. In the Turkish case, such an analysis implies that the 
replacement of the Kemalist and aggressive secular elite by the JDP—comprising a 
new group of policy-makers, mostly with Islamist backgrounds—has resulted in 
tectonic foreign policy changes, altering the country’s grand strategic positioning. On 
the other hand, realists would argue that such a change can only occur due to changing 
power-driven calculations in response to fluctuations in relative power ,either as an 
irresistible feature of humankind, or as a result of anarchy in the international system. 
Therefore the shift Turkey experienced (and is still experiencing) needs to be 
primarily interpreted in terms of its changing systemic power position in response to 
changes in its surroundings and in the broader international and global system, 
causing fluctuations in its relative power.  
I argue that rather than a value-driven shift, Turkey’s activism reflects a far 
more realist one. In line with this position, this research positions itself against the 
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primordialist approach and embraces a realist reading of the process in terms of the 
way it engenders and drives Turkey’s activism. Morgenthau argued that “The main 
signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.”21 In Ancient 
Greece, “the real cause of the Peloponnesian War was the growth of the power of 
Athens”.22 Increasing relative power is mostly followed by an activist grand strategy 
and a stronger desire to extend power and influence abroad. This law held true in 
ancient Greece. The Athenians rightly ascribed it to human nature, and as such, it has 
maintained its centrality over the ensuing millennia.23 Operating under anarchy, 
primary actors—mostly states, as purposive and unitary actors—pursue their interests 
rationally.24 Power-maximisation is the key to a successful pursuit of national interest, 
and the scope of national interests will expand and evolve in line with the changes in 
relative power. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself in an era defined by 
greater manoeuvrability and the sudden absence of previously rigid bipolar settings. In 
line with fluctuations in its own and its regional rivals’ power, and to take advantage 
of these fluctuations to raise its profile, Turkey’s grand strategic approach became a 
great deal more actively oriented.  
The research’s selected theoretical framework, namely neoclassical realism 
(NCR), incorporates both international and domestic factors in its analysis. It accepts 
that the primary impact of changes will be at the international level, and their impact 
on the relative power position of a particular state will be the main cause of changes in 
state behaviour. However, it also accepts that domestic factors can also affect the 
state’s ability to pursue its desired goals. In line with this assumption, investigating 
                                                          
21 Morgenthau, 1954, p.5. 
22 Thucydides, History of the PeloponnesianWar, translated by Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: 
PenguinBooks, 1986) book 1 chapter 23; Rose, 1998, pp. 153–154 and Jonathan Monten, 
“Thucydides and Modern Realism”, International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006), pp. 3–25, p. 9. 
23 See Thucydides, History of the PeloponnesianWar, book 5 chapter 105 and Monten, 2006, p.11. 
24 Monten, 2006, p. 8. 
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changes at both international and domestic levels would provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of why Turkey pursued an activist grand strategy in the 
post-Cold war era, and why the country experienced the zenith of this activism abroad 
under the JDP rule.  
With its detailed analysis of Turkey’s changing grand strategic attitude and the 
motivations behind these shifts, especially in the period under the JDP rule, this thesis 
has the potential to attract a broad audience. This audience would consist not only of 
scholars and policy-makers dealing with Turkey’s foreign policy attitudes and grand 
strategy, but also of scholars whose primary focus is IR theory. The research also 
addresses an audience focussing on the analyses of how lesser powers acted in the 
post-Cold War era in general, even if they are not studying the particular case of 
Turkey. 
 
Methodology 
 
 
In my research I rely mostly on a qualitative approach to analyse the shift in Turkey’s 
grand strategic behaviour. I use primary sources including speeches, statements, and 
public addresses of leaders of political parties, business associations and military 
figures. The research also incorporates dozens of interviews with experts, scholars, 
diplomats and journalists with expertise on Turkey and/or Turkey’s domestic 
transformations and relations with the selected actors. A list of the interviewees from 
different ideological standpoints and professions is provided in the acknowledgements 
section. I also use secondary sources on the country’s grand strategic behaviour as 
well as on rival theoretical approaches. I begin by studying academic articles and 
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books to lay the theoretical groundwork and to clarify the research’s theoretical 
Neoclassical Realist approach within the broader realist school of thought. From there 
I move on to analyse three relationship-based case studies.  
Gerring describes the case study as: “an intensive study of a single case (or a 
small set of cases) with an aim to generalize across a larger set of cases of the same 
general type”.25 In this research, three case studies covering specific bilateral 
relationships are analysed in order to conduct a small-n cross-case analysis. These 
case studies will consider the Turkish-Iranian, Turkish-Israeli and Turkish-EU 
relationships. The relationships are analysed within a time frame covering the late 
1990s to 2016 (with a primary focus on the period from 2002 onwards). Their 
identity-heavy backgrounds and power- and interest-driven adjustments allow these 
case studies act as theoretical “battlefields” between value-driven accounts and realist 
analyses. The aim of the case studies is not only to make sense of the shift Turkey’s 
grand strategy has undergone, but also to present a causal mechanism that can be 
generalised to other cases, 
Choosing the right cases to explain the phenomena on which a particular 
research focuses is about choosing cases that experience change in the selected 
variables.26 By doing this, a “purposive selection” of the most analytically valuable 
cases—ones that have a causal relevance representative of a broader universe—can be 
undertaken.27 This research therefore chooses the relationships that have been 
influenced by the changes in the variables upon which the research concentrates, 
                                                          
25 Gerring, 2007, p. 65. 
26 Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p. 296. 
27 John Gerring, “Case Selection for Case-study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques” in 
Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp. 645–684, 645.  
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namely external shifts, domestic coalitions, and the reconfiguration of the civil-
military power calculus.  
In terms of the construction of case study chapters, each case study chapter 
begins with a brief historical background, presented in order to showcase the contrast 
before and after the selected critical junctures. Following that, selected critical 
junctures and the ways in which they affected their relationships with Turkey and 
Turkey’s behaviour will be analysed. Afterwards, in line with the research emphasis 
on the domestic level, the ways in which selected domestic factors and the changes 
they underwent affected Turkey’s pursuit of shifting attitudes towards the selected 
three actors will be discussed. This will be followed by sections focusing on the ways 
in which the selected variables impacted on Turkey’s foreign policy regarding certain 
actors in particular and its grand strategy in general. Each chapter will close by 
considering whether or not those variables succeeded in explaining the shift, or 
whether primordialist accounts could offer a better explanation. To summarise, an 
analysis based on the impact of the selected variables will be presented after a brief 
historical background on the case studies selected, showing commonalities and 
continuities over time, followed by a theoretical discussion centred on rival 
explanations.  
Van Evera notes that “testing theories” is one of the purposes case studies 
successfully serve.28 According to Bennett and George,29 in-depth analysis is also 
considered to be particularly useful when attempting to challenge existing theories. 
Theoretical claims and expectations which are closely linked to empirical data and 
causal mechanisms will be rendered more visible through closer observation, which is 
                                                          
28 Van Evera, 1997, p. 55. 
29 Alexander George & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), p.215. 
  
12 
 
why the specific case studies were chosen for analysis in this research.30 Studying 
multiple cases makes it possible to build a logical chain of evidence,31 and it should be 
possible to construct stronger hypotheses or challenge existing ones by taking a closer 
look at the causal mechanisms in each case study and by triangulating between case 
studies.32 This research will therefore be able to challenge existing explanations, 
thereby testing the explanatory power of primordialism and neoclassical realism.33  
A clear theoretical framework sits at the dividing line between chronological 
accounts of events over a specific period of time and the ways in which we make 
sense of them. Here, neoclassical realism will be presented as a theoretical framework 
that challenges its rivals with higher exploratory power thus a comprehensive 
framework. 
In terms of the limitations of this research, a broader list of case studies is 
deliberately avoided. The reason for this is that such a study would be over-ambitious 
in terms of the research’s geographical scope, and would far exceed the physical limits 
of this thesis. Instead, the research has selected three key bilateral relationships and 
will examine them in the ways outlined above. This will make it easier to measure the 
impacts of specific factors on Turkey’s grand strategy. Any analysis performed under 
a wider geographical and geopolitical remit—such as Turkey’s new attitudes towards 
the Middle East and the Caucasus—would suffer from over-generalisation and a 
consequent necessity to simplify. Analysing fewer cases in greater depth allows the 
thesis to display the impact of the chosen theoretical tools and factors of the study and 
is more illustrative of the research’s theoretical positioning and its explanatory power. 
                                                          
30 Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.226–228. 
31 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984). Also see 
Matthew Miles and Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook (London: 
Sage Publications, 2014). 
32 Ibid., p.19 
33 George & Bennett, 2005, p. 24 and 91–92 
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Therefore, by narrowing its focus for the sake of depth and accuracy in its arguments 
and greater precision in its assumptions, limiting the work to three important and 
contrasting case studies reinforces the ability of the research to explain broader 
arguments and assumptions.  
For similar reasons, the time period has been limited to the last two decades with 
a much higher emphasis on the more recent one. The number of observed domestic 
factors was limited to two in order to analyse the most important factors and to focus 
on the components and critical junctures which principally affected the shifts in 
Turkey’s grand strategies. But even under such controls, the pace of events and 
changes in Turkey and its surrounding regions has made the task of obtaining the most 
up-to-date information and producing a contemporary analysis a very difficult one. 
However, the research has made a great effort to remain relevant, in order to act as 
one of the most up-to-date studies so far in terms of setting events against a theoretical 
framework.  
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
In the following chapter I will present the rival theoretical frameworks in depth and 
engage with the main concepts of the thesis, such as “windows of opportunity”, “state 
autonomy”34 and “grand strategy”. A detailed examination of Neoclassical Realism, 
with references to several eminent IR scholars such as Snyder, Schweller, Zakaria and 
Van Evera will also form an important part of the chapter. I will investigate how and 
                                                          
34 The term refers to the elected executive’sability to extract the resources it needs and channel them 
to respond to systemic changes when it considers them beneficial without being prevented by other 
interest groups or cliques. See Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of 
America’s World Role (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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where neoclassical realism positions itself in both the realist school and in broader IR 
theory literature, and how it can be used to understand the Turkish case in particular. 
In the subsequent case study chapters, I analyse the impact of international 
developments and Turkey’s changing attitude towards Iran, Israel and the EU. In each 
chapter, after providing a brief historical background, I will elaborate on critical 
junctures and their consequences. Following that, I explore the impact of the selected 
domestic factors—the coalitions between statesmen and conservative businessmen 
and the demise of the military’s influence over policy-making—as multipliers of 
Turkey’s ability to pursue its changing policy preferences. Lastly, I will engage with 
the theoretical debate on Turkey, concentrating on the theoretical differences between 
culture and value-driven analyses and NCR.  
In the final chapter, I provide an analysis of the way neoclassical realism has 
helped make sense of Turkey’s grand strategic activism. I then present an analysis of 
the sustainability of Turkey’s new grand strategic approach in the light of the current 
state of affairs at both domestic and international levels. Lastly, a detailed section will 
be presented on the expected contributions of this research to the literature on Turkey, 
to IR theory in general and neoclassical realism in particular, and to the concept of 
grand strategy as well as academic and policy debates.
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Chapter 2: Rival Explanations and Important Concepts  
 
The introduction offered an insight into shifts in Turkey’s grand strategic behaviour, 
and touched upon rival explanations before laying out the structure and approach of 
the thesis in general. 
The main goal of this chapter is to introduce and further explore the theoretical 
groundwork, engage with the rival explanations in much more detail, provide a 
literature review and present the conceptual frameworks I will use to structure the case 
study chapters. I will start by considering primordialist arguments and relevant 
literature on Turkey’s shifting grand strategic attitude. Then, in accordance with my 
approach to analysing grand strategy through the lens of neoclassical realism, I will 
elaborate on NCR. After that, I will offer a closer examination of the shift in grand 
strategic behaviour in the specific context of Turkey by analysing the changes at both 
international and domestic levels.1 
 
Primordialist Explanations, Neoclassical Realism, and Making Sense of Turkey’s 
Grand Strategic Behaviour 
 
Primordialism refers to religion, culture, tradition, ethnicity and history in general as 
the key independent variables affecting policy outcomes.2 The core primordialist 
                                                          
1 Anthony F. Lang, Jr., “Morgenthau, Agency, and Aristotle”, in Michael C. Williams, ed., Realism 
Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), pp. 18–42, p. 28; William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 42 and 78; Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 57; Oliver Jütensonke, “The Image of Law in 
Politics Among Nations” in Williams, ed., Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations, pp. 93–118 at p. 107; . H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001, p.19. 
2 Eva Bellin, “Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics”, World Politics 60:2 
(2008), pp. 315–347. See also Ronald Grigor Suny, “Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for 
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assumption is that differences and similarities in the religious and ethnic values of 
various actors determine their choice of allies and enemies, acting as the main 
independent variable in policy-making processes.3  
One of the most popular defenders of this line of argument is Samuel 
Huntington, who, in his Clash of Civilizations, argued that in the post-Cold War era, 
the lines of conflict and cooperation would be drawn along religious boundaries.4 
Huntington argued that “in the modern world, religion is central, perhaps the central, 
force that motivates and mobilizes people.”5 He goes on to draw imaginary boundaries 
along “civilizational” lines, which in reality reflect the religious boundaries between 
Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Hinduism, Sub-Saharan Africa and so on,6 showing the 
way he frames ethnicity and more importantly religion at the top of his interpretation 
of  the “new world” in the post-Cold War era. Since only one of Huntington’s 
groupings, namely the Sub-Saharan African civilisation, does not follow an explicit 
religious affiliation, it can be concluded that religion also triumphs over ethnicity in 
his definition of the ultimate motivation for social groups—up to and including states. 
Several key international developments have reinforced this primordialist 
reading of the world. For instance, the proclamation of the State of Israel and ensuing 
decades of conflict between the Arab states and Israel have highlighted religion’s 
continuing influence in international politics. To primordialists, the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1979 signalled nothing less than the “return of religion” or the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
New Nations”, The Journal of Modern History 73: 4 (2001), pp. 862–896 and Patricia Springborg, 
“Politics, Primordialism, and Orientalism: Marx, Aristotle, and the Myth of the Gemeinschaft”, The 
American Political Science Review 80: 1 (1986), pp. 185–211. 
3 Andreas Hasenclever and Volker Rittberger, “Does Religion Make a Difference? Theoretical 
Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
29:3 (2000), pp. 641–674, pp. 641–643. 
4 Sabina A Stein, “Competing Political Science Perspectives on the Role of Religion in Conflict”, 
Politorbis 52:2 (2011), pp. 21–26 and Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000, p. 643. 
5 Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (1993), pp. 22–49, p. 27. 
6 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Touchstone, 1996), p. 28. 
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“global resurgence of religion”,7 while religiously intensified conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia offered further empirical ammunition to the primordialist approach. Such 
events drove sociologist Peter Berger to revise his stance from his 1968 opinion that 
religions would lose their importance in time to his confession in 1999 that he was 
wrong and the world is as “furiously religious as it ever was”.8 The terror attacks of 
9/11, which were defined as being religiously-motivated, provided the most important 
empirical ammunition to the primordialist approach, sparking a post-9/11 growth in 
debates about the role of religion in international relations.  
However, it is also a widely held argument that world politics seriously 
challenges the validity of primordialism. One of the primordialists’ most popular case 
studies is Iran, with its clear official religious orientation and the numerous statements 
made by its leaders. However, many studies have concluded that Iran—from the 
famous “Contra-Iran affair”, referring to Iran’s covert cooperation with the “Great 
Satan” and the “lesser Satan” (the United States and Israel respectively), to its high 
levels of trade with the Christian West—is in fact an important demonstration of the 
limitations of such approaches. The country’s cooperation with Armenia against 
predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan and its pro-Russian policy regarding the Chechnya 
question is seen as some other examples of these limitations.9 In The Limits of 
Culture, a major study on how primordialism frequently fails to explain state 
behaviour, Shaffer and Ansari show how Iranian policy is in fact far from 
                                                          
7 Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion and International Relations after ‘9/11’”, Democratization 12:3 (2005), pp. 
398–413, p. 398 and Bassam Tibi, “Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicised Islam”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29:3 (2000), pp. 843–859. 
8 Peter Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: An Overview”, in Peter Berger, ed., The 
Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics (Washington DC: 
Eerdmans/Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), p. 2.  
9 Ruhi Ramazani, “Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations”, Middle East Journal 43: 2 (1989), 
pp. 202–217, p. 213; Ruhi Ramazani, “Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran's Foreign Policy”, Middle East 
Journal 58: 4 (2004), pp. 549–559, pp. 556–559; Tibi, 2000; Brenda Shaffer, “The Islamic Republic of 
Iran: Is It Really?” in Brenda Shaffer, ed., The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 2006), pp. 219–240, p. 221–229. 
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primordialist. There are further cases showing the limits of primordialist explanations, 
even in respect of the cases primordialism is widely used to make sense of. Cornell, 
for example, shows how Pakistani politics, despite being run under the banner of 
religion, maintains a clear realpolitik line. Suny offers a detailed analysis of the post-
Soviet Turkic states that constructs their identities via their preferred policy choices 
and their allies and enemies, rather than by following “ancient” ethnic or religious 
codes in analysing their interactions with other states.10 
However, from rationalizing the Global War on Terror to dealing with the 
immigrant question in Europe, and from making sense of apparently endless Middle 
Eastern conflict to analysing individual countries such as Turkey, the primordialist 
approach has gained a certain amount of credence—more especially outside academia, 
but also to some extent within academic circles.11 In their explanations of the 
phenomenon of the “New Turkey”, primordialist accounts argue that ideology and 
values act as the ultimate motivation behind the shift. The next section will engage 
with that assumption in relation to shifts in Turkey’s grand strategic attitude. 
 
 
Turkey and Primordialist Explanations: A Value-Driven Ethno-Religious Shift? 
 
The overarching argument of the primordialist approach to Turkey’s grand strategic 
shift attributes it to Islamism and ummah12-oriented policy-making, or a sense of neo-
Ottomanism with the ultimate goal of reviving Turkey’s Ottoman past. These two 
                                                          
10 See Brenda Shaffer, “The Islamic Republic of Iran: Is It Really?”, pp. 219–240; Ali M. Ansari, 
“Civilizational Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Iran”, pp. 241–262; Svante E. Cornell, 
“Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Islamic or Pragmatic?”, pp. 291–324; and Ronald Grigor Suny, “History 
and Foreign Policy: From Constructed Identities to ‘Ancient Hatreds’ East of the Caspian”, in Shaffer, 
ed., The Limits of Culture, pp. 83–110, respectively. 
11 Haynes, 2005 and Stein, 2011, p. 23. 
12 The term “ummah” refers to the “nation of believers”, a key Islamic concept. 
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concepts are frequently used interchangeably or at least in conjunction with each other 
as they both follow a similar value-driven mindset.13 
Primordialist accounts have their own explanations for the dramatic shifts in 
Turkey’s particular bilateral relationships. The three selected cases stand out as being 
particularly illustrative within this context. Turkey, during the JDP rule, has been 
politically ruled by conservative democrats, of whom almost the entire senior cadre 
has an Islamist background.14 As one would expect from such an identity- and 
ideology-centred political outlook, Turkey has significantly improved its relations 
with Iran as another dominantly Muslim-populated country, whilst its relations with 
Israel have deteriorated. Turkey has at best a stagnant relationship with the EU, 
towards which previous Islamist movements had serious ideology- and identity-driven 
objections. These new dynamics have reinforced ideology-driven efforts to explain 
“New Turkey” and encouraged studies, op-eds, articles and books to adopt such a 
theoretical viewpoint.15 The following sections engage with primordialist assumptions 
                                                          
13 Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” 
Insight Turkey 13:1 (2011), pp. 47–65, pp. 47–48. On the debates surrounding the ‘shift of axis’, also 
see Meliha B. Altunışık and Lenore G. Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish foreign Policy in the Middle 
East under AKP”, Turkish Studies 12:4 (2011), 569–587, p. 572; Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in 
Turkish Foreign Policy”, SETA Policy Brief 32, (May 2009), p. 8; Zeyno Baran, Torn Country Turkey: 
Between Secularism and Islamism, (California: Hoover Institute Press, 2010), p. 106–117. 
14 As the leading Islamist political figure in Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan was the key figure in Turkey’s 
Islamist political movement from the 1970s. His political parties were banned one after another—
the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party and the 
Felicity Party (which is still active on Turkey’s political scene)—until his death in 2011. However, the 
JDP evolved from Erbakan’s political philosophies and was founded in 2001 by the “reformist” wing 
of the Virtue Party. With respect to the differences between Erbakan-led Islamist political parties 
and the JDP as a conservative democrat party, see Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. 20–33. On the 
emergence of the JDP, see also Stein, 2014, p. 1–11. 
15 For some examples of such an approach, see Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: 
Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”, Carnegie Papers 10, (September 2008), p. 1–15. On this 
concept, see also Bulent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SETA Policy Brief 32, (May 
2009), p. 6; Cengiz Çandar, “Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy: A New Vision for a Multipolar World” in 
SETA Brief, No.38 (2009), p. 4; Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition 
and Challenges”, Turkish Studies 11: 1 (2010), pp.103–123, pp. 108 and 119; Zeyno Baran, Torn 
Country Turkey: Between Secularism and Islamism, p. 116-117; Soner Cağaptay, “When Islamist 
foreign policies hurt Muslims”, LA Times, 7/12/2009 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/opinion/la-oe-cagaptay7-2009dec07>, accessed 
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and the JDP’s relationship with Islamism and its Neo-Ottoman discourse in more 
detail. 
 
a- The JDP and Islamism 
According to primordialist or naïve culturalist approaches, the JDP—with its leading 
figures’ Islamist backgrounds—has worked to “Islamise” Turkish grand strategy. The 
JDP was founded by a leading trio of politicians—Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah 
Gül and Bülent Arınç—who led the reformist movement within the Erbakanist 
tradition. Therefore, the JDP’s leading figures, with their Islamist political 
backgrounds within an Islamist political movement which had been led for decades by 
Necmettin Erbakan, were expected to pursue a similar Islamist approach despite their 
constant reiteration that the party has nothing to do with Erbakanist policy line and 
regarded itself as a conservative democrat political party. As an important example of 
assessments drawn from this approach, Cornell argued that:  
Erdogan and Davutoglu set out as pan-Islamists, which is truly the root of 
Davutoglu’s ideology, a naïve belief that Muslims have the same interests, 
should be united, and all splits among Muslims are the result of nasty 
imperialists and/or Jews. ...it is to me beyond any doubt that this [Turkey’s 
new grand strategy] has been an ideologically motivated policy...2008-11 
was the period of Pan-Islamism, which ended with the Arab uprisings, 
which led to a period of Sunni sectarian policies lasting to the present, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
06/07/2013; Soner Çağaptay, “Turkey mends fences with Israel”, Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 
16/04/2013. 
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though in a more and more reactive way as Turkey’s ability to manoeuvre 
has been cut down in Egypt, Iraq and Syria.16 
 
Even though there has always been a tendency to reject Erbakanist roots and religion 
in general as a founding political principle of the JDP, speeches and statements to the 
contrary have been far from absent, enriching the empirical ammunition of 
primordialist approaches.  
To mention some examples, former PM Davutoğlu once stated: “Since the end 
of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims have gotten the short end of the stick, and the JDP is 
here to correct all that”.17 This statement appears to stand as a strong reference to the 
tension between the Muslim civilisation and the external “other”, in which Turkey 
positions itself within the camp labelled as the Muslim world. Furthermore, according 
to Davutoğlu’s statement, Turkey appears eager to act as a representative for the 
Muslim world in order to improve the situation of the Muslims in the international 
system. Drawing from this statement, Islam stands out not only as Turkey’s defining 
characteristic, but also an important source of motivation in Turkish policy-making. 
The JDP’s rhetoric about the Palestinian cause led Hamas leader Mashal to name 
Erdoğan as a “leader of the Islamic world”. Rashid Al-Ghannouchi, leader of 
Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement, considered the JDP era as a “return to the heart of the 
ummah”18 and as a “successful modern Muslim administration,”19 empirically 
reinforcing Turkey’s Islamist credentials. The JDP occasionally uses religiously-
                                                          
16 Svante Cornell, personal communication, 17/2/2016. 
17 Sally Mcnamara, Ariel Cohen, James Philips, “Countering Turkey’s Strategic Drift”, Backgrounder, 
No. 2442, July 26, 2010, p. 10. 
18 Burhanettin Duran, “Understanding the AK Party's Identity Politics: A Civilizational Discourse and its 
Limitations”, Insight Turkey 15:1 (2013), pp. 91–109, p. 94. 
19 Stein, 2014, p. 37. 
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oriented rhetoric, and this rhetoric is warmly embraced by religiously-oriented 
political groupings abroad.  
Embracing other actors within the Muslim world in both political and economic 
terms has been an important facet of leading JDP figures’ public speeches. Erdoğan’s 
address at Cairo University echoed his famous public address on the balcony of the 
JDP’s headquarters after the party’s election victory in 2011. In that address, he stated 
that Gaza, Ramallah, Damascus, Mecca, Madina, Istanbul, and Diyarbakır were all 
“brothers”, and his references to the atrocities happening in these cities stressed the 
strong tone of Islamic fraternity that underlay his thinking.20 His call for “raising a 
religious generation”21, his defence of Sudanese leader Bashir in 2009 when he said 
that “a Muslim cannot commit suicide”22 and similar statements further strengthened 
the empirical basis of a value and ideology-based assessment of the “new Turkey”.  
 
b-  Value-Driven Neo-Ottoman Discourse 
 
 
“Neo-Ottomanism” is a concept that is mentioned in many studies, and mainly refers 
to a grand strategic approach with direct links to Turkey’s Ottoman past. The concept 
of “Neo-Ottomanism”, first coined during the early 1990s, refers mainly to Turgut 
Özal’s foreign policy approach.23 However, it is argued that the concept has been 
                                                          
20 Duran, 2013, p. 94-95. 
21 Ibid., p. 106. 
22 Cornell, 2012, 19. 
23 Turgut Özal (1927-1993) was Turkey’s eighth President. He graduated from Istanbul Technical 
University, then studied economics in the United States. He served as the head of the State Planning 
Organization (SPO) for two terms, worked at the World Bank and at the Sabancı Holding Company. 
In 1983, he formed the Motherland Party, which won the first free multi-party elections after the 
coup in 1980. The party was the leading political party between 1983 and 1993, with significant 
levels of public support in several elections of around 30 to 45 percent. The party, with its centre-
right stance and emphasis on economic improvement, can be regarded as the predecessor of the 
JDP. Similarly its leader, Turgut Özal, who served as Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 and as 
President between 1989 and 1993, can be broadly regarded as the predecessor to Recep Tayyip 
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further developed by the JDP, which has put a great deal of effort into its pursuit of 
this concept.24 Fuller defines the term as “a renewed interest in the former territories 
and people of the Empire, which includes Muslims who were part of the Empire”.25 
This conceptualisation argues that Turkey’s pursuit of Western identity and closer 
integration with the West has been replaced by nostalgic sense of Islamism and the 
pursuit of the country’s Ottoman past as a result of a major “shift of axis”.26 Taheri 
argues that Erdoğan is pursuing neo-Ottomanism as a way of fulfilling Turkey’s 
“historical responsibility” to the former Ottoman Empire27 by disguising it as Islamist 
endeavour.28  
There are numerous examples of statements that empirically reinforce 
primordialist explanations in the JDP era. Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs between 2009 and 2014 and as Prime Minister from late 2014 to 
mid-2016, referred to the last century as a parenthesis setting Turkey apart from its 
Ottoman past, a separation to which Turkey is determined to put an end.29 Davutoğlu 
refers to the Republican era’s policy of distancing the country from the former 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Erdoğan, due to not only to their ideological similarities but also to their focus on economic 
improvement and domestic reformation as well as increasing involvement in neighbouring regions. 
24 Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”, Carnegie 
Papers 10, (September 2008), p. 1–15. On this concept, see also Bülent Aras, 2009, p. 6; Cengiz 
Çandar, “Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy: A New Vision for a Multipolar World” in SETA Brief, No.38 
(2009), p. 4; Ahmet Sözen, 2010, p. 108 and 119; Zeyno Baran, 2010, p. 116–117; Nora Fisher Onar, 
“Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy”, EDAM Discussion Paper Series 3, 
(2009). Also see Nur Bilge Criss, "Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Governments", 
UNISCI Discussion Papers 23 (2010), pp. 9–22. 
25 Graham Fuller, Turkey Faces East: New orientations toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet 
Union (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), p. 13. 
26 Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, “A New Ottoman Empire?”,Forbes, 06/02/2009, 
<http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/02/ahmet-davutoglu-turkey-obama-opinions-contributors-
ottoman-empire.html>,  accessed 18/08/2013. 
27 Tarık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the 
West?”,Turkish Studies 9:1 (2008), pp. 3–20, p.13. 
28 Amir Taheri, “Turkey and the Neo-Ottoman Dream”, Al Arabiya, 06/08/2011, 
<http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/06/161026.html>, accessed 12/07/2012. 
29Tulin Daloğlu, “Davutoglu Invokes Ottomanism as New Mideast Order”, Al Monitor, 10/03/2013, 
<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/turkey-davutologu-ottoman-new-order-
mideast.html#>, accessed 01/02/2014. 
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Ottoman space as regretful, and emphasises his desire to revive this link based on the 
historical borders of the Ottoman Empire. As a key figure since 2002, and as a 
politician considered one of the masterminds behind the ruling party’s foreign policy 
choices, Davutoğlu uses the term “restoration” when referring to the JDP’s mission to 
revisit Turkey’s relationship with the former Ottoman space, a word that carries with 
it the nostalgic sense of reinventing something better that existed in the past—in this 
case the Ottoman era.30  
In a similar vein, Davutoğlu also stated that “Beyond representing the 70 million 
people of Turkey, we have a historic debt to those lands where there are Turks or 
which was related to our land in the past. We have to repay this debt in the best 
way”.31 Here, references to the people beyond Turkey’s population—as well as the 
use of the term “debt” regarding Turks living outside the country and to those who are 
“related to our land”—clearly highlight another direct reference to the Ottoman past. 
He further stated that: “We are a society with historical depth, and everything 
produced in historical depth, even if it is eclipsed at a certain conjuncture of time, may 
manifest itself again later”. The reference to this “historical depth” again underlines 
Davutoğlu’s allusions to the Ottoman connection. He mentions Turkey’s “historical 
responsibility” with respect to developments in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the 
Middle East—areas which share the experience of centuries-long Ottoman rule.32 
At a conference in Sarajevo, Davutoğlu stated that “… the Ottoman Balkans 
were a successful part of history and now should be reborn…” in a speech referring to 
                                                          
30 Çınar Kiperapr, “Sultan Erdogan: Turkey's Rebranding Into the New, Old Ottoman Empire”, 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/sultan-erdogan-turkeys-rebranding-
into-the-new-old-ottoman-empire/274724/>, accessed 12/03/2014.  
31 Srdja Trifkovic, “Neo-Ottomanism in Action: Turkey as a Regional Power”, Balkan Studies, 
07/02/2012, <http://www.balkanstudies.org/articles/neo-ottomanism-action-turkey-regional-
power>, accessed 03/03/2014.  
32 "The ‘‘Strategic Depth’’ that Turkey Needs", Interview with Ahmet Davutoğlu, The Turkish Daily 
News, 15/12/2001. 
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the Ottoman era in the Balkans as an era of economic interdependence, collaboration, 
and political harmony.33 In the same speech he also noted that: 
 
One western diplomat asked “why are you suddenly parachuting this 
issue? Why are you involved in Bosnia like parachutes?” I told our 
ambassador who brought this news to me: “Tell them we didn’t go to 
Bosnia with parachutes, we went by horse and stayed there with the 
Bosnians sharing the same destiny!”34 
 
Here, “going to Bosnia by horse and staying there” is another direct reference to the 
Ottoman past, and Davutoğlu’s emphasis on the success of the Ottoman era underlines 
his appraisal of it. In 2006 another important figure, Turkish State Minister Kürşad 
Tüzmen, stated that “…the AKP government wished to cultivate a relationship with 
peoples that once lived in the Ottoman geography based on cooperation and respect. 
This conveyed a soft-power approach to neo-Ottomanism.”35 The statement 
highlighted the JDP’s desire to establish closer links with the former Ottoman space 
whilst at the same time carefully referring to “cooperation and respect” in an effort to 
downgrade any possible sense of “imperial tone”.  
                                                          
33 Nicolas Panayiotides, “Turkey between Introversion and Regional Hegemony from Ozal to 
Davutoglu”, The Cyprus Journal of Sciences 8 (2010), pp. 23–38, p. 28. On Turkey’s activism in the 
Balkans, which is used as an empirical starting point for the ethno-religious assessment of Neo-
Ottomanism, see Zarko Petrovic and Dusan Reljic, “Turkish Interests and Involvement in the Western 
Balkans: A Score-Card,”Insight Turkey 13:3 (2011), pp. 159–172; Erhan Türbedar, “Turkey's New 
Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions and Obstacles”, Insight Turkey 13:3 (2011), pp. 139–158; 
Dimitar Bechev, “Turkey in the Balkans: Taking a Broader View”, Insight Turkey 14:1 (2012), pp. 131–
146. 
34 Gökhan Saz, “The Political Implications of the European Integration of Turkey: Political Scenarios 
and Major Stumbling Blocks”, European Journal of Social Science 20:1 (2011), pp. 47–80, p. 62. 
35 Criss, 2010, p. 14.  
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 In spite of all these and many similar statements from Turkey’s leading 
figures, the question of whether primordialism still enjoys a major explanatory 
position with respect to Turkey will be addressed in the next section. 
 
Weaknesses of Primordialism in Analysing the Shifts in Turkey’s Grand Strategy 
 
The overarching argument of this research is that primordialist approaches suffer from 
serious weaknesses and cannot provide a comprehensive explanatory framework for 
the shifts in Turkey’s grand strategy. Studying a country like Turkey, which has 
hosted both NATO and OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) summits, 
requires much closer observation and analysis in order to avoid over-simplifications 
and over-generalizations.  
Shaffer argues that “If Islam is the defining force in a Muslim-populated state, 
then...these states should be willing to make significant material sacrifices and take 
security risks to promote their religious beliefs”.36 Shifts in Turkey’s grand strategic 
position are in fact a long way from Shaffer’s definition of religiously motivated 
grand strategic moves. Instead, they seem to be more pragmatic and opportunistic, 
adopting policies that best serve Turkey’s goal of power-maximisation across multiple 
regions. Turkey did not just seek to improve its relations with predominantly Muslim-
populated neighbouring countries, but eagerly strove towards acquiring a higher 
profile in every theatre in which it perceived an opportunity to engage itself, whilst 
simultaneously trying to utilise each emerging window of opportunity in its 
surroundings.  
                                                          
36 Brenda Shaffer, “Is There a Muslim Foreign Policy?”, Current History, November 2002,  
<http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/currenthistory%20article%2011.02.pdf>, accessed 
12/12/2013. 
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According to Simpson, “As the Erdogan years in Turkey have attempted to turn 
Turkey from a once secular country into a de facto Islamist country, the West and 
Turkey seem to be on a collision course…”37 The argument that the JDP has been 
eager to improve Turkey’s relations with its Muslim neighbours38 is a common theme 
in similar studies—although the argument seems prejudicial, based as it is on 
questionable empirical data. For instance, as an important example of Turkey’s much 
closer relationship with particular non-Muslim actors in this era, the dramatic increase 
in the Turkish-Russian economic activity has been accompanied by a much closer 
political relationship. This lasted until the two nations faced a crisis over Turkey’s 
downing of a Russian jet in 2015 due to the aircraft’s alleged repeated transgression of 
Turkish airspace, although the atmosphere began to relax in August 2016 with 
Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow.39 The increasing number of Turkish diplomatic 
representations to Caribbean and African countries,40 as well as efforts to improve 
                                                          
37 Simpson, 2010. 
38 Efraim Inbar, “Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Beyond”, Turkish Policy Quarterly 8:3 (2009), pp. 27–35. 
39 Göktuğ Sönmez, Energy dependency and a Route Map Within the Context of the Recent Turkey-
Russia Crisis, ORSAM Review of Regional Affiairs, No. 36, December 2015 and “Putin mends broken 
relations with Turkey's Erdogan”, 9/8/2016, BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
37018562>, accessed 11/8/2016; “Russia's Putin and Turkey's Erdogan meet after damaging rift”, 
9/8/2016, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/09/world/russia-putin-turkey-erdogan-
meeting/>, accessed 10/8/2016; “Erdoğan and Putin discuss closer ties in first meeting since jet 
downing”, 9/8/2016, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/09/erdogan-
meets-putin-leaders-seek-mend-ties-jet-downing-russia-turkey>, accessed 10/8/2016; “Russia and 
Turkey Vow to Repair Ties as West Watches Nervously”, 9/8/2016, New York Times, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/world/europe/putin-erdogan-russia-turkey.html>, accessed 
11/8/2016. 
40 See “Turkey-Russia Eye Increased Trade, Joint Auto Production”, <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/infocenter/news/Pages/261113-turkey-russia-joint-auto-production.aspx>, 26/11/2013, 
accessed 8/12/2014 and Foreign Ministry’s statistics on “Turkey´s Commercial and Economic 
Relations With Russian Federation“, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-
relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa>, accessed 6/12/2014. According to these, trade with 
Russia increased from around $4 billion in 2002 to $35 billion in 2012. See also Foreign Ministry’s 
briefs, “Turkey´s relations with the Latin American and the Caribbean Countries” at 
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-relations-with-the-latin-american-and-the-caribbean-
countries.en.mfa> and “Turkey-Africa Relations” at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-
relations.en.mfa, accessed 30/06/2014. In line with these, according to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs statistics, trade with Africa increased from almost $3 billion in 2002 to almost $20 billion in 
2012, and in the same era, trade with the Caribbean increased 9-fold and reached around $8 billion. 
In the same period, in both regions, the number of Turkey’s diplomatic representations, including 
embassies and consulates, almost doubled and now Turkey has representations in almost all 
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relations with Armenia and Greece,41 are other significant examples acting as 
contradictions to primordialist theory. 
Even the most faithful supporters of Turkey’s pursuit of an “Islamic grand 
strategy” cannot fail to recognise the empirical weaknesses of their theoretical 
framework. For example, Soner Cağaptay, an ardent defender of such a position, 
argues that: 
 
Russian violence in Chechnya continues, yet the JDP seems not to be 
bothered by the Chechen Muslims’ suffering. Despite Russia’s northern 
Caucasus policies, the rapport between Russian leader Vladimir Putin and 
Erdogan and commercial ties have cemented Turkish-Russian ties. Russia 
has become Turkey's No. 1 trading partner, replacing Germany.42 
 
From controversies over the positioning of the Ballistic Missile Defence System 
(BMDS) in Turkey to Turkey’s interest-driven engagement during the Arab Spring; 
from its continuing commitment to EU reforms and its maintenance of economic ties 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Caribbean countries. See Sorumluluk ve Vizyon: 2014 Yılına Girerken Türk Dış Politikası 
[Responsibility and Vision: Turkish Foreign Policy towards 2014], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
<http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/sorumlulukvevizyon-2014.pdf> accessed 
20/1/2015. 
41 See “Turkey-Armenia Relations”, European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies 
(October, 2013); Fulya Memişoğlu, “Easing Mental Barriers in Turkey-Armenia Relations: The Role of 
Civil Society”, TESEV Foreign Policy Programme (2012); Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey's New 
Geopolitics", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52:2 (2010) pp. 157–180; Bahar Rumelili, 
“Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: the Case of Greek-Turkish Relations”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 45:1 (2007), pp. 105–126; Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Greek-Turkish 
Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?”, Political Science Quarterly 123:1 (2008), pp. 123–149; 
Emiliano Alessandri, “Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations”, The 
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 45:3 (2010), pp. 85–100. 
42 Soner Cağaptay, “When Islamist foreign policies hurt Muslims”, LA Times, 7/12/2009 
<http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/opinion/la-oe-cagaptay7-2009dec07>, accessed 
06/07/2013. 
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with Israel (even during the height of political tension), there is nothing to indicate a 
dramatic ideology or a religion-driven shift of axis.  
Shortcomings to the primordialist neo-Ottoman viewpoint are just as numerous. 
The term “neo-Ottoman” was popularised in the Özal era, with Özal seen as the 
architect of an activist grand strategy designed to end Turkey’s isolation from the 
Middle East. Özal “was a man for economic liberalization and Turkey’s strategic 
place in the Middle East”.43 He also aimed to engage with the former Soviet Union 
with the goal of making Turkey a more influential player in the post-Cold War era by 
utilising Turkey’s cultural and historical assets.44 Thus, even the earliest mentions of 
the “neo-Ottoman” label actually indicate an attitude that was strictly interest-driven.  
Later mentions of the same “neo-Ottoman” stance were broadly attributed to 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, and referred to his effort to replicate the “glorious achievement [of] 
the Muslim Turks”.45 The label is also used with reference to the threats it 
occasionally poses to Turkey’s material achievements. The argument suggests that if 
such an ethno-religious endeavour, based on “Ottoman legacy and Islamic tradition”,46 
were to triumph over Turkey’s efforts towards power-maximisation, it would do the 
country more harm than good.  
Onar argues that Turkey pursued a Neo-Ottomanist grand strategy to match its 
cultural assets, not to advance its influence abroad. However, the problem with this 
argument—as she admits herself—is that this reading of Turkey’s grand strategy 
                                                          
43 Norman Stone, Turkey: A Short History (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2010), 162. 
44 Cengiz Çandar, “Turgut Özal: The Ottoman of the 21st Century”, Sabah, 28/4/1992; Alexander 
Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Middle Eastern Studies 42:6 
(2006), pp. 945–964, p. 946–947; Lerna Yanık, “Constructing Turkish “Exceptionalism”: Discourses of 
Liminality and Hybridity in Post-Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy”, Political Geography 30 (2011), pp. 
80–89, p. 84; Cengiz Çandar, “Turgut Özal Twenty Years After: The Man and the Politician”, Insight 
Turkey 15:2 (2013), pp. 27–36. 
45 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism”, Critique: 
Critical Middle Eastern Studies 7:12 (1998), pp. 19–41, p. 23; Yanık, 2011, p. 84–85. 
46 Sinan Ülgen, “A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame?: Understanding  Turkey’s New Foreign 
Policy”, Carnegie Papers 1 (December 2010), p. 5. 
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emerged in the 1990s at a time when Turkey was beginning to pursue its own interest-
driven policy choices in response to a significant systemic external shift—the end of 
the Cold War, a timing which seems far from coincidental. Having the same values 
and cultural assets, this particular timing itself says a great deal about the underlying 
motivations behind such a transformation. A new era was beginning in the former 
Soviet space and in the Middle East, and this timing weakens Onar’s culturalist 
account, which was based on the claim that the shift centred on changing identity 
perceptions and the increasing importance of religious and cultural motivations in 
policy-making. A further problem is that while Onar ascribes such a change to factors 
of culture and identity, she also alludes to closer ties with Russia and increasing trade 
with Georgia as a way of advancing Neo-Ottomanism. However, neither of these 
moves accord with Onar’s choice of cultural assets (referring to a high commitment to 
Ottoman values and historical experience), on which she based her argument of 
Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist grand strategy.47                     
Criticising such over-simplified culturalist approaches, this thesis embraces its 
own version of neoclassical realism, which has strong parallels to the way in which 
Zakaria understands the theoretical framework—of which details will be presented 
over the course of the following sections.   
 
Neoclassical Realism within the Broader Realist School 
Realists do not deny that domestic politics influences foreign policy, 
but they contend that the pressures of [international] competition weigh 
                                                          
47 See Nora Fisher Onar, “Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy”, EDAM 
Discussion Paper Series 3, (2009). 
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more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political 
pressures.  
Kenneth Waltz48 
Starting particularly from the end of the Cold War, critiques of Waltzian realism 
paved the way for theoretical endeavours investigating both international and 
domestic influences and the ways in which they help explain state behaviour.49 Robert 
Jervis notes that the popularity of Neorealism has been in free fall since the end of bi-
polarity.50 Neorealism’s neglect of domestic factors—as opposed to these factors’ 
places in the Classical Realist school—further reinforced criticisms about its 
deterministic “billiard balls” analogy,51 pushing for a revision which would examine 
the domestic level more closely. Thucydides, as the shared ancestor of the realist 
school, argued that domestic cultural and political differences among city-states 
affected the way the Peloponnesian War started and was fought.52 Waltz himself 
admits the weaknesses of a strict “third image” foreign policy analysis that focuses 
only on the international level, and notes that the understanding of the forces that 
determine particular foreign policies will be incomplete without examining the “first 
and second images”, referring to individual and state levels.53 Therefore, even though 
the billiard balls analogy contains significant truths in its reference to the impact of the 
contours of the broader billiard table and the interactions between the movement of 
                                                          
48 Kenneth Waltz, “A Response to My Critics” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 329 as mentioned in Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and 
Domestic Politics”, International Security 17 (1992), pp. 177−198, p. 180. 
49 Michael C. Williams, ed., Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International 
Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 8. 
50 Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics”, International Organization 52:4, (Autumn 
1998), pp.971–991, at p.980. 
51 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 96-97. 
52 See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1986)  and Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in 
International Relations”, International Organization 48:1 (1994), pp.131–153, at p.132–136. 
53 Rose, 1998, p.165–166. 
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each ball, its deterministic nature needs re-evaluation. The reason behind such a need 
is that “the spin, speed and bounce of the balls” will also depend on the material the 
balls are made of, a reference to each country’s individual domestic dynamics.54  
As an important consequence of criticisms on Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism 
(NCR) emerged as a theoretical effort to revisit neorealist determinism within the 
boundaries of the realist school. NCR offers a modification of Neorealist determinism 
by taking a renewed interest in classical realism’s emphasis on other factors, ranging 
from domestic circumstances to the role of ideas.  
The term “Neoclassical Realism” implies that the concept relates to “Classical 
Realism” but entails new ideations of that philosophy. NCR shares a classical realist 
emphasis on power-seeking and the selfish nature of individuals and communities, 
without ignoring Neorealism’s emphasis on systemic and structural influences. It thus 
follows that in order to respond to problems arising from international anarchy, states 
would behave as Thucydides, Morgenthau and Carr expected them to—by expanding 
their influence to seek more power in order to achieve their interests. Morgenthau’s 
imperfect political animal55 is always selfish and its actions are motivated by self-
interest; there is no prospect of correcting these flaws now or in the future, and we 
will inevitably compete for scarce resources driven by an animus dominandi56 (a 
desire for power).57 According to Kenneth Thompson, “human nature has not changed 
since the days of classical antiquity”. This reflects Niebuhr’s, Treitschke’s and 
                                                          
54 See Zakaria, 1998, p. 9. 
55 William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 
2 and p.10; Anthony F. Lang, Jr., “Morgenthau, Agency, and Aristotle”, in Williams, ed., Realism 
Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, pp. 18–42 at p.27. Also see 
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations ,(New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 592. For Niebuhr’s and Treitschke’s views on this see Donnely, 
2000, p. 9. 
56 Lang, Jr., “Morgenthau, Agency, and Aristotle” in Williams, ed., Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of 
Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, p. 28; Scheuerman, 2009, p. 42.  
57 Stephen Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism” in John A. Vasquez & Colin Elman, Realism and 
the Balance of Power: A New Debate (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2003), p. 61. 
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Morgenthau’s pessimistic view of human nature as being driven by an uncontrollable 
desire for power, which will translate into a desire for even more power and influence 
in line with the Athenian thesis in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.58  
NCR shares such common realist assumptions about power, interest and state 
behaviour, and argues that “states conduct their foreign policy for strategic reasons, as 
a consequence of international pulls and pushes.”59 It also re-introduces domestic and 
immaterial elements which were emphasised in Classical Realism in the past but were 
ignored during the “Waltzian reign”. As such, NCR offers a promising framework in 
terms of acting as a middle ground between realism and value-based accounts, since it 
makes room for values that have found their way to policy-making circles as 
secondary factors after state’s demands for power. It offers room for the examination 
of ideas and values and their impact on domestic factors and actors, in the same way 
as its classical realist ancestors did. This ability to act as a middle ground is even more 
important for countries such as Turkey, where policy moves are often ascribed to 
ideology and values. 
In the next section, in order to link the research’s theoretical stance with the 
conceptualisation of the term “grand strategy”, I will show the parallels between the 
concept of grand strategy and NCR’s two-dimensional approach before moving on to 
explore NCR’s potential to explain the changes and continuities in Turkey’s grand 
strategy by looking at the changes at both of these levels. 
 
 
                                                          
58 See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1986), book 5 chapter 105; Donnely, 2000, p. 57 and Monten, 2006, p. 11. 
59 Zakaria, 1992, p. 179. 
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The Concept of Grand strategy and Neoclassical Realist Scholarship 
 
The concept of grand strategy, with its focus on both international and domestic levels 
and the ultimate goal of power-maximisation, has strong parallels with the 
neoclassical realist approach. NCR emphasises a two-dimensional theoretical reading 
of state behaviour, with references to the shifts at both domestic and international 
level.  
From as far back as Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, the role of a 
state’s relative power as an enabling or constraining factor in the making of its grand 
strategic preferences has been fundamentally influential.60 Once a political actor 
perceives that it can advance its influence by using a comparatively advantageous 
power position, an activist policy line will be pursued.61 From a historical viewpoint, 
changes at the international level in the form of shifting balances of power, shifts in 
relative power positions due to the elimination or demise of rivals or systemic 
structural shifts have all played roles in the rise and fall of the Great Britain, France 
and Germany,62 as well as accounting for fluctuations in the grand strategies of China 
and the United States.63 
The degree of success in the pursuit of grand strategy is also affected by 
domestic factors, drawing parallels with the basic assumptions of neoclassical realism. 
These domestic factors include the importance of using a nation’s economic 
resources—the “extraction and mobilization capacity”64—as well as the executive’s 
                                                          
60  Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, 2002, p.380-381. 
61 See Monten, 2006, p. 11. 
62 See Jack Snyder, Myths Of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), p. 66–112 and p. 153–212; and Schweller, 2008, p. 69–85. 
63 See Christensen, 1996. 
64 On the terms “extraction and mobilization capacity”, see Aron, 2003, p.49 and Christensen, 1996, p. 
11. Aron argues that state’s mobilisation capacity is the ultimate determinant of how much power it 
can mobilise to pursue the goals it deems beneficial in terms of power-maximisation, pointing to a 
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ability to rally them as and when necessary in the pursuit of state policy goals. This 
has direct links to the concept of the “autonomy of the state apparatus” or the 
“autonomy of the elected executive”65 which refers to the ability of the state’s legal 
and bureaucratic apparatus to obtain the upper hand in both policy-making and the 
extraction and mobilisation of national wealth for policy goals.66  
In the next section, I will provide the empirical context that links the basic 
assumptions of NCR to grand strategy using the specific case of Turkey’s shifting 
grand strategy and the transformations in its domestic environment. 
 
Turkey’s Grand Strategy and Neoclassical Realism’s Explanatory Power 
Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman note that “there is no single neoclassical realist theory 
of foreign policy, but rather a diversity of neoclassical realist theories”.67 In terms of 
my stance regarding this diversity, this thesis rejects the use of domestic factors 
simply as transmission belts through which the impacts of international developments 
are filtered before becoming foreign policy outcomes.68 Instead they will be 
considered as multipliers. I also seek to avoid taking a stance that would be almost 
indistinguishable from innenpolitik69 in emphasising domestic factors as the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                                                       
difference between “national power” and the portion of this which could be used by the state, or 
“state power”. 
65 See Freedman, 2001, p. 11; Timothy Andrews Sayle, “Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy”, The 
Telegram 4 (January 2011); and Qin Yaqing, “A Response to Yong Deng: Power, Perception, and the 
Cultural Lens”, Asian Affairs 28: 3 (Fall, 2001), pp. 155–158, p. 155. For more information about the 
term autonomy of the state apparatus, see Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: the Unusual 
Origins of America’s World Role (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 35–39. 
66 Also see Hal Brands, “Evaluating Brazilian Grand Strategy under Lula”, Comparative Strategy, 30:1 
(2011), pp.28–49, at p.44; Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, “Grand Strategies 
Clashing: Athenian and Spartan Strategies in Thucydides’ “History of the Peloponnesian War”, 
Comparative Strategy 12 (2002), pp. 377–399, at p.378. 
67 Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, p. 9. 
68 Schweller, 2006, p. 6–9. 
69 Rose, 1998, p. 148–150 and Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, Ch.1, Ch.3 and Ch.5. On BPM, OPM and the link between 
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reason behind foreign policy outcomes, as in the case of Snyder’s Myths of Empire.70 
Instead, I embrace a more “realist” version of neoclassical realism, similar to that 
presented by Fareed Zakaria in his book From Wealth to Power.71 Within the context 
of this approach, the international level is the primary driving factor affecting state 
behaviour. However, domestic factors act as multipliers which either increase or 
decrease the state’s ability to pursue its grand strategic choices and particular policy 
shifts.  
In line with this research’s focus on both international and domestic levels, I 
will present in the next section an insight into the shifting external and internal 
settings within the particular context of Turkey’s grand strategy. 
Major Factors Explaining the Shift in Turkish Grand Strategy 
 
The Turkish experience of grand strategic shifts has been primarily affected by 
international changes and consequent fluctuations in the country’s relative power. 
These changes and fluctuations have allowed Turkey to revisit “systemic contours”72 
which had previously limited its options, especially during the Cold War. The Turkish 
case reinforces Wohlforth’s assumption that “Change in state behaviour is… 
                                                                                                                                                                       
domestic and foreign policy-making processes see also Cheng Li, “China’s Team of Rivals”, Foreign 
Policy, (February, 16, 2009) and James K. Glassman, “How to Win the War of Ideas”, Foreign Policy, 
(March 10, 2010).   
70 On this criticism, see Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics", International Security, 17 
(1992), pp. 177−198. He argues that Snyder’s study is illuminating and promising in terms of his 
detailed analysis of domestic politics. However, by almost completely ignoring the impact of the 
international level, shifts in relative advantage and systemic circumstances, he moves quite close to 
the Innenpolitik approach which argues that domestic politics is the answer to the question “What 
makes foreign policy of states?” Zakaria further argues that the problem is not simply his omission of 
Realist boundaries, but actually that the differences in his selected cases do not stem primarily from 
the differences in their domestic politics but rather from their position in the system, their material 
power and relative advantage over potential rivals. 
71 Zakaria, 1999. 
72 Rose, 1998, p.147. 
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conditioned by changes in relative power”.73 Not only did external developments 
encourage and occasionally force Turkey to act more eagerly within a broader 
geopolitical scope, but internal transformations helped the country to pursue an 
activist foreign policy line more effectively. In an era in which Turkey found new 
opportunities in its surrounding regions, the domestic environment gradually became 
more and more conducive to making the most of the changes at the international level, 
reaching a peak point under the Justice and Development Party government.
                                                          
73 William Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War", International Security 19:3 (1994–1995), 
pp. 91–129, p. 96. 
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Changes at the International Level, Relative Power Fluctuations, and Emerging Windows of 
Opportunity 
 
“The idea of interest is indeed the essence of politics,”1 and all political actors strive to 
achieve greater power in order to pursue their interests more effectively.2 However, the 
power that enables actors to achieve their ends in military, economic, or political terms does 
not automatically offer one state the upper hand over another. The expansion of an individual 
state’s power will only fully benefit that state when it provides itself with a relative advantage 
over other states. Power is a function not only of a state’s own strength, but also of the 
relative strengths of other states.3 Aron argues that on an international scale, power is the 
capacity of one political unit to impose its will upon others; therefore it is not an absolute in 
its own right, but is instead a human relationship with a strong reliance on the presence of 
other states against which it can compare its relative power.4 In world politics under anarchic 
settings—where power defines interests and thus has a direct impact on the scope and 
ambition of grand strategic choices—changes in relative power act as the key independent 
variable within the context of particular states’ grand strategies.  
Drawing from this assumption, the way in which the changing power positions of 
particular states in the post-Cold War era affected their grand strategy in general and 
Turkey’s grand strategy in particular is noteworthy. The assumption that lesser powers had 
fewer policy options to pursue during the Cold War due to their lack of manoeuvrability can 
be traced back to the Peloponnesian War, where alliances with great powers became a 
necessity for smaller entities in order to survive during wartime, and for whom neutrality was 
                                                          
1 Scheuerman, 2009, p. 78. 
2 Carr, 2001, p. 19. 
3 Donnely, 2000, p.60. 
4 Aron, 2003, p.47. 
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consequently not an option.5 Drawing from this assumption, lesser powers’ manoeuvrability 
increased with the end of the Cold War, and emerging windows of opportunity enabled them 
to play, or at least strive to play, different and possibly more influential roles. As one of the 
“lesser powers” during the Cold War, its conclusion presented Turkey with a vast area for 
political manoeuvre—especially in the former Soviet space and the Middle East, where 
economic opportunities emerged in former Soviet-controlled areas, and the removal of bloc-
based barriers enabled economic and political interactivity with both regions.6 
Following the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey re-discovered a “Turkic world” 
composed of the newly independent states of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkey’s expectation was that it would benefit economically 
and politically from this new environment due to kinship and linguistic ties. However, this 
proved to be an over-ambitious goal, and eventually caused disappointment. On another 
front, Turkey took advantage of the opportunity to revise its attitude to the Middle Eastern 
powers, some of which (including Egypt, Iraq and Syria) enjoyed quite a close relationship 
with the USSR during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War made facilitating closer 
contact with these actors possible. 
The independence of the Turkic states was regarded as an important window of 
opportunity for Turkey—something that could open a vast market for Turkey’s economic 
activism, which was in its “silver age” under the Özal administration. Özal’s desire to interact 
with the Turkic world was coupled with the growing spirit of entrepreneurship. However, 
Turkey’s economic capabilities were quite limited at the time, especially when compared to 
the “golden era” of the last decade, which was marked by much higher business involvement 
                                                          
5 Raymond Aron, “Thucydides and the Historical Narrative” in Miriam Bernheim Conant, ed., Politics and 
History: Selected Essays by Raymond Aron, (New York: The Free Press, 1978,) pp. 20–47 at p.28. 
6 Stephen A. Cook also argues likewise in his article, “The USA, Turkey, and the Middle East: Continuities, 
Challenges, and Opportunities”, Turkish Studies 12: 4 (2011), pp. 717–726, p.724.  
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and greater economic reach and capabilities. States in the Turkic world were also expected to 
look to Turkey as a model which would inspire and assist them in their pursuit of 
consolidating and strengthening their independence. However, Turkish expansionism 
produced a mixed set of results, bringing overall disappointment. Turkey’s economic power 
and political capabilities were limited in comparison to other “newcomers” to the region such 
as the United States, the EU and China—greater powers seeking to influence or control this 
new and geopolitically important theatre. In addition, many Central Asian rulers (most of 
whom were ex-Soviet autocrats) simply did not want to follow the “Turkish model” and start 
a democratisation process; instead, they wanted to consolidate their power. Turkey’s 
approach was also considered patronizing, while Russia’s influence over the economic and 
political spheres of the Turkic countries remained strong.7 Even though activism in this 
theatre brought Turkey closer to this newly independent “Turkic world” both politically and 
economically, the overall outcome was not as successful as expected due to these limitations.  
With respect to the revision of Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the Middle East, structural 
relaxation due to the absence of bloc-based barriers offered Turkey another opportunity to 
adopt a role as an influential regional power in a different theatre. As a NATO ally, Turkey 
had already enjoyed a high level of deterrence against neighbours such as Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran, with which it experienced occasional points of tension. Turkey’s level of deterrence 
further increased at the end of the Cold War, allowing Turkey to alter its primary military 
focus. Some indicators of this shifting military view included the redeployment of Turkish 
troops from the Northern region following the disappearance of any meaningful Soviet threat. 
Turkey’s re-deployment of 100,000 military troops to its southern and south eastern border 
was its second largest troop movement since the Cyprus Operation of 1974.8 On these 
changing dynamics in Turkey’s surroundings, Hale notes that: “Having been previously 
                                                          
7 Larrabee & Lesser, 2003, p. 100–101. 
8 Ian O. Lesser, “Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and the West after the Cold War”, RAND Corporation (1992), p. 30. 
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surrounded on three sides by what was, in effect, a single state far more powerful than itself, 
Turkey was now surrounded by smaller neighbours that were weaker than itself both 
militarily and economically.”9 Another important development linking the end of the Cold 
War and Turkey’s relationship with the Middle East was the Conventional Forces of Europe 
(CFE) Treaty. The Treaty came into force in 1990 and allowed Turkey to keep some of its 
heavy military assets in its Southern region thanks to the exclusion clause in the treaty, which 
had been put in place due to the PKK attacks in the region.10 Turkey also acquired the surplus 
military arsenal of other NATO members, which needed to be dismantled under the 
obligations of the Treaty. Turkey was thus able to modernise its Korean War and early 1960s 
military equipment by the acquisition of  “roughly 1050 M-60 and Leopard tanks, 700 
armoured combat vehicles, 70 110-mm artillery pieces, 40 F-4 fighters, Cobra attack 
helicopters and Roland surface-to-air missiles.”11 These major military developments further 
increased Turkey’s deterrence strength, especially towards the Middle East, by highlighting 
its military superiority over its neighbours. This in turn had the effect of changing Turkey’s 
leverage in matters such as the Turkish-Syrian tension in 1998 that resulted from Syrian 
support of the PKK and Syria’s harbouring of its leader, Öcalan.12 The era also witnessed one 
of Turkey’s highest levels of military spending in terms of both percentage GDP and total 
expenditure.13 The Gulf War in 1991 underscored Turkey’s “return to the Middle East”, with 
permission given to the US to use joint air bases in southeast Turkey, highlighting Turkey’s 
                                                          
9 Hale, 2013, p. 135. 
10 Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 69–70 and Robins, 2003, p. 21–25. 
11 Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Global Security Watch -Turkey: A Reference Handbook, (London: Praeger Security 
International, 2009), p. 69–70; Hale, 2000, p. 232–233; Richard A. Falkenrath, “The CFE Flank Dispute: 
Waiting in the Wings”, International Security 19:4 (1995), pp. 118–144. Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in 
Turkish Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review 19:1 (1999), pp. 92–113; Ian O. Lesser, “Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and 
the West after the Cold War”, RAND Corporation, 1992, p. 26–31. The numbers are as follows in Robins, 
2003, p. 192: “1057 M-60 Leopard main battle tanks from the US, Germany, and the Netherlands, 72 M-110 
artillery pieces and 600 M-113 armoured combat vehicles.”  
12 See Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 70–74. 
13 In the late 1990s, which was a period of increasing terrorist attacks by the PKK, Turkey’s military spending 
accounted for almost 4 percent of its GDP, around $20 billion dollars. See Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute’s Military Expenditure Database, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>, accessed 
22/12/2014. 
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active involvement in the coalition.14 In this environment, developments following the Gulf 
War included a closer relationship with Israel and more recently (since 2002 and up until the 
Arab Spring) a rapprochement with Iraq, Iran, and Syria15 that brought with it a significant 
boom in trade volumes, further reinforcing Turkey’s “return to the region”.  
As far as Turkey’s relationship with the EU was concerned, the immediate post-Cold 
War period was a disappointing time for Turkey. The EU prioritised the integration of the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) over Turkey’s accession in order to destroy 
the remnants of the Iron Curtain and re-unify Europe after decades of division. The negative 
impact of this on Turkey-EU relations reached its zenith at the Luxembourg Council of 1997, 
from which Turkey was side-lined while other potential members were enlisted. In response, 
Turkey suspended political dialogue with the EU. The relationship began to recover with the 
Helsinki Council in 1999, when Turkey was also granted the same status as the CEECs. 
However, tensions between Turkey and the EU grew again because of the fifth enlargement 
wave of the EU, which recognised the Greek Cypriot government as the only representative 
of Cyprus in the face of Turkey’s harsh criticism. The Turkey–EU relationship has gradually 
lost momentum in spite of the reform efforts that brought official membership status to 
Turkey in 2005. However, the political stagnation of Turkey’s relationship with the EU did 
not result in a critical severing of the relationship—mainly due to continuing and significant 
economic activity, which maintained the EU’s position as Turkey’s No.1 trading partner and 
Turkey’s continued commitment to institutional and legal harmonisation with the EU 
institutions and acquis.  
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) proved another significant critical juncture for 
Turkey, since the 2003 Iraq War—an extension of the GWOT—was of great importance in 
                                                          
14 Hale, 2000, p. 219–223 and Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War 
(London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2003), p. 17. 
15 Stein, 2014, p. 11. 
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terms of how it contributed to the emergence of new dynamics in Turkey’s many bilateral 
relationships, including those with Israel, Iran, and Iraq. Turkey’s power- and security-related 
concerns focused on the issue of Northern Iraq. The potential spill-over effects of the 
emergence of an independent Kurdish state in the region required Turkey to revise its attitude 
towards two major Middle Eastern actors, namely Iran and Israel. Iran and Turkey realised 
that they shared a stance on preventing the dissolution of Iraq due to these potential spill-over 
effects on their own countries’ security and their common desire for the withdrawal of any 
external actors from Iraq as soon as possible.  
The war, while pushing Iran and Turkey closer to each other because of their shared 
concerns, also had a significant impact upon the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Israel’s 
perceived support for an independent Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq resulted in a gradual 
deterioration of the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Israel. The damaged 
relationship suffered from several other crises over the following years, including Erdoğan’s 
harsh criticism of the Israeli Operation Cast Lead, his storming out of the Davos Economic 
Forum,16 and the Flotilla Raid.17 The regional clash of interests between the two countries 
reached a point where joint military exercises and military modernisation projects were 
indefinitely cancelled and diplomatic relations and economic ties were downgraded. In the 
meantime, especially up until the civil war in Syria, Turkey’s relations with countries that 
might provoke Israeli concerns (notably Iran and Syria) significantly improved.  
                                                          
16 Tarık Oğuzlu, “The Changing Dynamics of Turkish-Israeli Relations: A Structural Realist Account”, 
Mediterranean Politics, 15, vol. 2 (2010), pp. 273–288; İlker Aytürk, “The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish-
Israeli Relations since 2002”, Turkish Studies 12: 4 (2011), pp. 675–687, p. 678; İlker Aytürk, “Between Crises 
and Cooperation: the Future of Turkish-Israeli Relationship”, Insight Turkey, 11:2 (2009), pp.57–74. 
17 Eligür, 2012, pp. 447–448,  Sabrina Tavernise, “Raid Jeopardizes Turkey Relations”, New York Times, 
31/5/2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/middleeast/01turkey.html?_r=0>, accessed 
12/07/2012 ; Roger Cohen, “Israel Isolates Itself”, New York Times, 5/9/2011, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/opinion/06iht-edcohen06.html?_r=2&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&)>, 
accessed 07/06/2013. 
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As well as these tectonic and critical junctures, which had significant impacts upon 
Turkey’s grand strategic attitude, each case study chapter in this thesis will examine several 
other critical junctures at the international level that had affected Turkey’s attitude towards 
the three actors selected for case study analyses. But in general terms, the key to 
understanding Turkey’s striving for an activist grand strategy has been the changing systemic 
and regional circumstances that have enabled and to some extent forced Turkey to pursue 
diverse goals in different regions and required policy revisions vis-à-vis other actors such as 
Iran, Israel and the EU.  
 
Domestic Factors as Multipliers 
 
The shift in Turkey’s grand strategic attitude came primarily in response to changing 
international circumstances in the regions and countries that surrounded Turkey, with an 
additional push (or multiplier effect) stemming from domestic changes. Firstly, overall 
economic growth and stronger ties between conservative businessmen and statesmen allowed 
policy-makers to reinforce foreign policy shifts with an economic dimension at a practical 
level, by increasing their extraction and mobilisation capacities. Secondly, civilian policy-
makers’ increased control over state apparatus and the demise of the military as an important 
and longstanding policy-making actor with a direct influence over the civilian establishment 
contributed to increasing autonomy of the elected executive, allowing politicians and 
statesmen to pursue their goals more effectively and more flexibly.  
State control over resources is an important indicator of state power. The state must 
possess adequate resources to begin with, but it is equally important that it has the capacity to 
extract and mobilise them when necessary to increase the efficacy of its policy steps. The 
more a state can mobilise its national power, the more it can translate national power into 
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state power. National power consists of major economic indicators such as GNP and GDP, 
which can easily be converted into military power when necessary, and can also affect the 
level of economic interactivity abroad as a result of increasing domestic prosperity.18 In 
summary, therefore, the power a state possesses within its boundaries does not automatically 
equal the power that the state can utilise. Its capacity to turn the former into the latter directly 
affects its ability to channel necessary resources to achieve desired ends.  
As far as Turkey’s economic improvement is concerned, in 2002 the country’s GDP per 
capita was $3,492. By 2015 this figure had risen to approximately $10,500.19 In terms of 
Turkey’s transformation into a “trading state”20 over the last decade, the level of international 
economic activity it conducts increased dramatically, with foreign trade constituting 45 
percent of its GDP in 2008 compared to only 13 percent in 1975. The country’s total foreign 
trade increased from around $72 billion in 2001 to $389 billion in 2012.21 This picture 
contrasts strongly with the economic inactivity of the Cold War years, when Turkey was at 
best a negligible economic actor, with a trade volume of just $1 billion in 1970, growing to 
$10 billion in 1980. By 2015, Turkey’s trade volume had reached $351 billion.22  
                                                          
18 Zakaria, 1998, p. 19. For instance, $18 billion (the military spending of Turkey in 2010) accounted for 2.4 
percent of its GDP. In comparison, $9.9 billion accounted for 2.9 percent of its GDP in 1988 while around $20 
billion had accounted for almost 4 percent of its GDP in 2003. Comparing the late 1990s and the 2002–2011 
period it can be concluded that, even though the gross amount was kept fairly constant, the percentage of 
GDP it accounted for gradually diminished. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Military 
Expenditure Database,<http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>, accessed 22/12/2014. Similarly, Turkey’s 
total defence and aviation turnover rose from around $2billion in 2006 to almost $5 billion in 2012, and its 
spending on R&D in defence industry rose from $49 million in 2002 to more than $750 million in 2012. See 
Undersecretariat for Defence Industries webpage, “Today's Turkish Defence Industry”, 
<http://www.ssm.gov.tr/home/tdi/Sayfalar/today.aspx>, accessed 10/12/2014 
19 Erdal Tanas Karagöl, “The Turkish Economy During the Justice and Development Party Decade”, Insight 
Turkey 15:4 (2013), pp. 115–129, p. 117. 
20 A term coined by Richard Rosecrance in Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and 
Conquest in the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 
21 Seymen Atasoy, “The Turkish Example: A Model for Change in the Middle East?”, Middle East Policy 18: 3 
(Fall 2011), pp.86-100, p.91. Also see Abdülkadir Civan, Savaş Genç, Davut Taşer, and Sinem Atakul, "The 
Effect of New Turkish Foreign Policy on International Trade", Insight Turkey 15:3 (2013), pp. 107–122, p. 109. 
22 Data retrieved from the Turkish Statistical Institute. 
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In addition to the former Soviet countries and the Middle East, Turkey has enjoyed 
much higher levels of economic interactivity with Latin America and the Caribbean as well 
as Africa.23 This economic activism has reinforced Turkey’s power-maximisation efforts 
abroad, whilst also helping its efforts to pursue a more balanced geopolitical and grand 
strategic approach. Plus, along with its rising economic profile, Turkey’s national or latent 
power increased, manifesting itself as greater international power. This ability to turn 
economic power into political power mainly stemmed from close statesmen-businessmen 
links which will be investigated in detail in the following section. 
In addition to overall improvements in Turkey’s economic landscape, close ties 
between small and medium Anatolian entrepreneurs and the JDP allowed the ruling elite to 
mobilise necessary resources for their policy goals and enjoy these groups’ electoral support. 
In turn, these entrepreneurs were given the opportunity not only to have their say as MPs and 
members of the JDP, but also to expand their businesses abroad. 
 
                                                          
23 See “Turkey-Russia Eye Increased Trade, Joint Auto Production”, <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/infocenter/news/Pages/261113-turkey-russia-joint-auto-production.aspx>, 26/11/2013, accessed 
8/12/2014 and Foreign Ministry’s statistics on ”Turkey´s Commercial and Economic Relations With Russian 
Federation“, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-russian-
federation.en.mfa>, accessed 6/12/2014.According to these, trade with Russia increased from around $4 
billion in 2002 to $35 billion in 2012. Also see, Foreign Ministry’s briefs, “Turkey´s relations with the Latin 
American and the Caribbean Countries” at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-relations-with-the-latin-
american-and-the-caribbean-countries.en.mfa> and “Turkey-Africa Relations” at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa, accessed 30/06/2014. In line with these, according to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stats, trade with Africa increased from almost $3 billion in 2002 to almost $20 
billion in 2012 and in the same era, trade with the Caribbean increased 9-fold and reached around $8 billion. 
In the same period, in both regions, number of Turkey’s diplomatic representation including embassies and 
consulates almost doubled and now Turkey has representations in almost all countries in both. See 
Sorumluluk ve Vizyon: 2014 Yılına Girerken Türk Dış Politikası [Responsibility and Vision: Turkish Foreign 
Policy towards 2014], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/sorumlulukvevizyon-2014.pdf> accessed 20/1/2015. 
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1) The JDP and Conservative Businessmen/“Anatolian Tigers” 
 
On the role of economic activism within the context of Turkey’s grand strategy, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu—who served as Foreign Minister between 2009 and 2014 and Prime Minister 
between 2014 and mid-2016—emphasised the role of business associations, stating that: 
“Turkey’s success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil 
society, business associations and numerous other organizations, all operating under the new 
guidance of the new vision”.24 
The geopolitical orientation of trade serves to reinforce or challenge the efficacy of 
grand strategic design and widen or restrict its geographic limits. Internationally-oriented 
businesses can affect the applicability and success of a particular grand strategy by 
supporting state policies regarding particular countries or limiting the impact of political 
                                                          
 24 Eligür, 2012, p. 433. 
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deterioration by maintaining economic links in the face of political divergence. The more a 
state is able mobilise its resources, the more successfully it can pursue its desired policy 
preferences with a supporting economic dimension or a “practical hand.”25 Links between 
political elites and businessmen can act as an important catalyst within this context. 
Jack Snyder’s Myths of Empire26 is a highly useful source for understanding the 
implications of links between business coalitions and the ruling elite in the pursuit of grand 
strategic choices. By analysing the key dynamics and motives behind the expansionist 
policies of leading powers, Snyder argues that domestic politics have always played a 
significant role, producing certain policy outcomes, including the expansion of political and 
economic influence. These outcomes can then take the form of expansionist policies, which if 
over-extended may result in exceeding the feasible limits that a power can reach, or self-
encirclement by making more and more enemies. Coalitions are usually formed between 
military and political elites or between industrialists and political figures, but they may also 
take the form of “hijacking” state mechanisms by imperialist military or internationalist 
business groups.  
Snyder examines Japan, Germany, Great Britain, the USSR and the United States in 
order to support his theoretical position. He argues that Germany’s aggressive attitude in the 
first half of the 20th century was a direct result of coalitions between imperialist militarily-
oriented interest groups and the ruling elite,27 which worked together to raise Germany’s 
position in the great imperialist game between European powers. In contrast, Japanese 
overexpansion in the 1930s came as a result of power resting in the hands of the military, 
which was given a dominant role in the process of the Meiji restoration. The resulting attitude 
                                                          
25 Mustafa Kutlay, “Economy as the 'Practical Hand' of 'New Turkish Foreign Policy': A Political Economy 
Explanation”, Insight Turkey 13:1(2011), pp. 67-88,. 
26 Snyder, 1991. 
27 Snyder, 1991, p. 108–111. 
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pushed Japan into a costly campaign of expansion in the 1930s and led to its eventual defeat 
in World War II.28 In all the cases Snyder chooses to analyse, he argues that either the 
existence or the absence of domestic coalitions (in terms of centralised state structures 
offering more direct control to the leadership over policy choices) caused shifts in grand 
strategy.  
Giving domestic politics pride of place, Snyder’s Innenpolitik approach as the source of 
state behaviour stands in stark contrast to the Aussenpolitik approach which argues that 
external considerations of material power determine state behaviour.29 Like Zakaria, I 
position the theoretical standing of my research against Snyder’s approach. Zakaria rightly 
argues that differences between expansionist policies pursued by Japan, Germany or Great 
Britain do not point to the influence of domestic groups. Instead, they should be attributed to 
the position of states within the structure as a whole, taking into account the relative power 
they enjoy and the presence or absence of rival powers which directly affected the fate of 
their expansionist ambitions. But despite disagreeing with Snyder, I find his concept of 
coalitions useful, not as the ultimate determinant of grand strategic outcome, as Myths of 
Empire suggests, but as an important domestic factor that can act as a multiplier to the state’s 
ability to pursue a particular policy choice vis-à-vis certain actors.  
For decades, Turkey stood as a symbolic example of a “late, late industrialized/ 
developed” country. 30 This general classification was defined by Snyder to refer to states 
with a centralised governing mechanism which experiences the occasional emergence of 
powerful cartels within a system plagued by weak democratic institutions. Up until the 1950s, 
Turkey’s political and economic environment was hyper-centralized, and the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP) was the only political party with unquestionable leadership skills and 
                                                          
28 Ibid, p. 146–152. 
 29 Monten, 2006, p. 7. 
 30 Snyder, 1991, p. 18. 
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principles,31 and which therefore had a free hand to organise a state-planned economy. 
Turkey was a country that had been devastated by several wars, with World War I and the 
Independence War probably the most serious. Under these circumstances, coupled with 
wartime economic devastation, the private sector was largely absent and even state-controlled 
economic activity was relatively limited.32 However, changes at the international level can 
initiate and support the rise of economic coalitions by offering new opportunities for 
internationalist businessmen both domestically and abroad. In the Turkish case, new markets 
emerged with the end of the Cold War, including the predominantly Muslim and Turkic post-
Soviet markets, which encouraged the entrepreneurial spirit of nationalist and religious 
businessmen. Meanwhile, the bloc-based mentality came to an end in both economic and 
political terms, enabling Turkey to engage with its neighbours more deeply.  
The gradual de-securitisation of Turkish politics after the Cold War, in conjunction 
with the slow but constant growth of civil power against the military, also enabled former 
peripheral organisations—including conservative and Islamist small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Anatolia—which took the chance to organise under broader and 
stronger organisational umbrellas, setting the tone for a developing link between business and 
politics. From the 1990s, Turkey’s economic and political arenas became more vibrant, 
reflecting a growing enthusiasm for wider political participation. The growth of NGOs in 
Turkey, including business associations,33 in a much more diverse political environment 
                                                          
31 Some features here are reminiscent of Anderson’s Imagined Communities. Anderson argues that the nation-
building processes aim to replace religion with the nation-state and direct people’s loyalty to another focal 
point to control more secular aspects of the nation-building process. 
32 For a detailed analysis of the era, see Güneri Akalın, “The Turkish Economic Development since 1923: 
Achievements and Failures”, Turkish Public Administration Annual 20–21 (1994–1995), pp. 91–107. 
33 While the coup of 1980 closed down more than 20,000 of Turkey’s 38,000 NGOs, the number gradually 
increased and has now reached around 104,000. See Sefa Şimşek, “The Transformation of Civil Society in 
Turkey: From Quantity to Quality”, Turkish Studies 5:3 (2004), pp. 46–74 and “Bozkır: STK Sayısı Cumhuriyet 
Tarihinin Rekoru” [Bozkır: Number of NGOs Highest in the History of the Republic of Turkey], İHA, 24/3/2015, 
<http://www.iha.com.tr/haber-bozkir-stk-sayisi-cumhuriyet-tarihinin-rekoru-449507/>, accessed 2/4/2015. 
Here, it is important to note that constitutional amendments in the 1990s helped “Islamist” groups to 
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distanced Turkey further from the characteristics of Snyder’s “late, late industrialized/ 
developed” countries. Old political parties were restored after the 1980 coup and new parties 
arose. Three parties contested the first election after the coup in 1983; this number rose to 13 
in 1995, and there are more than 80 at present. The new atmosphere matched the rise of the 
neoliberal and internationalist entrepreneurialism thanks to the emergence of significant 
economic opportunities in the post-Cold War world, particularly in the Caucasus, Central 
Asia, and the Middle East.  
The Anatolian Tigers was a group of Anatolia-based companies (mainly SMEs) with 
generally conservative ideological affiliations. We now know most of these companies as 
members of conservative businessmen associations such as MÜSİAD and TUSKON. So 
while economic liberalisation provided businessmen with the opportunity for domestic 
expansion, dramatic changes in foreign markets in the post-Cold War era also offered them 
the chance to expand abroad. Shifts in external settings were therefore vital in terms of 
enabling Turkey’s conservative business associations to exert a far greater influence. Political 
parties led by conservative leaders such as Özal and Erbakan strove for political power in the 
belief that the old elite had enjoyed power due to their close ties with military, business and 
bureaucratic circles. At the same time, Turkey’s new business class began competing more 
vigorously for a share in the economy that they had previously been beyond their reach.34 
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efforts to transform it, see Ziya Öniş, “Turgut Özal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical 
Perspective” Middle Eastern Studies 40:4 (2004), pp. 113–134; Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey: How Far from 
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Abramowitz., “Turkey After Özal”, Foreign Policy 91 (1993), pp. 164–181; Gerassimos Karabelias, “Dictating 
the Upper Tide: Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Özal Decade, 1993-2003”, Turkish Studies 9:3(2008), pp. 
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Historically, Turkey’s conservative businessmen sided with conservative political parties, 
which provided them with official encouragement and support while politicians enjoyed their 
electoral and economic support in return. However, Turkey’s comparatively limited 
economic capabilities in the immediate post-Cold War era up to 2002 prevented such 
associations from being as active as they became during the JDP era.35 Even though their 
share in Turkey’s overall foreign trade might be not as big as TÜSİAD’s figures suggest,36 
their influence is still far from negligible. For instance, in an interview conducted by the 
author, Professor Özlem Tür mentioned that she was one of the people who accompanied 
Erdoğan to Yemen on a flight filled with TUSKON members before the Erdoğan-Gülen split. 
These businessmen successfully lobbied to lift the visa regime between the two countries, and 
were delighted by the ready compliance of both countries. TUSKON members were looking 
to conduct business in “virgin lands”—the Middle East from Syria to Yemen and from the 
Caribbean to the ex-Soviet area. Numerous cases where MÜSİAD successfully lobbied for 
similar ends can easily be found. From this it can be concluded that Tür considered that the 
level of influence of Turkey’s conservative business associations to be much higher than their 
share in Turkey’s overall foreign trade might suggest.37  
The JDP has a reputation as a “pro-private sector party”,38 and half of the party’s 
Executive Board describe themselves as “businessmen” or “merchants”.39 The party has a lot 
of businessmen MPs, including several former heads of MÜSİAD, and has challenged the 
pre-existing sense of Kemalist étatism in the economic sphere,40 helping Turkey reduce the 
EU’s concerns. The shared vision of the JDP and the Anatolian Tigers has contributed to a 
                                                          
35 Mustafa Kutlay, associate professor, TOBB University, personal communication, 8/4/2016. 
36 Mustafa Kutlay, personal communication, 8/4/2016 and Özlem Tür, personal communication, 28/4/2016. 
37 Özlem Tür, personal communication, 28/4/2016. 
38 Henri Barkey and Yasemin Çongar, “Deciphering Turkey's Elections: The Making of a Revolution”, World 
Policy Journal, 24: 3 (Fall, 2007), pp. 63–73, p. 66. 
39 Seda Demiralp, “The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey”, Comparative 
Politics, 41: 3 (April 2009), pp. 315–335, p. 328. 
40 On Kemalist étatism, see Ömer Celâl Sarc, “Economic Policy of the New Turkey”, Middle East Journal,2:4 
(October 1948), pp. 430–446. 
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more successful mobilisation of Turkey’s economic potential in order to reinforce the 
country’s foreign policy choices. This has engendered a new grand strategy with a 
geopolitical scope that is broader than ever, and of which economic activity is an essential 
part. Turkish businessmen and politicians share a common conservative intellectual outlook41 
and a critical stance against the mindset of the old elite due to their isolationism, securitised 
foreign policy approach and alarmist attitude towards different ethnic, political and religious 
groups and ideologies.42 The new alliance also shared a desire to see Turkey become an 
integral part of and a leading actor in the Middle East as well as an active player in the 
Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. In economic terms, this has led to an expansion in 
business abroad for these associations with the government’s direct support.43 
With regard to Turkey’s geopolitically broader economic reach and dramatically higher 
profile, there are two leading conservative and/or Islamist businessmen associations which 
deserve to be considered at some length in this thesis, namely MÜSİAD (the Independent 
Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) and TUSKON (the Confederation of 
Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey). In the post-2013 era, however, TUSKON’s image 
was seriously damaged because of accusations directed at Fethullah Gülen and NGOs with 
close ties to him about their clandestine plans to “hijack” the state establishment. This 
deterioration of the association’s image and the Gülen movement reached its zenith with the 
coup attempt of July 15, 2016. However, due to the role TUSKON played during the JDP era 
and its role in terms of reinforcing Turkey’s grand strategy abroad as a “practical hand”, 
providing the JDP full support both domestically and internationally until 2013, TUSKON 
needs to be included in any analysis of Turkey’s grand strategy since 2002. It also stands out 
                                                          
41 Karasipahi, 2009, pp. 104-105. 
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as one of the key actors that took a clear anti-Erdoğan and pro-Gülen stance after 2013 and 
gradually became more aggressive as the Erdoğan-Gülen split proceeded, leading to its 
removal from the economic arena to a great extent. The organisation had been encouraged 
and supported prior to 2013 by the JDP, especially in terms of its investments in Africa and 
the Caribbean and vice versa. The ups and downs of TUSKON’s relationship with the JDP 
and its final deterioration will be discussed at greater length in the next section. Meanwhile, 
MÜSİAD succeeded in retaining its privileged position within this context following the 
Gülen-Erdoğan split in 2014. The next section will investigate these two associations in 
detail. 
 
 
Rising Businessmen Associations: MÜSİAD and TUSKON 
 
a- MÜSİAD 
 
MÜSİAD is a business association composed of SMEs, and is the body that is most 
representative of the so-called “Anatolian Tigers”. MÜSİAD was founded in 1990 by a group 
of twelve religiously motivated businessmen who decided to organise themselves under the 
banner of a new business association rather than joining the already established TÜSİAD. 
The reason behind their decision was that they considered TÜSİAD to represent a policy line 
that was statist, “Kemalist in nature,”44 and aggressively secular, with close ties to the old 
elite, including the military.45 This image of TÜSİAD was fostered by the association’s 
                                                          
44 Robins, 2003, p. 86. 
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supportive stance regarding the military coup in 1980 and the post-modern coup or “silent 
coup”46 of February 28, 1997. In these coups, TÜSİAD supported the military’s policy line, 
as well as endorsing the pressure the military put the government under during the latter 
coup, forcing Necmettin Erbakan to resign. These criticisms were also levelled at the group 
by İshak Alaton, a leading businessman who is himself a member of TÜSİAD.47  
MÜSİAD’s outlook, according to its former leader and founding Chairman Erol Yarar, 
was to represent businessmen who were “affiliated with the values adopted by the Muslim 
population of Turkey and its national culture”.48 In the association’s brochure, under the 
section “Our Identity”, a picture of minaret in front of skyscrapers in Istanbul stands as a 
poignant symbol of MÜSİAD’s self-identification, values and desire for greater economic 
activism without ignoring cultural values. The organisation’s mission statement talks of 
“being loyal to faith and to the thousand year old values of the people of Turkey”, offering 
the reader a deeper idea about its self-positioning and ideological stance.49 Erol Yarar 
highlights the ideational stance of the organisation, stating that “the beautiful things that were 
once gained with the Quran were lost one by one as Muslims moved away from it and the 
degeneration that appeared in political, economic and social life—immorality, self-interest, 
and injustice—dried up their tree of civilization”.50 
MÜSİAD was the first organisation of its kind to represent the vast number of SMEs of 
Anatolia, which were becoming increasingly vocal about their religious affiliations and which 
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had been at the periphery both economically and politically up until the 1990s. The 
organisation gradually raised its profile as it came to reflect the transformation that was 
taking place in the political arena. With the rise of conservative and Islamist parties, it 
established closer ties to important figures such as Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan. The 
organisation enjoyed a gradual rise in profile, partly due to Özal’s centre-right Motherland 
Party’s market liberalisations, which enabled the mushrooming of private-enterprises and the 
encouragement of entrepreneurship. The organisation also enjoyed a close relationship with 
Erbakan and his Welfare Party. Both Özal and Erbakan emphasized the importance of 
economic activism and more precisely the spirit of entrepreneurship, especially with regard to 
economic activities abroad. Both politicians shared strong conservative and/or “Islamist” 
ideological affiliations, which brought them closer to MÜSİAD and vice versa. The last 
decade can be seen as the “golden age” of MÜSİAD’s links to the ruling elite. This was 
thanks to the fact that the political party to which it has closest ties, the JDP, enjoyed far 
greater electoral support than Erbakan and has survived for much longer in government than 
Özal. 
Hakan Yavuz noted that “Islam has become the oppositional identity for the excluded 
sectors of Turkish society.”51 This oppositional identity began searching more actively for its 
share in the political and the economic arena, and MÜSİAD became an important symbol of 
this search in the business world.  
MÜSİAD is now active in 63 countries, and represents more than 8000 members and 
almost 36,000 businesses with a combined labour force of 1.6 million. Member companies 
account for 18 percent of Turkey’s GNP, while its exports have reached a remarkable $17 
billion dollars.52 MÜSİAD has branches and partner organisations not only in countries with 
                                                          
51 Hakan Yavuz, ”Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere”,  Journal of International Affairs 54:1 (2000),  pp. 21–
42, at p.22 
52 See MÜSİAD International Business Fair webpage, <http://www.musiadfair.com/?p=musiad>, accessed 
8/1/2015. 
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predominantly Muslim populations, but also in Europe, with offices in numerous cities 
including Munich, London, Copenhagen, Brussels, Paris and Milan. It also has branches in 
the US, in Washington DC and New Jersey.53 
The International Business Fairs which MÜSİAD organises have been important focal 
points, where the organisation keeps in touch with the Muslim world and establishes and 
strengthens economic links with it. From their inception in 1993, these fairs are now run 
annually, and have enjoyed a gradual increase in visitor and participant numbers. The 14th 
fair in 2012 attracted more than 1.8 million visitors and 735 companies from 92 countries, 
who came from as far afield as Malaysia and Senegal.54 The participation of significant 
figures from the government to these fairs, including Minister of Economy Zafer Cağlayan 
and Prime Minister Erdoğan himself has encouraged the association’s efforts to raise its 
profile as an important international business entity. Even more illustrative of the 
encouragement and support MÜSİAD received; newly elected President Erdoğan and the 
then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu participated in the 15th fair in 2014 as keynote 
speakers.55 Such events therefore offer a precious opportunity for MÜSİAD to show off its 
prestige and underline its links with the ruling elite. Along with business fairs, businessmen 
trips and political encouragement, MÜSİAD also enjoyed direct channels into the JDP, 
allowing the organisation to increase its influence further. MÜSİAD has long been active in 
terms of political involvement. The businessmen whom we now know as MÜSİAD members 
had been quite close to Erbakan since the 1970s, and almost all conservative political figures 
and parties not only did business together but also socialised together. In 1996, under the roof 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, there were 22 MÜSİAD members as MPs, of which 
17 came from the Islamist Welfare Party. When the JDP was founded following the split with 
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the “reformist wing” of the Virtue Party, 28 out of 31 MÜSİAD members in the Virtue Party 
chose to side with the “reformist wing”. Six MÜSİAD members were among the founders of 
this new political party. With the JDP’s first election victory in 2002, more than twenty 
MÜSİAD members became MPs. In the 2009local elections, MÜSİAD succeeded in electing 
some of its members as district mayors in several cities including Sakarya, Gaziantep, 
İstanbul and Kayseri, as well as a metropolitan mayor in Kayseri and a town mayor in 
Malatya. In 2007, 30 MÜSİAD members became JDP MPs. In 2011, this number was 26 in 
2011. In terms of local chambers of commerce, MÜSİAD’s influence was no less impressive. 
Erdoğan himself a close friend of MÜSİAD, playing a significant role in MÜSİAD’s 
foundation, whilst Abdullah Gül was a consultant MÜSİAD affiliate and Ali Babacan was a 
member of the organisation’s Kayseri branch. From Konya to İstanbul, the organisation 
gradually came to dominate chambers of commerce and industry, to the extent that in 2013 
the rivalry for the position of president in the Istanbul Chamber of Industry was between two 
MÜSİAD members, ensuring that the organisation would enjoy a superior position over 
substantially influential holdings such as Sabancı, Koç, and others. Moreover, the former 
head of the organisation between 2008 and 2012, Ömer Cihad Vardan, became the head of 
the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) in 2014. This is a key institution that 
encourages and promotes Turkish business abroad, and one with which Turkish 
businessmen—regardless of secular, ideological or political affiliation—have to work 
together in order to be able to attain their desired trade goals and retain a strong presence 
abroad.56  
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Through this political and bureaucratic presence and leverage, as well as with direct 
government encouragement, the association took the opportunity to have a secondary 
influence over policy making after the primary motive of Turkey’s animus dominandi. 
 
b- TUSKON  
 
TUSKON is another important business association, the profile of which grew during the JDP 
era until 2013, when Erdoğan-Gülen57 split resulted in a hostile relationship between the two. 
TUSKON is the umbrella organization for seven regional federations (corresponding with 
Turkey’s seven geographical regions), which cover a total of 211 voluntary business 
associations and around 55,000 entrepreneurs. TUSKON’s members are its regional 
federations, rather than associations or individual companies.58 Founded in 2005, TUSKON 
defines its goal as “making the Turkish economy and businessmen an effective part of the 
global economy…”59 It played a major role in fostering closer ties with neighbouring regions 
as well as establishing contacts with Latin America and Africa. Its role was therefore central 
in helping Turkey achieve a new sense of economic activism with a broader geographic 
outlook. TUSKON has offices in Brussels, Moscow, Beijing and Washington D.C. Rızanur 
Meral, the head of the association, had publicly praised the JDP numerous times for its 
contribution to Turkey’s stability and called on businesses to support the government. The 
then Prime Minister Erdoğan60 also praised TUSKON’s activities abroad on several 
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occasions when he was in office, and offered them much encouragement.61 In several 
interviews, while admitting that most of TUSKON’s members have a conservative 
ideological stance, Meral refrained from defining the organisation itself as “conservative” 
while stressing the good relationship between the JDP and TUSKON as an important part of 
the organisation’s success, and as something to be encouraged and perpetuated.62 
Having received encouragement and support from the Undersecretariat of Foreign 
Trade from the Ministry of Economy, the Turkish Exporters Assembly, and the then Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, TUSKON’s activities grew to establish new contacts with markets in Latin 
America, Africa, and the former Soviet area. The organisation’s principal events were its 
“Foreign Trade Bridge” meetings, which were similar to MÜSİAD’s International Business 
Fairs. The first Foreign Trade Bridge summit in 2009 attracted more than 5,000 participant 
businessmen from more than 130 countries. Since 2006, TUSKON has organized trade 
summits with Eurasian, Asia-Pacific and African countries.63 The volume of trade with 
African countries has increased from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $17 billion in 2012, and 
TUSKON has been a key player in this growth. It not only conducts ever-increasing levels of 
economic activity in African countries, but also encourages and contributes to further growth 
by sending delegations and by organising meetings through its World Trade Bridge.64 In 2010 
and 2011, two Trade Bridge summits were devoted entirely to economic relations with 
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Africa, attracting more than 1000 participants from more than 40 countries. In 2012, 
TUSKON conducted three ambitious “Trade Bridge” projects—namely Turkey-Africa, 
Turkey-Pacific and Turkey-Eurasia—in order to foster trade with countries in these regions 
and add new sectors to Turkey’s pre-existing bilateral trade and investment portfolio.65  
In response to the encouragement and support it received from the ruling elite, 
TUSKON was characterised as “always supporting and never challenging the government’s 
position”, and TUSKON’s privileged position was attributed to this fact.66 The organisation’s 
goal seemed to be to influence Turkey’s economic atmosphere not only in terms of the 
country’s domestic economy but also in terms of the expansion of its economic reach. The 
organisation’s “Foundation Story” states that the seven founding federations “have the 
mission of constituting an expansion at economic policies”.67  
However, since 2013 the relationship between TUSKON and the JDP has deteriorated 
significantly due to allegations of malicious and clandestine activities of groups and 
individuals affiliated with Fethullah Gülen, a retired preacher living in the United States. 
These allegations have affected TUSKON directly as the economic flagship of Gülenist 
movement, and the resulting tension has significantly affected the association’s profile by 
depriving it of government support. This may be one of the reasons for a sharp downturn in 
participant numbers at the World Trade Bridge summits, from 5250 businessmen in 2009 to 
only 1400 in 2014.68  
A more detailed look at the Erdoğan-Gülen split, which directly affected TUSKON’s 
profile, is worth presenting here. When the JDP came to power in 2002, a close alliance 
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between the JDP and the Gülen movement and its affiliates in the police and judiciary was 
forged. In line with this alliance, the JDP helped people affiliated with the organisation to 
further infiltrate state institutions and consolidate their power against the old elite and the 
aggressive secular wing of the military. This alliance between the two benefitted the 
Gülenists in having a much more supportive government behind them than any other 
previous ones. It also benefitted the JDP on several occasions, such as in 2008 when the JDP 
survived the Constitutional Court’s closure bid thanks to Gülenist judges who voted against 
the case. The increasing power of the movement in judicial circles also resulted in the 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials. These trials were based on accusations of alleged coup 
plans by high-ranking military officials, and as recent re-trials proved, relied on mostly 
forged and fabricated evidence,69 which nonetheless inflicted a significant damage to the 
military’s image. The Gülen movement’s support also contributed to the JDP’s victory in the 
constitutional referendum in 2010, which in turn further improved the Gülenists’ position in 
judicial institutions thanks to substantial changes in the judicial system with the constitutional 
amendments. In terms of political influence, the movement was thought to have around 60 
MPs before 2013 and even around 15 after the group’s tension with the JDP reached a critical 
point in December 2013. Among those, some leading figures—including Hüseyin Çelik, İdris 
Naim Şahin, Erkan Mumcu, Bülent Arınç, Sadullah Ergin, and Suat Kılıç, who served as 
MPs and Ministers—are widely believed to have strong ties with the group and opened up 
both political and economic space for it.70   
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This alliance benefitted both sides for some years, but gradually lost its momentum and 
moved towards collapse and more recently an open hostility step by step. The first incident 
that signalled a crisis between the two partners came with the new party list prepared by 
Erdoğan for the election in 2011. In this list of between 60 and 70 Gülenist MPs, only a few 
managed to save their seats. The second point of tension centred on the Turkish National 
Intelligence Organisation (MİT). In early 2012, intel chief Hakan Fidan—known to be 
someone with whom Erdoğan had a close relationship—was called by a Gülenist prosecutor 
to testify because of the negotiations conducted between the government and the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK). Fidan has been subject to a significant amount of criticism from the 
Gülenists, who wanted a stronger presence in the MİT, a goal to which Fidan was seen as an 
obstacle. Meanwhile, the government’s decision in late 2013 to close down weekend courses 
and preparatory schools (of which almost a quarter belonged to the Gülen movement) was the 
first attempt against the movement by the government. These schools have long been 
regarded as providing the movement not only with required financial power, but also with 
educated and qualified human capital. Unsurprisingly, pro-Gülen media harshly criticised the 
decision, and began to confront the government more vocally than ever. Hakan Şükür, a 
retired football star and a famous pro-Gülen figure who also served as a JDP MP, resigned 
following the government’s decision about these educational institutions. Just after his 
resignation, dozens of individuals were arrested in an early morning raid, with accusations of 
being part of “illicit back-door trade” with Iran. Individuals arrested included the CEO of 
Halkbank and the sons of three JDP ministers, namely Minister of the Interior Muammer 
Güler, Minister of Environment and Urban Planning Erdoğan Bayraktar, and Minister of 
Economy Zafer Çağlayan. The then Minister and chief negotiator for European Union 
Egemen Bağış was also accused of involvement and close ties with Reza Zarrab, as the 
intermediary of this process. The ministers accused were removed by the JDP in a cabinet 
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reshuffle, while the incident was referred to as a “coup attempt” carried out by Gülenists. In 
the later stages of the coup, it was argued that Gülenist polices and judges would have 
concentrated on Erdoğan and his family with the goal of trying anyone based on accusations 
about back-door trading with Iran and corruption. As Turkey moved closer to its election in 
2014, audiotapes were uploaded to YouTube almost on a daily basis about the leading JDP 
figures’ corruption and nepotism. The last one, however, was probably the most damaging 
and controversial, and was a recording of the then PM Ahmet Davutoğlu, intel chiefs and top 
brass discussing Turkey’s options regarding Syria. The wiretapping was referred to as a 
Gülenist attack against Turkey’s national security.  
Since that time, Erdoğan’s supporters have complained of a “parallel state” running 
within Turkey which allegedly acts according to its own internal hierarchy and uses state 
power for its own clandestine goals. Several journalists from the Gülenist Zaman newspaper 
have been tried, the newspaper itself was seized by the government and several leading 
Gülenist businessmen were either arrested or fled the country. As a result, Gülen-aligned 
businesses have been largely excluded from Turkey’s economic picture. The coup attempt of 
July 15, 2016 marked the high point of the fight between the JDP and Gülenists who, 
according to the evidence and testimonies so far, were believed to be the leading—if not the 
only—group behind the coup attempt. In the attempt, tanks, helicopters and jets attacked the 
Parliament, the headquarters of MİT and the Special Forces, killing more than two hundred 
people and injuring more than two thousand who stood against the attempted coup. Following 
the attempt, all four political parties with MPs in the Parliament unanimously and harshly 
condemned the attack; most of the military labelled the junta as “traitors”; and people 
continued to stay on the streets for weeks in order to prevent any further attempts and show 
their stance against the failed attempt. More than fifty thousand people from bureaucracy, 
military, the police and judicial institutions were either sacked, suspended or arrested and a 
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three month state of emergency was announced in order to combat Gülenist infiltration more 
effectively. At the time of writing, interrogations and arrests continue, and an increasing 
number of testimonies seem to confirm the accusations of Gülenist links in the attempt.71  
Due to this total destruction of the dynamics of the old alliance, TUSKON lost its 
powerful position as a government partner reinforcing its policies abroad and broadening its 
own economic reach in return. It is very difficult to imagine the organisation recovering in 
the foreseeable future.72 However, the association’s previous close contact with the JDP is 
still important in explaining the rise of the association, which coincided with an era that 
marked the high point of Turkey’s economic activity abroad. TUSKON played a strong role 
within the context of broadening the scope of Turkey’s new grand strategic behaviour—
especially as regards Latin America and Africa—as a key pro-JDP business association prior 
to the start of the intensification of the conflict between the two sides in 2013, thus affording 
it an important place in any analysis of Turkey’s ambitious economic profile within the 
context of its activist grand strategy. 
 
2) Increasing the “Autonomy of the Civilian Elected Executive”: Transformation of 
Civil-Military Relationship 
 
High levels of military authority and control over domestic politics can be challenged by a 
reduction in securitisation and progress towards democratisation. Civil authorities can then 
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pursue policies more flexibly in line with a shifting grand strategic vision, without missing 
the chance of capitalising on day-to-day changes due to the military’s fixed and securitised 
policy preferences. They can do so without being concerned about the military’s possible 
reaction because of the challenges they pose to its mostly securitised and fixed policy 
choices. 
Turkey, for a fairly extended period, experienced the status of what Lasswell referred to 
as a “garrison state”—a semi-dictatorial society in which “the specialists on violence are the 
most powerful group”.73 From the early nineteenth century, the military’s control over policy-
making and over the civilian authorities gradually increased.74 A strong sense of paranoia 
concerning Turkey’s neighbouring regions and Western powers held sway due to the national 
memories of the declining decades of the Ottoman Empire. This became known as “Sèvres 
syndrome”—a term that refers to a desire to stay away from international developments as 
much as possible due to an overarching sense of distrust towards the other actors in the 
system. This feeling mainly stemmed from the memories of WWI, after which came 
“division, subjugation, and humiliation” and the feeling of being surrounded by enemies in 
every direction.75 The military stood as a privileged group that held sway over policy-
making, but due to its weaknesses at that point and recent memories of war it lacked both the 
opportunity and the means to push the state towards the aggressive attitudes of Japan or 
Germany. Instead, the military focused on consolidating its power domestically. During the 
Cold War, in the face of a perceived direct threat from the USSR and the need to stay within 
the contours delineated by the bi-polar structural settings, the greater picture underwent very 
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little change in terms of military influence. The military’s way of thinking showed parallels 
with von der Goltz’s views on the commanders’ right to exercise political influence and their 
superiority over civilian policy-makers. Military commanders, von der Goltz believed, ought 
to be more than just loyal servants of the state; they need to have a “superior position in the 
state” and should enjoy the status of noblesse oblige.76 The idea of what Feaver called “the 
civilians’ right to be wrong” became open to doubt. In an ideal civil-military relationship, 
according to him “…officers are professionals, like highly trained surgeons” and a statesman 
can “freely decide whether or not to have an operation … he may choose one doctor over 
another, and he may even make a decision among different surgical options…”77 However, 
those were very early days in Turkey’s ability to restrain the military. The idea that apart 
from providing necessary raw material to the civilian authorities, the military has no right to 
intervene in political decision-making processes—or try to “punish” civilian authorities even 
if their policy choices do not coincide with the military’s preferences—was comparatively 
new.78   
Zakaria argues that state power is a function of “the autonomy of the executive”, among 
other factors, referring to the control of the elected executive over the extraction and 
mobilisation of national resources with no powerful rival claims on that executive. In 
Zakaria’s case, this alludes to the system of checks and balances that exists among the 
Presidency, the Senate and Congress in the United States. Here, the Presidency fights to 
achieve a better position vis-à-vis powerful rivals, which occasionally prevent the President 
from “exercising his will”79 in order to be able to make the most of emerging windows of 
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opportunity by operationalising policy choices.80 In Turkey’s case, considering its experience 
of the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire and the history of the Republic of Turkey, the 
determinant of this autonomy has been the relationship between the military and the 
executive and/or the elected civilian policy-makers. Since the military has historically played 
a significant role in Turkish politics by defining “national interest” and regulating domestic 
politics, a gradual decrease in its influence became one of the main factors providing the 
elected civilian executive with more autonomy and control over domestic and foreign policy-
making. In the next section, I will provide a closer look at the military’s influence in Turkish 
politics and explore the gradual loss of this influence over recent decades. 
 
Historical Background to the Military’s Influence over Policy-Making in the Turkish Case
  
 
“There is no honour of the army, honour of the judiciary, or the Council of State 
any more than there is an honour of farmers or cigar sellers. The army is 
composed of civilians, clothed in a certain fashion and subordinated to a special 
regime for a certain purpose. Men are neither better nor worse if they wear red 
pants or grey, a képi or a bowler hat.”  
Georges Clemenceau, The Tiger81 
 
The military has a strong tradition of intervention in Turkish politics, a tradition that dates 
back to the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire. As Huntington suggests, “the main causes 
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of military intervention in politics are not military but political… they reflect the political and 
institutional characteristics of the country concerned, and not just those of the military 
establishment.”82  
In the late Ottoman era, with the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), 
military influence over politics reached the point where the armed forces were able to directly 
affect the policies and challenge the Sultan’s position of pre-eminence. Following the CUP’s 
coup d’état in 1913, a “dictatorial triumvirate” began, an era in which Enver Pasha, Talat 
Pasha and Cemal Pasha ruled the country de facto with a highly aggressive attitude vis-à-vis 
any opposing force and civilian ruling figures. Military influence over civilian policy-making 
reached its peak when Enver Pasha signed a secret treaty with Germany without even 
informing the Sultan. With the treaty, the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany in WWI. By 
doing this, Pasha changed the Ottoman Empire’s balancing strategy among European great 
powers and significantly contributed to the collapse of the Empire. Putting aside any 
historical implications, Pasha’s secret treaty was also one of the most striking examples of 
how much power a rival domestic interest group or actor can wield, when given unchallenged 
authority over actual policy-makers. The Empire was forced into a war on numerous fronts 
and in numerous theatres which would ultimately provide its undoing—without the highest 
political authority knowing about the alliance in the first place. In order to trace the 
extraordinary power of Turkey’s military in domestic politics, it should be kept in mind that 
almost without a single exception, the first elite groups of the republican era had either direct 
involvement in or indirect links to the CUP and its ideological narrative.83 
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From the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey until 1950, the military’s authority 
over politics grew. Since the new leading elite was almost completely composed of members 
of the old military establishment, the result was a clearly defined hierarchy that reflected an 
undisputable harmony of interest between the military and the political leadership. The iron 
fist of the new elite had successfully eliminated rival groups (mainly composed of former 
military officials with opposing views) in order to seize power. The People’s Party (later the 
“Republican People’s Party”) held a monopoly over the political system in the early 
Republican era, with no other political parties able to survive the PP’s harsh policies and bans 
on running for elections. The military, therefore, had a face and a voice that represented itself 
in a civil establishment made up of members of the military establishment from only a few 
decades before.84 An example of how the military was viewed in this new atmosphere can be 
seen in Mustafa Kemal’s speech in Konya in 1931: 
 
Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up, it has always looked to 
the army…as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals…When 
speaking of the army, I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation 
who are the true owners of this country…The Turkish nation … considers its 
army the guardian of its ideals.85 
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However, the Democrat Party’s time in office under Menderes, which lasted from 1950 until 
the coup of 1960, ended what Hale referred to as the symbiotic relationship between the 
ruling elite and the military. The equation: “the RPP + Army = Power” no longer applied.86 
Unsurprisingly, the military in general and middle-ranking military officials in particular 
were irritated by the new power calculus and the shift in power from the RPP to the 
conservative Democrat Party. They regarded it as a challenge not only to their position but 
also to the very characteristics of the state. These middle-ranking officers, working in 
conjunction with a conspiratorial organization composed of younger officers, toppled the 
Democrat Party government on May 27 1960, after obtaining support from high-ranking 
officers and generals. Following the coup, former Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, 
Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were executed 
“despite pleas from the Pope, President Eisenhower and the Queen of England”.87  
A controversial coup in 1971 managed to change the government with a memorandum 
issued by high-ranking officials.88 From 1973, Turkey was led by fragile coalition 
governments which possessed little or no coherent structure.89 These weak coalitions were 
later regarded as the reason behind further increase in street violence between leftist and 
rightist groups, which raised concerns across Turkish society as a whole. The general 
discontent arising from economic problems and the increasing gap between social groups 
prepared the ground for the military to act in the name of its stated mission “to guard the state 
and the regime”. In this atmosphere, another major intervention from the military came in the 
form of the coup of September 12 1980. When strict controls and curfews were imposed after 
the coup with the aim of preventing street violence, the question remained as to why the 
military—with its clear ability to stop the state of quasi-civil war between rightist and leftist 
                                                          
86 Hale, 2011, p.197. 
87 Stone, 2010, p. 160. On the coup, also see Hale, 1994, p. 88-113. 
88 Altunışık & Tür, 2005, p. 37-38. 
89 For the era between 1970 and 73, see Hale, 1994, p. 153-211. 
 73 
 
youth groups which characterised most of the 1970s—had refrained from doing so without 
taking over political control earlier. Demirel argued that “according to Mr. [Kenan] Evren, 
the more blood was spilled, the more justification there would be for the intervention plan. 
This was the arrangement which was entered into, the game played against the state…”90 In 
the final analysis, however desirable the relative tranquillity was for most of the public 
afterwards, the coup of 1980 became yet another event in which the Turkish military proved 
its interventionist character based on its self-assumed responsibilities.91 
Desch, in Civilian Control of the Military, investigates more than twenty cases of civil-
military relationships from different parts of the world, and concludes that civilian control 
weakens in the face of internal threat. However, if the civilian authority is powerful and 
stable, it will consolidate its control over the military when threatened by external forces.92 
Considering the internal uprisings the Ottoman Empire faced in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the military’s growing influence should come as no surprise. Even 
though external hostilities were no less threatening in the same era, unstable civilian control 
and the fading authority of the ruling elite in the last years of the Ottoman Empire matched 
Desch’s expected theories of civilian control over the military in the face of external threat. In 
a similar way, the Republic of Turkey (putting aside the interwar years) was first challenged 
by a serious external threat during the Cold War in the form of possible aggression from the 
USSR. At the time, Turkey did not possess a strong and stable state mechanism, and 
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numerous governments formed and dissolved within a quite short period. Coups and a weak 
economic structure and state mechanism unsurprisingly reinforced the military’s superior 
position over the civilian authorities. From the late 1980s and early 1990s, the internal threat 
in the form of PKK terrorism helped the military to consolidate and even strengthen its 
position.  
Of the eight Turkish presidents up to Özal, six were high-ranking military officers, a 
tradition which changed with Özal and the next four civilian presidents. The only civilian 
president before Özal was Celal Bayar who was deposed in 1960 following the coup.93 Özal 
strove to re-civilianise Turkish domestic politics. The relaxation at international levels 
brought about by the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
significantly helped the re-configuration of the civil-military relationship in favour of the 
civil authorities, and this revision was reinforced by the rising rhetorical power of democracy, 
the softening of Western security cultures and the rise of political liberal narrative in 
domestic politics.94 However, in the late 1990s the military was still one of the key decision-
makers along with the president, the prime minister and the foreign minister, as evidenced by 
the “silent coup” of February 28, 1997. The military’s success in consolidating its privileged 
position came primarily because of the rise in number of PKK terrorist attacks during these 
years.95 Philip Robins notes that this era witnessed a process of “de-democratization” in 
Turkey, and the country “in many respects, whether in terms of an authoritarian ideology, a 
deified political leader, the enduring role of the military and the primacy of the state, 
appeared more to resemble the former East European states than their post-Communist 
successors”.96   
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In the last years of the millennium, the picture gradually began to shift. Turkey’s 
relationship with Greece, Armenia, Syria and Iran began to improve, and the PKK leader, 
Öcalan, was captured. These factors, coupled with the post-Cold War environment, moved 
control more firmly into civil hands, and the shift reached its zenith under the JDP 
governments after 2002, thanks also in part to the reforms demanded by the EU regarding 
civil-military relations. 
Gradual Increase in the Autonomy of the Elected Executive and the JDP Era as its Zenith 
 
The JDP realised that it had seized a precious opportunity to re-configure the civil-military 
relationship—partly thanks to Özal’s previous efforts, which laid an important ground 
already as well as rising public discontent with military control over elected civilian political 
actors. The JDP’s survival instinct against military dominance was one of the major factors 
that shaped this process.97 The JDP’s commitment to the reforms demanded by the EU—
including those related to civil-military relationship—also played an important role. A 
detailed list of these reforms is provided in the chapter on the Turkish-EU relationship, but to 
give an example here the EU insisted that Turkey should amend certain legal documents, 
such as Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Internal Service Law, Article 85 of the 
Internal Service Regulations, and Article 2a of the Law on the National Security Council. 
These laws had been used since 1961 by the military to consolidate its control over the 
elected civilian policy-makers. The military had long provided frequent “recommendations”98 
via so-called “red books”99 which had periodically defined external and internal threats to 
Turkey. According to Article 118 of the 1982 constitution, the NSC’s “suggestions” were to 
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be given “priority consideration” by the government.100 Since these articles had effectively 
justified any military intervention by referring to the military’s “duty” to defend not only the 
country but also the regime “from internal and external threats”, amending them was a major 
step which deprived the military of its legal justification to intervene in civilian policy-
making.101  
Still, in 2007, Turkey’s presidential elections caused tension between the JDP and the 
military over who would be the JDP’s candidate for the presidential election. The official 
website of the Turkish Armed Forces published an “E-ultimatum” stating the military’s 
concerns about the election process and noting that the Turkish Armed Forces was a party to 
all debates as a defender of laicism. This emphasis on laicism was interpreted as a warning to 
any potential JDP candidate whose spouse wore a headscarf. The military promised “to act 
with precision and determination if and when necessary”—a promise that could easily be 
interpreted as a threat. However, this was to no avail, since the election of the JDP’s 
candidate Abdullah Gül went ahead, resulting in a further loss of prestige for the military in 
the eyes of the public.  
From then onwards, the balance tilted quite visibly. In 2008, a court case supported by 
the old elite including the hawkish wing of the military aimed at banning the JDP was 
rejected by the Constitutional Court. Following that, legal inspections were conducted on 
alleged military coup plans. Within this context, in addition to the famous Ergenekon case, 
two other alleged plans were revealed later: “The Glove” in 2008 and “The Sledgehammer” 
in 2010, both of which triggered new waves of legal action against those allegedly involved 
in the plans.102 Although some of the evidence taken into consideration during these trials 
                                                          
100 Hale, 1994, p. 258. 
101 Kirsty Hughes, “Turkish Democracy under Siege”, Economic and Political Weekly, 43: 22 (2008), pp. 16–19 
and Taşpınar, 2007, p.115. 
102Aydinli, 2011, p. 228–235. On this era of also see Gerassimos Karabelias, 2008; Heper, 2005; Aydinli, 2009; 
Cizre, 2011, pp.57–75. 
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was later proved to be fabricated, the process helped ease the problems the government was 
experiencing in trying to end the military’s judicial autonomy—which it finally managed to 
do in 2009—as well as seriously challenging its overall privileged position and influence in 
domestic politics. Moreover, the government raised its level of influence by the decision to 
involve itself with the promotion of high-ranking military officers from 2010 onwards.103 
Overall, the civil-military relationship changed to a great extent during this era. Regarding 
the changing atmosphere in the civil-military relationship, Paul Kubicek concluded that “I 
believe that in the early 2000s... the power of the military has been radically reduced”.104 
Turkey, from the Özal era onwards, and especially during the JDP rule, experienced a 
dramatic departure from its former character as a “garrison state”. Civil authorities gradually 
achieved their right “to be wrong” in a new power calculus. Over the last decade, the military 
has gradually moved to the position of “valued and respected servants of the state and its 
citizenry”, which is “accountable before the law” and “obedient and supportive of democratic 
polity” within the borders drawn by the constitution. Meanwhile the JDP seems to have taken 
a huge step forward by achieving what Barany refers to as “the aim of democratizers”, which 
is to “roll back” the privileged status of the military.105 The gradually increasing civilian 
control over the military was coupled with the military’s fading influence over civilian 
policy-making processes. The coup attempt of July 15, 2016—when most of the military 
vocally opposed the attempt and stood with the democratically elected government—points 
to an overall change in the civil-military relationship in Turkey. Some post-attempt steps 
have the potential to act as further improvements in terms of civilian control of the military. 
These steps so far include military high schools being shut down, war academies are to be 
merged under a new National Defence University, land, air and naval forces will be brought 
                                                          
103 Cizre, 2011, pp. 66–67. 
104 Paul Kubicek, personal communication, 20/2/2016. 
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under the Ministry of Defence, Coast Guard and Gendarmerie General Command will be 
brought under the control of the Interior Ministry and military hospitals will be brought under 
the Ministry of Health. All in all, after decades of effort, the result is a more autonomous 
executive, mirroring the example of the United States discussed by Zakaria in From Wealth 
to Power. Combined with close links between statesmen and businessmen, these political 
moves have significantly contributed to an increase in the power of the ruling elite to pursue 
their policy choices more confidently and effectively.  
This chapter engaged with rival theoretical frameworks and the main concepts. In doing this, 
their relevance to the Turkish situation was also presented, along with a detailed look at 
actors, incidents and changing patterns. Key international and domestic dynamics and how to 
incorporate them for a comprehensive analysis will be useful in making sense of grand 
strategic shifts. In the light of the research’s emphasis on both international and domestic 
levels, the following three chapters, by investigating the shifts and continuities at both levels, 
will analyse the changing patterns of the Turkish-Iranian, Turkish-Israeli and the Turkish-EU 
relationships respectively. By aligning themselves with the causal mechanism provided in 
this chapter, these chapters will look at critical junctures and changing dynamics at both 
international and domestic levels. They will then engage with a theoretical debate on whether 
culturalist arguments have the potential to make sense of the Turkish case or whether the 
proposed neoclassical realist causal mechanism is better prepared to take up this challenge. 
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Chapter 3: The Turkish-Iranian Relationship: A Period of Overall 
Rapprochement with Realpolitik Limits 
 
The previous chapter elaborated on the dissertation’s theoretical research question as well as 
looking at other major factors, actors, and shifts relevant to this research. This was followed 
by an empirical discussion on the impact of international and domestic factors, particularly on 
Turkey. While changing international dynamics provided Turkey with temporary windows of 
opportunity and/or caused occasional losses, domestic factors impacted on the 
implementation of its revised policy choices in response to these.  
In this chapter I will investigate the relationship between Turkey and Iran. After 
presenting the historical background, I will identify certain regional and international changes 
as critical junctures in the relationship, and consider their impact. I will also analyse changes 
Turkey experienced at domestic levels that influenced its changing attitude towards Iran.  
In general terms, Turkey’s relationship with Iran moved from an era of tension in the 
1990s, through a time of recent rapprochement, before transforming into a controlled era of 
low-intensity controlled tension in the post-Arab Spring era. By analysing the reasons behind 
these changes, I will address the question of whether the primary motivation behind Turkey’s 
shifting attitude to Iran has been values, ideology and culture, or self-interest and the desire 
for power.  
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Turkey’s Return to the “Arc of Crisis” 
 
Aaron Stein states that since its foundation, Turkey’s “preference” has been “non-
intervention and neutrality in the areas which, until the First World War, had formed part of 
the Istanbul-centred Ottoman Empire.” However, this “benign neglect” was rejected by the 
JDP in favour of a “proactive foreign policy aimed at creating ‘strategic depth’ by expanding 
Turkey’s zone of influence in the Middle East…”.1 Turkey’s previous grand strategic policy 
of keeping its distance from the “arc of crisis”2 (a term coined by Brzezinski with reference to 
the Middle East) came gradually to an end, and Turkey’s changing relationship with Iran was 
an important component of this transformation. Hale considers Turkey’s position on the 
Middle East during the Cold War era as “stay[ing] on the edge of regional subsystem”,3 a 
position that stemmed mainly from Turkey’s external restraints under the bipolar Cold War 
settings. Turkey’s return to the “arc of crisis” began with the end of the Cold War and 
consolidated itself due to changing international and domestic dynamics over the following 
years. Turkey’s return to the region was oriented principally by power and interest issues; 
Rabasa and Larrabee argue that: 
 
Turkey’s greater focus on the Middle East does not mean that it is turning its back 
on the West. Turkey remains strongly anchored in Western institutions, especially 
NATO. Nor does it reflect an “Islamization” of Turkish foreign policy, as some 
observers fear (although there are certainly elements within the AKP 
[abbreviation of the JDP in Turkish, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi] whose foreign-
policy views are religiously motivated). Rather, it is primarily a response to 
                                                          
1 Stein, 2014, p. 2–3 
2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘”Iran: The Crescent of Crisis”, Time, 15/01/1979, 
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structural changes in Turkey’s security environment since the end of the Cold 
War.”4 
 
Responding to the post-Cold War atmosphere and the elimination of the threat of Soviet 
aggression, Turkey moved its troops from its northern and north-eastern borders and 
repositioned them in the southern and south-eastern regions of the country, increasing its 
level of military deterrence against its Middle Eastern neighbours. Turkey then took part in 
the Gulf War as a symbolic display of its return to the region. It also established closer links 
with Israel in the late 1990s in its search for regional cooperation against the PKK, and 
conducted cross-border operations in Iraq when necessary.5 By increasing its involvement 
during the JDP rule—from the post-Iraq War reconstruction efforts via mediation to 
engagement during the Arab Spring and its aftermath—Turkey seemed to be on the ascendant 
in the region.  
During the last decade, a significant dimension of Turkey’s widening engagement with 
the Middle East has been its relationship with Iran. Turkey’s activist grand strategy was 
aimed towards power-maximisation through increasing levels of involvement in its environs 
as soon as its relative power position allowed it to play a more active role. This overarching 
attitude was reflected in its relationship with Iran, too. For a while, the two countries enjoyed 
a much closer relationship, both politically and economically. However, the next wave of 
clashing interests, stemming from the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) crisis and 
their competition over the MENA region in the Arab Spring era and beyond, showed 
realpolitik limits of this relationship in more recent times.  
                                                          
4 Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008, p. 87 
5 Graham E. Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds”, Foreign Affairs, 72:2 (Spring, 1993), pp.108–121, p. 115.Lenore 
Martin, “Turkey’s National Security in the Middle East”, Turkish Studies 1:1 (2000), pp. 83–106, p. 84–85. 
 82 
 
To make better sense of Turkey’s shifts and their timing, an insight into the historical 
background and the dynamics of the Turkish-Iranian relationship from the interwar period to 
the Cold War will be presented in the next section. 
Historical Background: A Self-Perpetuating Cycle of Rivalry and Cooperation 
 
Iran and Turkey enjoyed close contact during the interwar period, mostly because of the 
shared political and social programmes of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Pahlavi, both of whom 
were trying to promote the modernisation, industrialisation and Westernisation of their 
countries and peoples. This was aimed not only at challenging traditional state structure, but 
also at changing their peoples’ way of thinking.6 In Mozaffarpour’s words, the two countries 
are, along with Egypt, Middle Eastern nation-states that touched modernity through 
constitutionalism and Westernisation. Turkey and Iran also played the role of a bridge for 
each other, exchanging new norms and values.7 Despite the fact that their newly established 
regimes differed in nature—one being a democratic republic (although it had only one 
political party and banned any effort at democratic challenge) and the other a monarchy—
they both shared an absolutist attitude, a monopoly over policy-making and a strict 
commitment for the top-down reformation of their societies.  
In the interwar period, both countries focused on internal reform and restructuring 
efforts, from importing legal codes from various Western countries to limiting the role played 
by religion in social life.8 Neither country had a particularly high international profile, so the 
range of steps they could take to cooperate in a bilateral or regional sense was quite limited 
during this era. The only exception was the modest and short-lived Saadabad Pact of 1937 
                                                          
6 Bayram Sinkaya, personal communication, 9/3/2016. 
7 Nematollah Hamid Mozaffarpour, Head of the Turkish Policy Section at the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, 
personal communication, 4/5/2016. 
8 Richard H. Pfaff, “Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran”, The Western Political Quarterly 
16:1 (March, 1963), pp. 79–98, at p. 87–88.  
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between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan,9 which was primarily aimed at preventing 
mutual antagonism and resolving border disputes. In this era, due to their low profile and 
inward–looking political approach, “neither Shah Reza Pahlavi’s much-celebrated visit to 
Turkey in 1934 nor the Saadabad Pact turned into a full-fledged partnership”.10 For closer 
cooperation based on a shared feeling of insecurity, they had to wait until the end of WWII 
and the beginning of the Cold War.  
After the Second World War, Turkey and Iran grew closer to help forge regional 
initiatives in their struggle to defy the growing communist threat. The Cold War increased 
their level of cooperation. Both states’ Western orientation made them allies until the 
revolution in Iran in 1979. Both countries aligned themselves with the Western bloc and took 
advantage of this alliance to facilitate much closer ties with each other due to their shared 
threat perception of a Soviet aggression.11 One of the most symbolic examples of this 
regional cooperation was their alliance (which also included Iraq) under the Baghdad Pact of 
1955. The pact was renamed CENTO in 1959 after Iraq’s Free Officers’ coup of 1958, which 
led to the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact. The pact was supported by the Western 
powers to prevent Soviets from destabilising regional powers in order to provide its allies 
with the upper hand and, if possible, export its regime and expand its sphere of influence.12 
The Turkish-Iranian cooperation became more solid than ever under the US “Northern Tier” 
policy. The policy line was coined by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,13 devised to 
contain the perceived communist threat against a tier of allies including Greece, Turkey, Iraq 
and Iran. In this era, while Iran “was equipped with enough military hardware by NATO 
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countries to act as the policeman of the Persian Gulf”; Turkey “was the bulwark against 
Soviet intrusion into eastern Europe”.14  
Even during this era, the military imbalance in favour of Turkey as a NATO member 
and the Shah’s ambition to make Iran the leading power in the region signalled the potential 
for rivalry between the two countries. In terms of regional supremacy, their relationship was 
shaped by an implicit rivalry which had to remain muted and controlled by larger-scale 
structural dynamics.15 Iran gradually replaced Turkey as the United States’ main ally in the 
region due to growing tension between the US and Turkey over the Cyprus question, which 
led to the suspension of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between the US and 
Turkey in 1975, leading in turn to the closing of US bases in Turkey.16 Sinkaya considered 
Iran as a more attractive partner in the region, and the Nixon Doctrine of 1972 was primarily 
focused on this.17 However, Turkey and Iran’s perceived  level of mutual threat was relatively 
limited due to their common stance in the same broader alliance. From 1979 onwards, 
however, the situation changed dramatically. 
 
 
Iranian Exit from the Allied Camp: an Old Friend Becomes a Threat 
 
The main danger to the positive atmosphere in the Turkey-Iran relationship during the Cold 
War was a communist takeover of either side or a voluntary exit from the bloc. The second 
possibility manifested itself after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The shockwaves of the 
revolution impacted  upon Turkey’s perceptions of Iran directly. The emergence of a new 
Iran, with an ambition to increase its own regional influence and a hostile attitude towards 
                                                          
14 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, personal communication, 23/3/2016. 
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Turkey resulted in a dramatic deterioration in the relationship between the two countries. Iran 
was no longer an ally, and the bilateral relationship now had the potential for an intense 
rivalry for regional influence, with no short-term possibility of improvement.  
For more than two decades, starting with the revolution in 1979 and lasting until the 
rapprochement of more recent times, Turkey perceived two major threats from Iran: the 
danger of the Iranian export of its new regime and the possibility that the Kurdish influence 
in the region might increase under the new post-revolutionary structure,18 which could 
support the PKK to destabilise Turkey. Recalling the domino theory concept and the goal of a 
socialist world revolution, the two concepts of Bolshevism, the alleged Iranian efforts to 
export its revolution raised concerns in Turkey.19 Mozaffarpour shared an anecdote about 
meeting the Turkish consul general in Tabriz thirty years after the revolution, when he 
admitted that Turkey’s attitude was an exaggerated one, based on paranoia.20 Nevertheless, 
this suspicion and alarmist attitude was still the norm in the 1990s. Turkey’s assertive secular 
outlook during that period made it the perfect “other” for Iran in its immediate 
neighbourhood. A third concern can be added to this list; this “new Iran”, with new ambitions 
and foreign policy goals, might have challenged Turkey not only by threatening its border 
security, but also by aligning with the USSR and exposing Turkey to a threat from both 
sides—the USSR from the north and Iran from the south east.  
The only partial relaxation in this period of bilateral tension came during the Erbakan-
Çiller coalition government in Turkey. Islamist Erbakan strived to improve bilateral ties and 
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 86 
 
desecuritise the relationship.21 The period began with the symbolic first visit of Erbakan as 
Turkey’s Prime Minister to Iran and the resulting surge of sympathy on the Iranian side 
towards Erbakan’s leadership.22 The era, according to Turan, also coincided with the rise of 
pragmatist politicians in Iran led by Rafsanjani in conjunction with Iran’s realisation of its 
need to economically restore the country after the war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988.23 
This comparatively positive atmosphere came to an abrupt end with a heightening of tension 
between the two countries due to Iran’s alleged direct support to Islamist groups in Turkey, 
and with Erbakan’s downfall after the military’s “post-modern coup” in 1997. The main 
reason behind his downfall was that: 
 
The power base of Erbakan was not strong enough to resist the opposition of the 
anti-Islamist elite and in particular the staunchly secular higher echelons of the 
Turkish military that are endowed with the constitutional mandate to uphold the 
Kemalist system in the country.24  
 
Erbakan was accused of having a secret agenda to turn Turkey into a theocratic state with the 
help of Iran, which brought the end of a brief period of relaxation in the bilateral relationship.  
All in all, Iran’s exit from the Allied camp after the revolution accompanied by an anti-
Western political rhetoric changed the very nature of its bilateral relationship with Turkey, 
transforming it into an intense rivalry, if not hostility. 
 
                                                          
21 The era under the coalition government formed by Necmettin Erbakan’s “Islamist” Welfare Party and Tansu 
Çiller’s “Centre-Right” True Path Party lasted one year from June 1996 to June 1997. 
22 Olson, 2004, p. 22. 
23 Turan, personal communication, 8/2/2016. 
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Making Sense of the Change in Turkey–Iran Relations 
Major International and Regional Developments and the Bilateral Relations 
 
International and regional developments such as the end of the Cold War, the Iraq War in 
2003 and its aftermath, the Iranian nuclear programme and the more recent Arab Spring have 
all affected the Turkey–Iran relationship by altering Turkey’s interest-driven calculations and 
relative power position in the region. 
The overall rapprochement between the two countries is in stark contrast with the 
deteriorated atmosphere in the 1990s. This new atmosphere stemmed from two main factors: 
firstly, the power and interest-based revisions in Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis Iran in the face of 
changing regional and global circumstances, and secondly the “desecuritisation” of Turkey’s 
relationship with Iran, thanks to the demise of the military’s influence over policy-making 
which traditionally acted as a key anti-Iran actor. This process of desecuritisation has been 
underscored by increasing economic involvement, thanks to close ties between statesmen 
who have encouraged business to flourish with neighbouring regions. 
The way to this era of overall rapprochement with realpolitik limits, however, was not a 
linear and easy one. To begin with, the end of the Cold War brought competition over the 
former Soviet space. Turkey and Iran, striving for regional leadership in their own different 
ways, saw each other as rivals that needed to be kept in check. Each tried to establish as many 
channels of communication as possible with the former Soviet countries in order to enter this 
new theatre with a more advantageous position and a higher profile than the other.  
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a- End of the Cold War and Competition 
Competition  over the Ex-Soviet Area 
The end of the Cold War signalled the beginning of a new “great game” centring on the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. The region is rich in energy resources, geostrategically important 
and economically promising with its thriving new markets. Iran and Turkey each considered 
that they possessed the vital important historical and cultural assets required to enter this 
theatre, coupled with their geographical proximity. They inevitably found themselves in a 
competition for the role of superior newcomer. Turkey had the upper hand in terms of 
linguistic and kinship ties, although ethnic and linguistic ties with the region also enabled 
Iran to perceive a window of opportunity for itself, as exemplified by its linguistic ties with 
Tajikistan. However, Iran lacked any serious outside support for its new quest in the region.25 
Turkey therefore perceived itself as possessing a relative advantage, not only against Iran but 
also against the supposedly fallen great power, Russia, in a region that was living in a power 
vacuum. The question at the end of the Cold War was which state could obtain the most 
benefit from the new environment and achieve a relative advantage over the other. This 
power could also raise its global profile by carrying Caspian hydrocarbon resources to the 
international market and reach out to the newly emerging states. 
The post-Cold War situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia gradually forced both 
countries to become aware of their limitations in influencing this new “great game”. 
Nevertheless, until they realised that they were not in a position to be the leading game 
changers, nor were they going to pose serious challenges to major players, their competition 
over this region and its newly independent and predominantly Muslim countries was intense 
in the immediate post-Cold War period. Turkey’s enthusiasm for the newly independent 
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Turkic republics found strong support from the US and the EU, both of which Turkey as a 
suitable player to help socialise these republics and help integrate them into the greater global 
community and the international system. The country also stood out as a key energy transit 
route. This support allowed Turkey to operationalise important energy projects,  such as the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in the immediate post-Cold War era, carrying Azeri oil via 
Georgia to the city of Adana to be transferred to Europe.26 This became known as the “deal of 
the century”, a project from which Iran was excluded, primarily due to American objections. 
Meanwhile, Turkey had ambitions for a unified Turkic world with Turkey at its head which 
could challenge Russia’s position in the region. However, Central Asian republics often 
viewed Turkey’s efforts as patronising, and as something that did not offer the bright future 
they sought after decades of Soviet repression. Nevertheless, Turkey’s bid for the region—
thanks to Western support and encouragement—appeared more promising than Iranian 
ambitions. The Turkic Summits and Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) proved to be 
the most influential avenues for improving Turkey’s standing in the region during the 
1990s.27 
Iran sought to act as a bridge between the two energy producing regions of the Caspian 
region and the Gulf, carrying their energy resources to energy hungry regions and growing 
economies, and to pursue its own goal of becoming a model for the region. However, Iran’s 
bid for power and influence lacked the substantial outside support that Turkey was receiving 
from the West. To compete with Turkey’s efforts, initiatives to establish a Caspian Sea 
Cooperation Organisation and an Association of Persian-Language Speakers were put 
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forward by Iran. However, even the most successful Iranian initiative in the region, the 
Economic Cooperation Organisation (which was co-initiated by Iran) did not seem so 
“Persian” when Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan joined in 
1992. The organisation was considered a successor to the old Regional Cooperation of 
Development, which was founded by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and functioned between 1964 
and 1979. Iran’s relative failure also stemmed from the strictly secular elite in the region who 
were at best suspicious of Iran’s entrance to the theatre. Other reasons include Iran’s 
comparatively hesitant steps in the region in order not to alienate Russia due to the two 
countries’ close nuclear relationship and its lack of required financial resources. The pre-
nuclear deal US efforts to isolate Iran worked to ensure that it had little political influence 
and prevented it from cutting energy deals with other countries in the region. 
As a facet of the Turkish-Iranian rivalry, the question over the status of the Caspian 
clearly showcased Turkey’s interest-driven attitude. Turkey’s position has been a thorn in 
Iran’s side within the context of the disputes along its shores. With respect to disagreements 
over the Caspian question, it should be noted that Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan probably 
stemmed from more than just from a feeling of kinship, but had to do with the fact that the 
state-run oil company TPAO had a 6.75% share in the consortium developing the Azeri, 
Chirag and Guneshli oil fields and a 9% share in Shah Deniz natural gas field.28 Despite the 
shared cultural ties and common regional perspectives that were working to bring Azerbaijan 
and Turkey closer, isolating the dispute over the status of the Caspian Sea (which directly 
affects the amount of energy reserves under the control of respective littoral states) from 
Turkey’s interests would have been a rather naïve move. Against Turkey’s military, political 
and economic cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia, Iran’s close contact with Armenia 
and Russia over the question of Nagorno-Karabakh could also be regarded as a facet of the 
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two countries’ competition in the region. Iran’s siding with Armenia and Russia—rather than 
with Azerbaijan’s predominantly Muslim Shi’a population—shows the limits of culture and 
ideology when interests are at stake.29 
Instead of cooperating to help the newly independent mostly Muslim-populated former 
Soviet countries, or support particular states based on sectarian affinities, Turkey and Iran 
chose to enter this new theatre with a competitive attitude over energy transportation and 
economic projects, vying for whatever external support they could muster in order to become 
the superior newcomer. Their clash was not based on Shi’a–Sunni competition, as power and 
economic superiority trumps over ideological dimension. Instead they supported parties 
regardless of their sectarian or religious affinities, with Iran supporting non-Muslim players 
such as Armenia, and Turkey supporting Georgia as a non-Muslim entity. As such, Turkey’s 
grand strategy, in areas where it diverged from that of Iran, shows that pragmatic realpolitik 
concerns triumph over values and religious or historical sympathies. This allows us to trace 
interest-driven policy-making in this bilateral relationship back to the 1990s.  
 
Energy Transportation and Interdependence 
Another consequence of the end of the Cold War was the emergence of a Turkish desire to 
play a key role in energy politics, setting itself up as an energy hub linking the Caspian 
basin’s energy resources with the European market. In the post-Cold War power vacuum, 
Turkey assumed that it could carry the energy resources of the Turkic republics to the West, 
raise its global profile and enjoy high energy revenues and increasing influence in both the 
former Soviet territories and Europe. Turkey envisaged its role as helping Europe to achieve 
diversification of energy supply whilst integrating the newly-independent Turkic republics 
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with the global community. In turn, Turkey would  raise its flow of income considerably as 
well as improving its international bargaining position.  
Turkey’s own energy demand has also risen sharply, and this has become an important 
motivating factor within this context. Turkey suffers from lack of substantial indigenous 
energy resources when compared to its neighbouring regions, which in terms of oil and 
natural gas account for almost 70 percent of world’s energy reserves.30 Moreover, it lacks 
necessary storage31 and LNG facilities32 and has not yet started to use nuclear energy. 
Coupled with a limited use of renewables,33 Turkey remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels 
and pipeline projects. It is almost totally dependent on imports for natural gas, as almost half 
of its electricity production depends on natural gas.34 Due to its close proximity to fossil fuel 
reserves and its comparative security and stability, Turkey is eagerly striving to act as a key 
energy player, an influential “energy transit state”35 or an energy hub. According to Gareth 
Winrow, nuclear plant constructions are delayed and renewables are obscured by bureaucratic 
difficulties in a country “endowed by little crude oil or natural gas”. Winrow comments that 
“Turkey will likely remain greatly dependent on gas imports for power production in the 
                                                          
30 Katinka Barysch, “Turkey’s Role in European Energy Security”, Centre for European Reform Essays (2007), p. 
1. 
31 See Gareth M. Winrow, “The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Transit State and Energy 
Hub”, Insight Turkey 15:1(2013), pp. 145–163, p. 154. Currently, Turkey has a strogae capacity of 10 bcm at 
most. Considering its energy demand of around 50 bcma and growing energy demand, a modest recent step 
was taken to construct a storage capacity near the Tuz Lake which will be consructed by China’s Tianchen 
Engineering Company and expected to be operational in 2019. 
32 Turkey has only two LNG processing facilities for now, Aliağa and Ereğli, with a total of 12 bcma capacity. 
Even though its LNG use increased by around 26 percent between 2005 and 2013, it only accounts for 
around 15 per cent of its overall gas consumption. In a personal communication with the author, Jonathan 
Stern, on 18/2/2016, also referred to the need for increasing the number of storage facilities as a key way 
out. However, due to its costs and time-demanding nature, he admitted that even in the mdeium-term, 
achieving this goal might not be possible. 
33 Göktuğ Sönmez, Energy dependency and a Route Map within the Context of the Recent Turkey-Russia Crisis, 
ORSAM Review of Regional Affiars, No. 36, December 2015. 
34 Dr Cenk Pala, energy expert currently working at ENERJİSA with years of experience in the sector at BOTAŞ 
and EoN, personal communication, 10/3/2016. 
35 See Winrow, 2013, p. 152. A successful “energy transit state” can use some of the energy resources it carries 
for its own domestic use, sometimes at discounted rates, whilst maintaining good relations with both 
demand and suply sides of the equation and avoid disruption of the energy flow. 
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foreseeable future.”36 This has resulted in an energy policy that emphasises both the 
satisfaction of Turkey’s own energy demands and the ability to generate income from transit 
revenues by acting as an energy hub within the context of an East-West energy corridor.  
Being an energy hub “offers Turkey extensive influence on a web of oil and gas 
pipelines as well as LNG trade, not only in terms of its ability to influence transit terms and 
conditions, but also to re-export some of [the] hydrocarbons passing through this system”.37 
However, Jonathan Stern rightly argues that Turkey might not get the opportunity to act as an 
“energy hub” in its truest sense due to the lack of liberalisation in its own energy market. 
Both Gareth Winrow and Cenk Pala share this view and consider that the monopolistic nature 
of Turkey’s energy market is a barrier to Turkey’s progress in becoming an energy hub, and a 
key reason for Turkey’s inefficient energy consumption.38 According to Stern, Turkey could 
act as a “crossroads for energy” rather than an energy hub which would offer the country its 
first step towards a competitive gas market which  “BOTAŞ can manipulate by playing one 
supplier off against another,”39 thereby contributing to Turkey’s energy profile. 
Towards the goal of both satisfying its own growing energy demand and act as a 
“crossroads for energy”, Turkey succeeded in forming energy links with Iraq via the Kirkuk-
Yumurtalık oil pipeline, with Iran via the Tabriz-Ankara natural gas pipeline and with Egypt 
via the proposed extension of the Arab Gas Pipeline. Such links offer Turkey a great 
opportunity to act as a key transit route for Middle Eastern energy resources heading to the 
West, along with the Caspian resources. Expanding the recent TANAP capacity and adding 
Iranian gas after the sanctions were lifted is an option Turkish policy-makers might need to 
seriously consider in order to add more resources to the Azerbaijani gas and use the pipeline 
                                                          
36 Gareth Winrow, personal communicaton, 22/2/2016. 
37 See Mert Bilgin, “Turkey’s energy strategy: What difference does it make to become an energy transit 
corridor, hub or center?,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 23 (Madrid: Research Unit on International Security 
and Cooperation [UNISCI], 2010).  
38 Winrow, personal communication, 22/2/2016 and Cenk Pala, personal communcation, 10/3/2016. 
39 Jonathan Stern, personal communication, 18/2/2016. 
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as an important leg of the East-West energy corridor. The possibility of realising the “Turkish 
Stream” pipeline (instead of the cancelled South Stream pipeline) offered Turkey the 
opportunity to act as a key energy player with its expected 63bcma impressive capacity. 
However, in the wake of the Turkish-Russian “jet crisis” the project has been shelved for 
some time before discussions about the project restarted following the Putin-Erdoğan meeting 
in early August, 2016. Overall Turkey’s proximity to the energy-rich regions and the growing 
energy demands in the East and Far East makes it a potential key alternative for the West to 
have access to the Caspian and the Middle Eastern gas. The Western markets’ need for 
diversification enables Turkey to consolidate its potential for the foreseeable future as a key 
transit country.  
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Within this context, the Turkish dependency on Iranian natural gas and the Iranian 
dependency on Turkey as a transit route for energy revenues (either in the form of money or 
gold) has helped nurture an interdependent energy relationship. Almost one-fifth of Turkey’s 
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natural gas imports come from Iran.41 Turkey’s general dependency on imported energy as a 
growing economy—and Iran’s significance in this context—was highlighted by Davutoğlu 
when he described Turkey’s need for Iranian energy as a “natural extension of Turkey’s 
national interests”.42 But in the past, Iran has shut off its supply at a time when Western 
efforts were being made to change Turkey’s position on the Iranian programme.43 This shows 
that along with Turkey’s dependency on Russian gas, its dependency on Iranian gas is also at 
times challenging, and bears serious risks for the future because of the potential for serious 
clashes between the two parties.  
The main institutional link between Turkey and Iran as far as energy transportation is 
concerned is a 25-year agreement signed in 1996 for $23 billion worth of natural gas, which 
started to flow in 2001 along with a pipeline construction scheme.44 Iranian natural gas was 
regarded as an important option to limit Turkey’s over-reliance on Russian natural gas, which 
currently accounts for more than half of Turkey’s gas imports. In 2007, an agreement 
between Turkey and Iran stated that the Turkish Petroleum Company could prospect for oil 
and natural gas in Iran and a Turkey–Turkmenistan gas pipeline would be constructed via 
Iran. This agreement remained in the balance in the pre-nuclear deal tension between Iran and 
the West, although a recent proposal to export natural gas to Europe may help deepen this 
bilateral energy relationship.45 Turkey, even in the face of sanctions, strove to further utilise 
Iranian energy—as exemplified by the bilateral MoU in 2007 to construct a new pipeline to 
                                                          
41 Tuncay Babalı, “The Role of Energy in Turkey’s Relations with Russia and Iran”, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, <http://csis.org/files/attachments/120529_Babali_Turkey_Energy.pdf>, accessed 
15/06/2013. 
42 Ahmet Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 91. 
43 Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 162. 
44 Calabrese, 1998, p.83. Also, see Stephen F. Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs 
86: 4 (2007),pp.104–106, p.108 and Kibaroğlu, Global Security Watch -Turkey: A Reference Handbook, p. 161. 
Here, Kibaroğlu also mentions another agreement that both parties decided to increase bilateral trade to 
$2.5 billion a year. 
45 Larrabee, 2007, p.108. 
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carry around 30bcma and TPAO’s entrance to the Iranian energy production market in the 
South Pars field. Renowned energy expert Gareth Winrow states that: 
 
Given the problems between Turkey and Iran, the lifting of sanctions is unlikely 
to have little immediate impact. Iran will still need to satisfy its own rising energy 
needs. It is likely that Iranian gas will be exported to nearby markets in the Gulf. 
Iranian LNG may eventually find its place on the world market if half-built 
facilities are completed.  
 
For Winrow, the Turkish-Iranian energy relationship would not significantly improve, even 
in the post-sanctions era,46 due to problems related to “pricing, quality, and the Iranian 
practice of reducing gas exports to Turkey in winter months.” Cornell shares this view: “since 
the Iranian gas market is so primitive, it [closer Turkish-Iranian energy cooperation] will take 
a long time to develop, and Iranian domestic consumption will make it difficult to provide 
any large quantities of gas to Europe.”47 
 
b- The Iraq War, Changing Regional Dynamics and External Intervention 
Major global and regional changes have altered state behaviour in order to maximise power 
or eliminate threats to established power positions. Countries with a geographical proximity 
to battlefields are expected to be especially cautious when evaluating such changes either as 
an opportunity to improve their standing and raise their profiles or as dangerous 
developments that require a new attitude more suited to damage limitation. The Global War 
                                                          
46 Gareth Winrow, personal communication, 22/2/2016. Also see Göktuğ Sönmez, “Nuclear Deal: Historical 
Background, Implications for the Region and Turkish-Iranian Relations”, ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs 29 
(2015), p. 3–6. 
47 Cornell, personal communication, 17/2/2016. 
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on Terror (GWOT) and the Iraq War of 2003 caused a great deal of anxiety in Iran due to the 
concern about being surrounded or “contained”. For Turkey, the GWOT presented an 
atmosphere that could eliminate Turkish concerns over the potential loss of geopolitical 
importance in the post-Cold War era. The Iraq War, however, brought with it the risk of 
triggering a spill-over effect and destabilising the region in general and Turkey in particular. 
Iranian concerns about encirclement48 were accompanied by the Turkish concerns about an 
independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Both countries shared concerns about the 
potential impact of post-war instability in Iraq, which could affect their own internal stability. 
Thus, under what Nematollah Mozaffarpour referred to as “new Sykes-Picot arrangements”, 
threatening the security and stability of regional powers, the two countries found themselves 
sharing a common stance against the possibility of an independent Kurdistan.49 
Even though the operation in Afghanistan led to the demise of an anti-Shi’a 
government, it also signalled the first steps towards containing Iran. The Iraq War, which 
toppled another nemesis of Iran in the form of Saddam Hussein, was a further step towards 
that end. However, from the Iranian point of view, the war was conducted by the US and 
Israel, which made the overall atmosphere more threatening for Iran, especially considering 
the US presence in the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia and the strategic partnership between Turkey 
and the US. Moreover, the post-9/11 presence of the US in Central Asia and its increasing 
participation in military training and assistance programmes in the Caucasus compounded 
Iran’s feelings of becoming totally encircled.50 
                                                          
48 See Shireen Hunter, “Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy”, Journal of International Affairs 56: 2 (2003), pp. 133–
147; Kayhan Barzegar, “Understanding the Roots of Iranian Foreign Policy in the New Iraq”, Middle East 
Policy 12:2 (2005), pp. 49–57; Bradley L. Bowman, “The 'Demand-Side': Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran”, 
Orbis 52:4 (2008), pp. 627–642, p. 631–633. 
49 Mozaffarpour, personal communication, 4/5/2016. 
50 See Enayatollah Yazdani and Rizwan Hussain, “United States' Policy towards Iran after the Islamic 
Revolution: An Iranian Perspective”, International Studies 43: 3 (2006), pp. 267–289. 
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The Iraq War dramatically affected the Turkish position, too, due to its concerns about 
a dissolved Iraq and the proclamation of an independent Kurdish entity. Clashing views and 
the 1 March crisis51 signalled a low point in the Turkish-US relationship, while Turkey and 
Iran’s shared stance for a unitary structure in Iraq and their demand for the withdrawal of 
external powers as soon as possible pushed the two countries closer together. The German 
Marshall Fund’s poll showed that 81 percent of Turks did not approve the war or Bush’s 
policies. Similarly, the Dew Charitable Trust’s poll in 2006 showed that only 12 percent of 
Turks viewed the US in a positive light.52 On July 4, 2003, the American detention of a team 
of eleven Turkish Special Forces in Suleimaniyah on Independence Day—a team that had 
been there since the Gulf War—worsened this picture further and inflamed public 
sentiments.53 Moreover, US reluctance to support Turkey’s cause against the PKK in 
Northern Iraq caused a further deterioration in Turkey–US relations. The reluctance on the 
part of the US might have been primarily due to the strong Kurdish support it enjoyed during 
the invasion and because of the risk of further destabilising the region with a clash between 
Turkey and the PKK in Northern Iraq.54 The US went further during this period, warning 
Turkey about cross-border military activities. Unsurprisingly, Turkey found this warning 
unacceptable since the PKK managed to acquire safe havens in the region directly because of 
the US moves during and after the Gulf War, such as the declaration of no-fly-zone in the 
region (the north of the 36th parallel).55 
                                                          
51 The crisis emerged due to the failure to get necessary support from the Turkish parliament for a resolution 
allowing deployment of US troops in Turkey, their passage to Iraq and including participation of Turkish 
forces. See Olson, 2004, p. 185–187. 
52 Larrabee, 2007,p.104–106. 
53 For a more detailed analysis of this event see Olson, 2004, p.249. 
54 Larrabee, 2007, p.106. 
55 Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Barış Çağlar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey”, Middle East Policy 15: 4 
(2008), pp. 59–80, p. 62. 
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Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that Turkey’s primary concern in Iraq’s post-war 
reconstruction was the question of Northern Iraq and the PKK,56 both of which showed 
Turkey’s prioritisation of its own interest-driven concerns and the threats it perceived against 
its own regional standing. Turkey realised that as far as the question of Iraq’s unity and future 
was concerned, it had more in common with Iran than with the US or Israel, despite the fact 
that the two occasionally clashed over which factions, political parties, and figures they 
support.57 Referring to this environment as a situation that engendered probably the most 
successful rapprochement between the two, Oğuzlu notes that “The imperial tone of 
American undertakings in the region has brought the two closer in the strategic sense of 
countering the West’s influence in their backyards”.58 Turkey and Iran both concluded that 
unilateral external intervention in the region was no less dangerous to their position than 
dealing with pre-war Iraq had been, considering the additional potential spill-over effects. 
 Turkey distanced itself from American and Israeli policies concerning the war and the 
post-war reconstruction, and shared its stance with Iran. Thus, the Iraq War was one of the 
international developments which caused Turkey to revise its attitude towards Iran based on 
its own interest-driven calculations about its power position and security in an era of higher 
levels of engagement with the MENA region. Thus, the Iraq War can be regarded as a major 
incident pushing the two towards rapprochement. 
 
c- The Iranian Nuclear Programme 
Over the last decade, one of the issues which brought the two parties closer was the Iranian 
nuclear programme. For years prior to the comprehensive nuclear deal of 2015 which settled 
                                                          
56 Ahmet Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 86. 
57 Gülden S. Ayman, “Regional Aspirations and Limits of Power-Turkish-Iranian Relations in the New Middle 
East”, Hellenic Studies 20: 1 (2012), p. 7–12. 
58 Tarık Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61:1 (March, 
2007), pp. 81–97, p.94. 
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the question of the Iranian nuclear programme for the foreseeable future, Iran’s programme 
formed a flashpoint for the UN, Europe, Russia, China, the US, the IAEA, and regional 
powers. The Iranian desire for nuclear energy was not new; Pahlavi wanted to have nuclear 
power in order to improve its country’s standing and help it act as the leading regional 
power.59 Iran received support from the US (which also provided the Shah with his first 
reactor) as a part of the “Atoms for Peace” initiative in return for the country’s stance against 
communism.60 France and West Germany also helped Iran in the years before the revolution, 
the turning point after which Iran lost this support from those countries.61 The Iranian nuclear 
programme, which was resurrected after the Iraq-Iran War, entered into a new phase with the 
1995 Russian-Iranian deal.  This deal included not only providing Iranian scientists with the 
nuclear know-how but also the construction of the Bushehr plant.62 The deal had been on the 
table during the Soviet era in the late 1980s, but was delayed due to the Soviet Union’s 
dissolution and the economic and political difficulties that came with it.63 
Iran had a difficult time after opposition figures exposed the existence of two 
clandestine facilities in Natanz and Arak in 2002. Plus, its failure to comply with the IAEA 
inspections beginning in 200664 resulted in UN sanctions. During this process, Turkey either 
abstained or objected during deliberations that eventually resulted in stricter sanctions against 
Iran. Turkey’s position was to pursue a supportive but cautious policy aiming at helping 
lower tensions between the West and Iran and making sure that the Iranian nuclear 
programme was used for peaceful ends. Turkey pursued its policy line through diplomacy, 
                                                          
59 Kibaroğlu, 2007, p. 225 and p. 230. 
60 See Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the 
West”, Middle Eastern Studies 43:2 (2007), pp. 223–245, p. 225–234 
61 Kibaroğlu, 2007, p. 231–234. 
62 Anton Khlopkov and Anna Lutkova, “The Bushehr NPP: Why Did It Take So Long?”, Center for Energy and 
Security Studies, <http://ceness-russia.org/data/doc/TheBushehrNPP-WhyDidItTakeSoLong.pdf>, accessed 
27/05/2012. 
63 See Kibaroğlu, 2007, pp. 234–235. 
64 Amin Saikal, “The Iran Nuclear Dispute”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 60:2 (2006), pp. 193–199, 
at p. 193. Also, see Aylin G. Gürzel and Eyüp Ersoy, “Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Program”, Middle East Policy, 
19:1 (Spring 2012), pp. 37–50, at p. 38. 
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strengthening social and economic ties while resisting sanctions.65 Turkish officials 
occasionally stressed their position and their concerns regarding a military-oriented nuclear 
programme, but underlined their perception that they did not expect the inclusion of military 
capabilities from Iran’s nuclear growth.  
Within this context, one of the most important mediation efforts in which Turkey took 
part was the Tehran Declaration (The Joint Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, Iran and Brazil). This was the so-called “Nuclear Swap Deal” between Turkey, 
Brazil and Iran, and referred to swapping 1200 kilograms of Iranian low-grade (3.5 percent-
enriched) uranium (LEU) for 20 percent-enriched nuclear fuel to be used for energy needs. 
The deal faced the US objections66—even though the idea had previously been proposed by 
the IAEA and P5+167 in the presence of the US delegates—since it did not offer a clear-cut 
settlement to Iranian enrichment efforts. The main reason behind the US objections was that 
the deal did not address the question of what would happen to the 20 percent-enriched 
uranium in Iranian territory, which was of high enough quality to be used in a weapons-grade 
nuclear programme.68 As a response, Turkey voted against the UN imposed sanctions in June 
2010, along with Brazil.69 
Turkey’s supportive stance regarding the Iranian nuclear programme was underlined 
several times by the then Prime Minister Erdoğan in front of international audiences, 
including during his interview in the Kuwaiti El Anba newspaper and his speech at the 
                                                          
65 For a more detailed analysis of sanctions, see Andrew Parasiliti, “After Sanctions, Deter and Engage Iran”, 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 52:5 (2010), pp. 13–20, p. 17 
66 However, Sinan Ülgen in his article “The Security Dimension of Turkey’s Nuclear Program: Nuclear Diplomacy 
and Non-Proliferation Policies”, in “The Turkish Model for that Transition to Nuclear Power”, Ekonomi ve Dış 
Politika Araştırma Merkezi (EDAM), December 9, 2011, pp. 138–181, at p. 156, states that for military 
purposes, the necessary enrichment level of uranium should be 90 percent, which is called highly enriched 
uranium.  
67 Mehmet Özkan, “Turkey–Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What Is the Big Deal?”, Strategic 
Analysis, 35:1 (2010), pp.26–30, at p. 27 
68 Aylin Gürzel, “Turkey's Role in Defusing the Iranian Nuclear Issue”, The Washington Quarterly, 35:3 (2012), 
pp. 141–152, at p. 141.  
69 Stein, 2014, p.31. 
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Munich Security Conference in 2008.70 He stated that “No one has the right to impose 
anything on anyone with regards to nuclear energy, provided that it is for peaceful purposes”, 
and added,  “Everyone with common sense opposes nuclear weapons”. Similarly, he noted 
that “We accept that acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful and civilian purposes is a 
sovereign right for countries. But we have told Iranian authorities numerous times that we are 
against nuclear weapons”.71 JDP member Ahmet İnal, who headed the parliamentary 
Turkish-Iranian Friendship Group, highlighted the Iranian right to advanced nuclear 
technology and know-how, and underlined Turkey’s support for the programme as long as it 
was used for peaceful ends.72  
A comprehensive deal regarding the Iranian nuclear programme came in April 2015, 
of which the main points were based on the framework agreement of 2013. With the 
agreement, the question of the Iranian nuclear programme seems to come to an end for the 
foreseeable future, also thanks to the election victory of the “reformist” Rouhani, who 
succeeded a much more aggressive Ahmedinejad. According to the April deal, the major 
points of tension—namely Iran’s enrichment level, nuclear capacity and stockpile—would be 
closely monitored and limited. Two more controversial points of tension, namely enrichment 
and heavy water facilities, are also addressed in this deal. The Natanz facility would act as the 
only enrichment facility, while the heavy water facility in Arak would be redesigned in order 
to prevent plutonium products from being enriched to weapons-grade levels. Meanwhile, 
enhanced access would be given to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials, 
used fuel would be exported to prevent it being reprocessed, and the Additional Protocol of 
                                                          
70 Kibaroğlu and Çağlar, 2008, p. 65. For other statements on Turkey’s belief in the programme’s peaceful ends 
see Abdülhamit Bilici, “Iran’s Nuke Program for Humanitarian Ends, Erdoğan Says”, Today’s Zaman, 28 
October 2009, “Erdoğan: West Treats Iran Unfairly”, Hurriyet Daily News, 26 October 2009. 
71 “Erdogan calls for just stance on Iran over nuclear program”, Today’s Zaman, January 14, 2010,                          
<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-198480-erdogan-calls-for-just-stance-on-iran-over-nuclear-
program.html>, accessed 26/11/2013. 
72 Gürzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 38. 
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the NPT would be implemented. In return for these concessions, Iran’s primary demand was 
unsurprisingly the lifting of sanctions, an act that would significantly help its economy. Both 
the EU and the United States agreed to lift sanctions, and the UN would terminate all related 
resolutions. According to the final deal, made in July 2015, Iran agreed to reduce its uranium 
enrichment capacity by two-thirds for a ten-year period at its Natanz facility, from around 
20,000 centrifuges to around 6,000. Iran also agreed to cut its stockpile of low and medium-
enriched uranium by 96 percent to no more than 300 kg—enriched no more than 3.67 
percent—by diluting it or selling it to other countries for 15 years. Iran promised not to build 
new uranium-enrichment or heavy water facilities for the next 15 years, to redesign its Arak 
facility in a way that would not allow it produce weapons grade plutonium, and to be 
subjected to intensive monitoring measures. 
In return, the US, UN and EU would terminate all resolutions, sanctions and 
regulations with respect to Iran. The exception was that ballistic missile technology transfer 
would continue to be restricted for an eight year period, and a heavy weapons and arms 
embargo on conventional weapons would remain in place for five years.73  
Even though the crisis currently appears to be settled, the question remains: what was 
the motivation behind Turkey’s stance regarding the Iranian nuclear programme? This 
question will be addressed in the next section. 
 
 
 
                                                          
73 Göktuğ Sönmez, “Nuclear Deal: Historical Background, Implications for the Region and Turkish-Iranian 
Relations”, ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs 29 (2015), p. 7–8. 
 105 
 
Turkey’s Position on the Iranian Nuclear Programme: Utilising an Opportunity or Backing a 
Co-religious Entity? 
 
I argue that there are four main reasons behind Turkey’s support for the Iranian nuclear 
programme for peaceful ends, with additional supporting reasons. A closer look at each of 
these will show that the support was driven by Turkey’s own interest-driven calculations. 
Firstly, by defending the Iranian right to make use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
ends, Turkey seems to be preparing the ground for its own plans for the intensive use of 
nuclear energy in the near future. Turan argues that Turkey’s position regarding the Iranian 
nuclear programme was cleverly devised in order to legitimise its own position, an argument 
shared by Mozaffarpour.74 Sinkaya stated that Turkey viewed the pressure on Iran as a 
showcase of the challenges Turkey itself might need to face as far as its own future nuclear 
programme was concerned.75 Turkey’s nuclear programme will significantly contribute to the 
country’s economy by decreasing the amount it pays for oil and natural gas imports, while 
limiting its current dependency on imports for its energy consumption, with its attendant 
political and economic risks. Turkey argues that every state has the right to pursue nuclear 
efforts for peaceful ends, a right stated in Article 4 of the NPT76—although the treaty’s 
efficiency and scope are already in question due to the refusal of Israel, Pakistan and India to 
sign it, and North Korea’s withdrawal.77 
                                                          
74 Turan, personal communication, 8/2/2016 and Mozaffarpour, personal communication, 4/5/2016. 
75 Bayram Sinkaya, 9/3/2016. 
76 Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty runs as follows: “1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as 
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this 
Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or 
together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.” For more detailed 
information on the NPT, see “the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 
<http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html>. 
77 Gürzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 37. 
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As far as its own efforts to use nuclear energy are concerned, Turkey agreed with 
Russia in 2009 to construct four nuclear plants near the city of Mersin on the shores of the 
Mediterranean,78 and with Japan to build another plant in the coastal city of Sinop on the 
Black Sea.79 According to Cenk Pala, nuclear energy is a key tool for limiting Turkey’s 
dependency whereas technological and ecological concerns need to be addressed. For him, a 
major factor that differentiates the South Korean economy from the Turkish one, which was 
functioning at around the same level before the Cold War, has been the effective use of 
nuclear energy along with R&D investment.80 Interestingly, it is also well-known that Iran 
has in the past offered to help Turkey develop nuclear facilities and to use nuclear energy.81 
However, with respect to the military use of nuclear technology, Turkey’s determined stance 
for a nuclear-free Middle East has long been supported by the political elite, from the 2010 
NPT Review Conference to the G-10 meeting in Berlin in 2011, an idea which was first 
mentioned by Egypt and Iran in 1974.82 
Secondly, Turkey considers that the risk of alienating Iran and applying strict 
sanctions would result in a more aggressive stance on Iran’s part. This is perceived as being 
more risky for Turkey than a nuclear programme in the short run—especially a nuclear 
programme which is not believed to be directed for military ends and subject to international 
monitoring anyway. Even if Iran has any long-term clandestine objectives, they would not be 
an immediate concern for Turkey, and international control over the programme is a measure 
that could be trusted in the face of any unexpected change of plans. In the first instance, it 
was the suffering of Iran during its long war with Iraq, coupled with Western indifference 
                                                          
78 Ülgen, 2011, p. 152. Especially, in the light of the recent Turkish-Russian jet crisis, Cenk Pala argues that 
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that contributed to the resurrection of its nuclear programme, which had been abandoned after 
the revolution.83 This offers a clue to the mentality behind Turkey’s sensitivity about Iran’s 
feelings of threat and isolation. For Turkey, a multilateral process of antagonism which might 
motivate Iran to plan for a military nuclear eventuality should be avoided at all costs. Even 
though a nuclear Iran would be a bad outcome for Turkey in terms of its security and  
regional relative power position, the Turkish stance focused on socialising Iran without 
denying its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.84 
A third reason is that the process itself offered Turkey an opportunity to present itself 
as an important regional player. The other party of the “nuclear swap deal”, Brazil, has a 
similar aim to present itself as a rising power, emphasising the importance of multilateralism. 
Brazil has also called for a revision of the system of permanent membership in the UN 
Security Council either by increasing their numbers or questioning their rights of veto—a 
criticism that is also shared by Turkey, with Erdoğan frequently stating that “the world is 
bigger than five”, referring to the UNSC’s 5 powers with the right of veto.85 
The fourth reason behind Turkey’s stance is its mutually important and 
interdependent energy relationship with Iran.86 For Turkey, as an almost completely energy 
dependent country, the severance of the Iranian energy flow would be no less dangerous in 
the short run than the rumours of clandestine nuclear programmes. More detailed information 
and analyses with respect to the two countries’ energy relationship was discussed earlier, but 
to add another dimension to the energy framework, we should note that Iran controls the 
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Straits of Hormuz, through which a significant amount of oil transportation flows between the 
Gulf countries and the rest of the world. Thus, Iran could have the potential to adopt the 
position that Turkey eagerly strives to achieve—that of a key transit country. As such, Iran 
has a significant role within the context of Turkey’s energy consumption and the potential to 
act as an important alternative energy provider from the Middle East to the West. This point 
is also mentioned by Stein, who argues that “Turkey’s reliance on Iran for energy and its 
emphasis on increasing bilateral trade have inevitably influenced the AKP’s approach to 
sanctions”. Therefore, energy dimension can be considered as an important reason for 
Turkey’s accommodative stance regarding the Iranian nuclear programme.  
According to Ünver, another reason can be the two sides’ joint operations against the 
PKK and the PJAK, which also contributed to Turkey’s milder and occasionally supportive 
stance and rhetoric.87 Considering Turkey’s search for regional partners in order to inflict the 
most possible damage to the PKK and to cope with the organisation more effectively,  Iran’s 
cooperative policy line in this respect—at least until its ceasefire with the PJAK—could have 
played an important role, forcing Turkey to calculate its steps more delicately during these 
thorny years.  
To summarise, all these reasons illustrate Turkey’s motivation regarding the Iranian 
nuclear programme, which was to raise its profile by utilising a globally controversial point 
of tension in order to pursue its own self-interest-driven calculations contrary to what Cornell 
argued, representing the primordialist point of view indeed: “This [pan-Islamism] motivated 
the pro-Iranian policies in 2009-10, when Ankara was the chief international support of the 
Iranian nuclear program”.88 
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d- The Arab Spring/Awakening and the Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) 
Controversy 
 
 
Recent regional developments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have had 
a significant impact on the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran. The rivalry over 
which actor will have the upper hand in the region during the Arab Spring and beyond, as 
well as tension over missile defence systems, have worked to put the Turkish-Iranian 
rapprochement under question. Coupled with the tension the two experienced over the BMDS 
controversy, the new atmosphere has seriously endangered the rapprochement they achieved 
up until 2011.  
 
The Arab Spring and the Internationalisation of the Syrian Civil War 
 
Since its very beginning, the Arab Spring has been the biggest blow to the two countries’ 
rapprochement in the last decade.89 Turan argues that Ayatollah Ali Khamanei—the Supreme 
Leader of Iran who saw himself as the religious leader of the Muslim world—was always 
irritated by the photos and posters of Erdoğan carried by people on the Arab streets, a feeling 
that was shared by the Iranian elite as a whole.90 The uprisings began in late 2010 in Tunisia, 
and the toppling of authoritarian leaders and the intensification of demands for reforms and 
democratization took hold of the region, with the people of Egypt and Libya overthrowing 
their regimes.91 When the wave reached Syria, things became complicated for the regional 
powers and the international community. In Stein’s words, “Syria was the centrepiece of the 
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AKP’s foreign policy in the Middle East”.92 Erdoğan, at a meeting in Damascus in 2004, had 
stated that he could not differentiate between the shining faces of Turks and Syrians, and 
would thus call them brothers, rather than friends.93 The two sides’ political and economic 
rapprochement and the lifting of visas between them stand out as a key achievement, 
considering their experience of coming to the brink of war over Syria’s support to Öcalan. 
This was a significant move in terms of showing the improvement in Turkey’s relationships 
with its neighbours—including the countries with which it had experienced clashes before. In 
2004, Assad was the first Syrian president to pay an official visit to Turkey in 57 years. 
During that visit, he underlined Syria’s position against an independent Kurdish entity in 
Northern Iraq and argued in favour of Iraq’s territorial integrity, sharing Turkey’s main lines 
of argument related to the future of Iraq.  
The two parties signed a free trade agreement in 2006 and established a “High Level 
Strategic Cooperation Council” as part of a Quadruple Council involving Turkey, Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon,94 where they decided to lift visa requirements. Thanks to this positive 
atmosphere, the two countries’ trading volume almost tripled from $773 million to $2.27 
billion between 2002 and the start of the Syrian Civil War. In 2003, 154,000 Syrian tourists 
visited Turkey; by 2010, this number topped half a million.95 The two countries even 
formulated the concept of “Shamgen”, aiming towards a joint visa regime imitating 
“Schengen” among Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq.96 Turkey also played a mediatory role 
between Syria and Israel in 2008 via indirect peace talks which had been halted after Israel’s 
Operation Cast Lead, which will be discussed at greater length in the chapter on the Turkish-
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Israeli relationship.97 Davutoğlu even held up the Turkish-Syrian relationship as a clear 
example of the success of the “zero problems with neighbours” doctrine.98  
From encouraging reforms by using its close relationship with Assad in Syria when 
violence escalated, Turkey’s policy gradually turned into a strictly anti-Assad one between 
the spring of 2011 and the November of the same year. Erdoğan, for the first time, explicitly 
called for Assad’s dismissal,99 likened him to “Hitler, Mussolini, and Ceausescu,”100 and 
overtly supported opposition groups, going as far as to host them and directly contribute to 
the emergence of the Syrian National Council in 2011. The group shared Turkey’s key 
concerns and announced “three Nos”, objecting to “sectarianism, violence and international 
intervention.”101 Turkey also hosted the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood the same year, at which 
they denounced the Assad regime,102 supported the Free Syrian Army103 and  insistently 
demanded Assad’s resignation. In the meantime, the US and Russia had agreed to accept 
Assad “as a de facto legitimate partner in the disarmament process in Syria” and prioritised 
the fight against ISIS.104 The Turkish Embassy in Damascus was closed in 2012 and its 
consul general in Aleppo was recalled in 2013.105 A key turning point was the downing of a 
Turkish F-4 Phantom in June 2012, after which Erdoğan referred to the Syrian crisis as a 
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“direct and proximate threat” to Turkey’s security.106 Following that, Syrian artillery fired 
upon Akçakale in Şanlıurfa the same year, claiming the lives of five Turkish civilians. In 
response, Turkey fired shots that killed 34 Syrian military personnel.107 Turkey’s tough 
stance and ensuing crisis resulted in a rapid deterioration of the country’s relationship with 
not only Syria but also Iran. “After a 10-year honeymoon, Turkish-Syrian relations are back 
to square one.”108 
A key development that further complicated this picture was the Russian desire for a 
direct military presence and involvement in what was becoming an internationalised civil 
war. Russia’s involvement was unsurprising, since “Syria is an important purchaser of 
Russian equipment, and Tartus is the only naval facility open to Russia in the 
Mediterranean.”109 Thus, Russia was also acting in order to defend its “last remaining ally in 
the Middle East”.110 The opportunity also provided Russia with a chance to show its 
continuing desire to be a key player in the Middle East and challenge NATO at a time when 
the US-led coalition was getting more involved. Russia’s involvement as a “protective 
shield” for the Assad regime and its veto of the UN sanctions against Syria resulted in 
demonstrations in Syria on the day Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Damascus where 
demonstrators shouted “Shukran (Thanks) Russia”.111 The Turkish-Russian relationship 
deteriorated further, and this deterioration of the relationship reached its zenith with Turkey’s 
downing of the Russian SU-24 jet on the Syrian border of Turkey in November 2015. Turkey 
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claimed that the Russian jet had repeatedly crossed the border, neglecting Turkey’s many 
warnings.112 The Syrian Civil War had a negative overall effect on Turkey’s grand strategic 
vision, resulting in the deterioration of relations with Syria and Russia (even though signals 
of normalisation and improvement in the Turkish-Russian bilateral relationship are strong in 
the summer of 2016)113 as well as a period of silent cold war between Turkey and Iran, and a 
loss of momentum in terms of their rapprochement. 
Following the turmoil in Syria, Turkey and Iran experienced a good deal of tension in 
an era when sectarianism gained further ground in the region, despite Turkey’s insistence that 
its policy line went beyond sects in favour of democracy, reforms, and stability.114 Thus, the 
deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and Syria brought a change not only in terms 
of Turkey’s “zero problems” foreign policy with the goal of good neighbourly relations in 
general, but also in terms of the Turkish-Iranian relationship, too. The tension between 
Turkey and Iran over the future of Syria has even reached the level of reciprocal accusations 
of trying to topple the Syrian government and of protecting a dictator who turned against his 
own people. These represent the two basic lines of criticism directed against each other by 
Iran and Turkey respectively.115  
Turkey stresses that external military interference—which became an increasing 
necessity due to the intensification of the Syrian Civil War—would destabilise the entire 
region like it did during the Iraq War. This possibility would have serious repercussions for 
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Turkey in economic terms, since the region accounted for 24 percent of its trade.116 Instability 
and failed state structures also offered a safe haven and room to manoeuvre for the groups 
like ISIS on Syrian soil, affecting both regional and external powers. Furthermore, the risk of 
Syria providing a new safe haven for the PKK, which would enable it to receive help from an 
autonomous Kurdish authority in Iraq, was another concern for Turkey.117 
From the Iranian perspective, however, Turkey is following the US and Western 
powers’ lead by intervening in another country’s domestic politics. Russian and Chinese 
support for the Assad regime strengthens the Iranian position and reinforces its insistence on 
supporting the Syrian government. Nematollah Mozaffarpour, in a personal conversation with 
the author, stated that the Arab Spring was regarded from the very beginning mainly as a 
foreign project from the Iranian perspective. Even though Mozaffarpour admits that the 
Iranian establishment is well aware of the fact that Assad is a long way from being a liberal 
democrat, Western powers started to export weapons there using “democratisation and 
liberalisation” rhetoric reminiscent of the Iraq War of 2003. He further argues that if it is 
really democracy and liberal values at stake, then the West needs to revisit its policy line 
regarding Saudi Arabia and Qatar, too. According to Mozaffarpour, the West regards Iran, 
Syria, and the Hezbollah of Lebanon as parts of the same devil; its head, belt, and tail 
respectively. Since attacking the head would be too risky and the tail might not be worth the 
effort, cutting the belt is the wisest choice since it would kill the devil.118  
For Iran, the fall of its closest ally in the region—which also has an intimate 
relationship with Lebanon and thus provides Iran an important opportunity to indirectly 
extend its influence there, too—is regarded as a threatening outcome that might cause a chain 
reaction which would end its ambitions for regional leadership. With respect to ties between 
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Iran and Syria, the two countries have long enjoyed a close relationship, standing against 
Israel and Turkey during the 1990s. Syria has been Iran’s only state ally since the Iran-Iraq 
War, during which the two shared a common stance against Iraq. Since then, Syria has helped 
Iran avoid regional isolation and allow it to “penetrate the Levant and pressure Israel, 
especially by providing it with access to Lebanon”.119 Syria has therefore become the 
ultimate battlefield for the two powers’ regional ambitions and their desire to possess a 
superior position in the region. “The oppositional politics in Syria may have halted a decade 
of deepening engagement between Turkey and Iran and set the limits for closer relations in 
the future.”120 The more Assad clings to power—thanks to the external support he receives 
from Russia, China and Iran—the more Turkey and Iran’s differences will become a source 
of tension. In order to reinforce its position, Iran sent high-ranking officers of the Army of the 
Republican Guards of the Islamic Revolution to Syria.121 Iran also brokered a ceasefire with 
the Iranian branch of the PKK—the PJAK—in late 2011,122 allowing the organisation to 
focus on its activities in Syria, Iraq and particularly Turkey. Mozaffarpour insists that Iran 
does not approach this issue from a religious perspective and argues that DAESH/ISIS 
emerged not because of Assad but because of the loss of his grip on Syria. As such, 
cooperation rather than regional conflict would be the best way to solve the Syrian crisis. “If 
regional cooperation cannot be achieved, the result will not be a rise in Shi’ism or the power 
of the JDP, but instead Salafism and Wahhabism”.123 With respect to the Iranian approach to 
the Arab Spring in general, Mehmet Şahin suggests:  
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Iran’s foreign policy is undergoing a new test with the Arab uprisings in the 
region. In this process, while Iran supports opposition groups in some countries 
like Bahrain and Yemen when thinking of its own interests, it cozies up to the 
authoritarian and secular government in some countries such as Syria.124 
 
 Overall, Turkey’s zero problems policy and its “symbolic showcase” or flagship, i.e. 
the Syrian dimension, seemed failed to a great extent with accompanied deteriorated relations 
with Iran and Russia. The foreseeable future does not offer a bright prospect, either. Even in a 
hypothetical post-Assad Syria, Turkey will have to deal with the PYD- the Syrian affiliate of 
the PKK- which in March 2016 proclaimed a federation in Northern Syria, merging the 
“cantons” it controlled.125 Realisation of this complicated picture and its potential dangers, 
was a direct reason behind Turkey’s engagement in the area between Azaz and Jarablus in 
Northern Syria in August, 2016. Following a diplomatic marathon in July and August, during 
which Turkey-Russia relations were normalised, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif and KRG 
President Barzani visited Turkey, Turkish artillery, tanks and jets started to give direct 
military support to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to take control of Jarablus, which was 
controlled by ISIS, as a first step. The operation, alongside ISIS, also targets PYD advances 
west of Euphrates where anti-ISIS coalition previously assured Turkey that no PYD presence 
will be allowed. Timing of the operation not only points to the consequences of Turkey’s 
recent turn to “strategic flexibility” from “precious loneliness” and revisions in its 
deteriorated relations with particular actors. It also shows how closing windows of 
opportunity where a rival group (PYD in this case) seem to force states to revise their 
policies. 
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The BMDS Controversy 
 
Turkey’s own strategic positioning and its calculations regarding the gradually increasing 
instability in the Middle East played a role in its consent to the deployment of radars for 
NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence Systems (BMDS).This step not only provided NATO with 
a further deterrent, but also helped secure and consolidate Turkey’s power position in the 
region. At the same time, the system is also expected to strengthen Turkey’s defence in case 
of a potential spill-over from ethnic and sectarian conflicts and weak state mechanisms in the 
region by further deepening its already close relationship with NATO. In September 2011, 
Turkey agreed to be part of NATO’s BMDS scheme and host one of the “early-warning 
radars” in Kürecik, Malatya, around 725 km west of the Iranian border. As a system co-
hosted by Spain, Portugal, Poland, and Romania, the BMDS aims to protect NATO countries 
from medium-range missile attacks.  
Iran saw the BMDS as a further tool for its containment, rendering Iran vulnerable in 
case of an attack, referring mainly to a possible surprise attack from Israel.126 Iranian 
anxieties regarding the siting of the BDMS radars on Turkish soil caused further damage to 
the bilateral relationship. In order to limit this damage, Turkey insisted upon the exclusion of 
any reference to any specific country as being threats against which these radar systems had 
been installed. As part of the deal, Turkey also strove for control over the equipment on its 
own soil.127 However, while Ahmadinejad claimed that the missile system was a way of 
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protecting Israeli interests against Iran,128 Brigadier General Ali Hajizadeh went a step further 
by stating that in case of a threat, Iran would target Turkey and other countries that hosted 
different components of the system.129 He also stated that “In today’s world, the Zionist 
regime conducts its acts with the US, and the US conducts its acts as NATO... The Muslim 
Turkish people will destroy this system when it’s time.”130 After Turkey allowed the system 
to be installed, former Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 2012 visit to Turkey was cancelled in 
protest to at decision and the visa waiver program was suspended. The latter was also partly 
due to Turkey’s condemnation of Iranian statements about Turkey’s support to Syrian 
opposition and its participation in the US-led coalition in Syria.131 For Iran, the system was 
seen as depriving the country of its “capacity for deterrence” against any future attack, and as 
permission for intelligence sharing between NATO and Israel. With the two combined, Israel 
would be encouraged to conduct a military attack against Iran.132 Considering the timing of 
the instalment of the system, it can be argued that Turkey’ realpolitik concerns were the 
primary motivation. BMDS controversy, therefore, reinforces the criticism this research 
directs at primordialist analyses arguing that ideology had the upper hand and Turkey has 
been pursuing a primarily sectarian and ethno-nationalist policy line.133 
Therefore, Turkey’s participation in the NATO’s BMDS scheme and the Arab Spring 
are two important developments showing realpolitik limits of the rapprochement enjoyed by 
Turkey and Iran over the last decade. As soon as their policy lines began to clash—a factor 
which is not expected from a primordialist point of view for any reasons other than 
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ideological—their relationship experienced tension and fluctuations, further reinforcing a 
realist reading of Turkey’s shifting state behaviour vis-à-vis certain actors.  
Having explored in detail how external shifts impacted upon Turkish attitudes 
regarding Iran (and vice versa), the next section will examine the ways in which domestic 
developments and shifts reinforced or impeded the changes in the relationship during this era. 
 
 
The Domestic Level: Coalitions between Businessmen and Political Figures and the 
Shifting Civil-Military Power Calculus 
 
Coalitions between conservative business associations and the JDP helped Turkey utilise its 
“national power” more effectively. This picture offered Turkey a “practical hand” in its grand 
strategic shifts. These ties  between businessmen and the ruling elite both reinforced closer 
relations with Iran and deepened economic relationship which can act as a deterrent in case of 
possible future tension. At the same time, the military’s loss of influence meant that an 
important actor from the anti-Iran camp would have a lessening impact (or none at all) over 
this policy line that was changing for the better and the interest-driven approach would more 
easily the old ideologised and securitised approach. This domestic atmosphere not only 
contributed significantly to the state’s ability to extract and mobilise necessary resources for 
such a revision, but also freed policy-makers from the constraints of the possibility “being 
punished” by coups or indirect interventions by the military if they revised Turkish policies in 
ways that contradicted the military’s preferences. 
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The JDP Era: Increasing Levels of Economic Interaction, Fading Military Alarmism 
 
 
While the old elite fought to distance itself from Iran, internationalist business groups and the 
new political elite demanded the opposite. Support from conservative internationalist 
business groups also helped further Turkey’s ambitions to expand the reach of the country’s 
economic activity in the Middle East and the former Soviet space. Their ideological stance 
provided a further motivation to have a stronger presence in Iran. 
 
Closer Economic Relations and the Role of Conservative Businessmen 
In economic terms, Iran has been the most important partner in terms of Turkey’s “return to 
the arc of crisis”. Between 2000 and 2010, Iran’s share in Turkey’s overall trade doubled and 
reached around 4 percent of Turkey’s total trade.134 Iran, according to Mozaffarpour, is quite 
satisfied with this picture, as it prefers having closer economic relations with Turkey than 
with Russia, China or the EU.135  
Leading figures from both countries argued that this trade could reach $30 to $50 
billion in the medium-term136 and was fluctuating between $10 and 15 billion in 2014 and 
2015.137 However, the impact of the Arab Spring on the bilateral relationship, which also 
affected the economic picture after 2012, left these ambitious goals open to doubt.  
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Within this context of closer economic relations with Iran, conservative businessmen 
played a very important role. This not only helped Turkey’s transformation into a “trading 
state”—in which trade is one of the main policy areas and businessmen are encouraged by the 
ruling elite following the footsteps in of Özal—but also helped the re-orientation of the 
country’s grand strategic geopolitical scope, which gives much more weight to neighbouring 
regions than it did before. Conservative businessmen associations’ support for the JDP’s 
policy line and the support offered to them in return by the government resulted in an 
increase in the state’s ability to mobilise necessary resources to help pursue its interests.  
These associations’ impact, in some cases, is quite direct. For instance, business 
associations repeatedly mentioned the goal of bilateral trade volume of $30 billion with Iran 
in the near future, a goal put forward by the former head of MÜSİAD, Ömer Vardan.138 This 
goal was endorsed by Erdoğan and echoed on several occasions. Similarly, calls for a 
common market between the Islamic Conference Organisation member states, an important 
goal of both Erbakan in the past shared by MÜSİAD, were echoed by Turkey’s Economic 
Minister, Zafer Çağlayan.139  
Forums and fairs with an emphasis on the Muslim world organised by MÜSİAD also 
shows how MÜSİAD approaches the bilateral relationship and how it contributed to it. The 
slogan used for MÜSİAD’s International Business Forums has been “Uniting Your Business 
with the Islamic World”,140 prioritising predominantly Muslim-populated neighbour states in 
accordance with MÜSİAD’s spirit of entrepreneurship. Business trips resulting in multiple 
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deals across various sectors are also a major part of the repertoire. The encouragement of 
political figures for these trips and their participation in them show the level of the 
cooperation between statesmen and rising businessmen groups. Trips to Iran are no 
exception. For MÜSİAD in particular, Iran has always been a significant destination for 
business trips. The last decade witnessed a significant rise in such trips and saw an increase in 
the number of deals made between Iranian and Turkish businessmen. In 2003, State Minister 
Kürşad Tüzmen was accompanied by 300 businessmen on his trip to Iran, where contracts 
worth $200 million were signed, agreements were reached on reducing taxes and customs 
duties, and plans were made to set up new cross-border trade points. In 2008 and 2009, 
Tüzmen, this time as the State Minister for Foreign Trade led similar delegations, during 
which deals were struck totalling $550 million.141 The head of MÜSİAD even went as far as 
to call for a customs union between the two, and succeeded in negotiating the prospects of 
increasing trade volumes with Iranian officials in a business trip conducted at the invitation of 
the mayor of Tabriz in 2011. This visit took place after an Iranian delegation visited Turkey 
in 2009, during which they concluded many business deals.142 These efforts succeeded in 
achieving support at presidential level in Iran, too.143  
As mentioned earlier, TUSKON primarily focused on African states and the 
Caribbean through its international business forums. However, TUSKON’s activity is not 
limited to these regions. Its head, Rızanur Meral, also called for higher Turkish economic 
involvement in Turkey’s immediate environs and decreasing customs tax with Iran in order to 
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facilitate more business deals. TUSKON was also against the sanctions imposed on Iran due 
to the potential economic drawbacks they would bring, and demanded urgent action in order 
to avoid the costs and risks of increasing oil prices in case the growing alienation of Iran led 
to a military action.144 This accorded with Turkey’s stance on the question of sanctions. In 
terms of sanctions and the Turkish-Iranian economic interactivity, MÜSİAD also called for 
higher levels of trade and Turkish economic involvement with Iran—even if sanctions remain 
in place—in order to achieve a more integrated position as a trading partner once these 
sanctions are lifted. This would help hold off challenges from other possible “newcomers” 
looking to conduct economic interactivity with Iran.145 Thus, for both associations, Iran 
always occupied a certain place due not only to its religious positioning, but also to the 
opportunities it offered in both the sanctions-period and the post-sanctions era for Turkish 
businessmen. 
All in all, in terms of Turkey’s relationship with Iran, the rise of the notion of a 
trading state aiming for economic integration with neighbouring regions in a way that can 
reinforce policy steps with the incorporation of “Anatolian Tigers” in a more organised 
manner has strengthened the rapprochement between the two. Closer economic contact via 
close links between statesmen and businessmen not only played an important role in 
increasing the state’s ability to mobilise economic resources for policy goals in an era of 
rapprochement, but also acted as an important source of deterrence vis-à-vis Iran in case of a 
possible tension.  
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Increasing Autonomy of the Civilian Policy-Makers and its Impact on the Relationship 
 
In the 1990s, political figures such as Erbakan paid a high price when they tried to forge 
closer contact with their Iranian counterparts. With the post-modern coup of February 28, 
1997, Erbakan was forced to sign an action plan against “Islamist reactionary movements” 
and then resigned. This move was justified on the grounds that his activities were directed at 
the regime and unitary structure of Turkey by cooperating with other religiously-motivated 
entities, Iran being the most prominent of these. Erbakan’s efforts to broaden the scope of 
cooperation with Iran from the energy sector to defence and security were strictly opposed by 
the military. With the 1997 post-modern coup which forced resignation of Erbakan, once 
again it proved its strength.146 Thus, putting aside some cooperative dimensions of the 
bilateral relationship in line with Turkey’s perceptions of interest, which included a 
significant energy link, the military’s critical stance regarding Iran further undermined a 
relationship that had been plagued with suspicion and mistrust especially since 1979.  
The military adopted a critical stance against Iran’s regime and its potential 
encouragement for Islamist groups in Turkey. It also further securitised the relationship by 
highlighting the accusations of Iranian support for the PKK. In short, concerns of the old elite 
and the military were that Iran would try to export its regime and alter the very characteristics 
of the state structure in Turkey the Turkish system; it can support the PKK, and it can possess 
WMDs, altering bilateral balance of power  and might use them in the future.147  
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From naming Iran as a terrorist state to extensively referring to its alleged efforts to 
export its regime, the military approached the relationship with Iran in a rather alarmist 
manner.148 Thus, it was not surprising when Mozaffarpour referred to the military as the 
“most important obstacle” standing in the way of a better relationship between the two 
countries149, The then Chief of Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, who served between 1998 and 
2002, even stated that Turkey and Iran would never stand shoulder to shoulder, which as far 
as the military were concerned, meant “abandoning all thoughts related to civilisation”.150 In 
1997, a brochure was distributed to participants at a briefing organized by the National 
Security Council—which was the most important mechanism for exerting military influence 
on civilian decision-makers—entitled “The Spread of Political Islam”. The brochure argued 
that Turkey’s democratic and secular structure was the only obstacle preventing Iran from 
turning the Islamic world into a united Shari’a state.151 In response to the military’s over-
involvement in policy-making, and in particular policy-making over Iran, Turkey’s 
ambassador to Iran, Osman Korutürk, had to reassure Iran that it was the Foreign Ministry’s 
responsibility, rather than the military’s, to announce official government views. However, 
the military’s influence and its rigid stance regarding the relationship with Iran unsurprisingly 
proved much more effective than this statement. This was made more apparent when 
Korutürk was expelled in retaliation for Turkey’s expulsion of the Iranian consul to Erzurum, 
Mohammed-Reza Baqeri. Baqeri’s expulsion was due to his speech on the Jerusalem Day, 
organized by the Welfare Party’s mayor in Sincan—the incident which triggered the post-
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modern coup of February 28, 1997. The event was harshly criticized by the then Chief of 
Staff Çevik Bir as being a fundamental threat to Turkey’s secular structure.152 In his first visit 
following this coup to the US, Bir heightened tension from the military standpoint by 
referring to Iran as a state that supported terrorism.153 
As far as military influence was concerned, the JDP era was different from the eras that 
preceded it. The old dynamics of the civil-military relationship had allowed the military to 
define national threats, enemies and partners, as was the case with the demonization of Iran 
and Syria and strategic alliance with Israel. However, the new power calculus between 
civilians and the military presented a completely different picture. In line with popular 
Western security structures, the military’s advisory role finally became just an advisory one 
in practice, too. The military, as the most ardent supporter of the hard-line anti-Iranian policy, 
gradually lost its leverage over civilian policy-makers, and no longer possessed the same 
amount of power to intervene either directly or indirectly in decision-making processes. The 
military previously possessed the power to impede closer ties with Iran, either through 
“advising” governments (most importantly via the powerful National Security Council) or by 
further contributing to the securitisation of the relationship The military’s alarmist attitude in 
the past often informed certain foreign policy choices which were designed for the express 
purpose of keeping Turkey as far as possible from any closer contact with any predominantly 
Muslim country whilst strengthening regional ties with Israel. All he efforts to desecuritise 
relations with Turkey’s neighbours—particularly Iran and Syria—worked against the 
military’s position. The military viewed such countries as threats to Turkey’s secular and 
unitary character, and thus maintained a securitised mentality. This mentality partly stemmed 
from the institutional memory of the military during the Cold War and the rigid bi-polar and 
security-oriented lenses it saw the world through back then. 
                                                          
 152 Aras, 2001, pp. 107–108. 
 153 Olson, 2004, p. 28–29. 
 127 
 
The change in the dynamics of the civil-military relationship allowed policy-makers to 
pursue policy shifts more confidently and effectively, as they did with Iran, rather than 
feeling obliged to make particular policy choices in line with the military’s policy 
preferences. Especially in the 1990s, the military’s black-or-white approach had significantly 
limited policy-makers’ ability to revise foreign policy choices and manoeuvre when faced 
with unexpected developments.  
The new era was thus marked not only by a number of international developments that 
required a revision in Turkey’s relationship with Iran, but also by important changes in 
Turkey’s domestic politics. Whereas close links between conservative businessmen and the 
JDP helped to carry out revisions in Turkey’s attitude toward Iran more effectively with a 
reinforcing economic dimension, the military’s gradual loss of influence allowed the political 
elite to act without the fear of being toppled or being financially or economically punished as 
the memories of the post-modern coup of February 1997 suggest. 
Concluding Remarks: Assessing the Strength of NCR vis-à-vis Primordialist/Naïve 
Culturalist Accounts 
 
This research positions itself against naïve culturalist and primordial assumptions about the 
new Turkey. Mark L Haas, for example, considers that it is the norm for us to witness a 
rapprochement between Turkey and Iran during Islamist governments and a tension during 
the Kemalist ones. In line with this assumption, Haas argues that the JDP, as an Islamist 
party, brought an era of renewed interest in closer relations with Iran. However, if we assume 
that the rapprochement between the two countries is due simply to ideology and shared 
values, major flaws will become apparent. For instance, a cultural or ideological explanation 
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regarding the way the Northern Iraq question that followed the 2003 Iraq War pushed Turkey 
and Iran towards each other seems quite difficult to explain in that light.154  
Within the context of the theoretical approach adopted in this research, the question of 
Northern Iraq is one of the major reasons behind the rapprochement between Turkey and 
Iran’s after 2003. The potential emergence of an independent Kurdish entity and the 
possibility of a more powerful PKK in Turkey and PJAK in Iran pushed the two sides 
towards each other. As another significant critical juncture, the Iranian nuclear programme 
and Turkey’s attitude to it were widely discussed. Primordialist accounts have a tendency to 
argue that the JDP’s ideological stance is the reason for Turkey’s support for the Iranian 
nuclear programme.155 However, rather than ideological affinity, it was the above- mentioned 
interest-driven reasons that pushed Turkey to pursue such a policy line.  
When considering the tension that Turkey and Iran experienced in the Arab Spring era 
and beyond,156 the role played by power- and interest-related concerns becomes even more 
visible. While domestic ideological settings remained constant, this tension clearly indicated 
how international shifts, with their direct impact on individual states’ interest-driven 
calculations, outweighed ideological assumptions. Unsurprisingly, Turkey and Iran’s 
individual ambitions to fill the power vacuum in the MENA region and claim the position of 
the leading regional power inflamed their rivalry. The uprising in Syria which turned into a 
fully-fledged civil war also caused a major blow to the overall rapprochement between the 
two countries. Iranian concerns were about “losing Syria”—its most reliable regional 
partner—and the potential rise of Turkey to regional leadership if the Syrian government 
were to be toppled—whereas Turkey’s goal of increasing its influence in the region in a 
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power vacuum via like-minded groups and political parties just gave Iran the reason to 
believe that it should be challenged.  
Even though Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatolah Sayyed Ali Khamanei stated in 2014 
that the two countries were enjoying the peak point of their relationship,157 the fact of their 
clashing views regarding the Arab Spring and beyond, the tension over BMDS scheme and 
their competition over Syria and Iraq say otherwise. A key fracture point was the Russian 
involvement in the Syrian conflict, which engendered a Russian-Iranian axis that saw itself 
standing against the Western alliance, which included Turkey. The normalisation signals 
between Turkey and Russia in the summer of 2016, followed by the Iranian Foreign 
Minister’s visit to Turkey just four days after the meeting between Putin and Erdoğan, may 
repair some of the tension the relationship endured for the near future. Turkey’s 
announcement that it would participate in air strikes after the meeting between Erdoğan and 
Putin (it was widely argued that the jet crisis and Russian deployment of air defence systems 
in Syria was the reason behind Turkey’s inability to do so since the jet crisis between Turkey 
and Russia) and that Iran and Turkey would cooperate in terms of Syria are quite striking 
developments which need to be monitored.158 Iran’s tacit approval of the Turkish armed 
forces’ support to FSA in Northern Syria in their effort to retake Jarablus from ISIS in August 
2016 should also be considered within this recently emerging context. 
In addition to the changes stemming from international and regional shifts and 
subsequent changes in Turkey’s policies regarding Iran, domestic factors played an important 
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role in expanding Turkey’s ability to pursue policies in line with this new attitude. Turkey 
was trying to make that best of emerging windows of opportunity during this period of 
changing dynamics. Two major phenomena contributed to the overall rapprochement and 
Turkey’s more flexible attitude toward Iran. These were the close links between the JDP and 
conservative businessmen and the military’s loss of influence over civilian policy-making. 
Conservative business associations, going beyond the boundaries of pre-established economic 
links, contributed to rapprochement efforts through rhetorical support and by intensifying 
their business trips and trade activity. Meanwhile, the military’s loss of influence over policy-
making as the leading component of the anti-Iran camp helped statesmen emancipate 
themselves from a rigid, alarmist and ideologically-driven approach adopted by the old elite 
and the military’s occasionally hawkish attitude towards Iran. Moreover, the military’s 
demise contributed to further rapprochement between the two until 2011, showing the 
secondary importance of shifts at the domestic level. Still, since 2011, interest-driven clashes 
have resulted in a worsening of the bilateral relationship, even though the military’s influence 
over civilian policy-makers in their policy choices did not undergo any kind of positive 
change.159  
A combination of all these factors resulted in a different atmosphere in the Turkish-
Iranian relationship, which suffered insecurities that stemmed from interest- and power-
related calculations and adjustments. The two “have retained cordial relations characterised 
by occasional outbreaks of crisis that are quickly contained and ameliorated through 
diplomatic channels.”160 The next chapter will focus on the relationship between Turkey and 
Israel especially since the Iraq War, including recent reconciliation, and an exploration of the 
impact of developments at both international and domestic levels on the relationship. 
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Chapter 4: The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: From Partners to Foes and 
towards Interest-Driven Rapprochement 
 
The previous chapter investigated the dynamics behind the changes and continuities in the 
Turkish-Iranian relationship, with a primary focus on Turkey’s JDP era. Based on this 
analysis, I questioned the validity of primordialist ideology and value-centred accounts and 
demonstrated the explanatory power of a neoclassical realist analysis with its emphasis on 
power- and interest-driven motivations without ignoring the secondary role of selected 
domestic factors.  
In this chapter, another controversial bilateral relationship, the one between Turkey and 
Israel, will be analysed. This relationship, once a strategic partnership, has experienced 
several important points of tension over the last decade, as well as efforts on both sides to 
normalise it.  
The chapter will begin by offering a brief historical background on the bilateral 
relationship in order to compare the ups and downs in the relationship during the Cold War 
period. Then, the era of strategic partnership in the 1990s and the escalating tensions of the 
last decade will be discussed, before touching upon recent normalisation efforts. The chapter 
will then investigate critical junctures at the international level in the light of their effects on 
Turkey’s attitude toward Israel. These critical junctures include the Iraq War and clashing 
views over Northern Iraq, their divergence about the Iranian nuclear programme, Operation 
Cast Lead and its damage to Turkey’s mediation efforts, as well as the Arab Spring with the 
post-Arab Spring re-evaluation of the relationship. The impact of the two principal domestic 
factors which contributed to the rise of state power will also be discussed; firstly the attitude 
of conservative businessmen who enjoy close ties to the JDP, and secondly the diminishing 
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influence of the Turkish military—the most ardent supporters of the Turkish-Israeli strategic 
partnership in the 1990s. After discussing the recent signs of normalisation in the relationship 
with possible motivations behind it, I will conclude the chapter by discussing whether values 
and ideologies or interest-driven adjustments have been the key motivation behind the ups 
and downs of this bilateral relationship. 
The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Do Old Friends Make the Worst Enemies? 
 
In terms of Turkey’s changing attitudes towards certain actors—especially over the last 
decade—Turkey’s relationship with Israel is probably the most controversial one. The 
relationship underwent a transformation from cooperation to hostility within less than a 
decade, and as of mid-2016 is once more on its way to rapprochement.  
In the immediate post-Cold War era, close partnership with Israel was one of the most 
important components of Turkey’s grand strategy. To some extent, Turkey’s hostile relations 
with Syria and Iran in this era were also both a reason and consequence of this close bilateral 
contact.  
However, the picture has reversed itself over the last decade, especially leading up to 
the Arab Spring. Turkey had desecuritised its relations with Syria and Iran to a great extent. 
However, Turkey’s desire to maximise power, pursue its interests and raise its regional 
profile caused clashes with Israel—although those very same motivations prevented it from 
totally burning bridges. There seems to exist a non-verbal agreement that while both sides 
accept that the relationship may not recover fully in the short term, they are aware of the fact 
that the relationship is not expendable either, which is the reason why keeping channels of 
communication open  seem to be a wise policy choice. The environment in the wake of the 
Arab Spring (Turkey’s deteriorated relationship and tension with Syria, the damage taken by 
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its relations with Iran and Iraq, and the consequent re-securitisation of Turkey’s attitude to its 
immediate neighbours) offers a fertile ground for a revision in the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship. 
Before investigating the details of the external and internal dynamics affecting the 
Turkish attitudes towards Israel, I will present a brief historical background in order to 
compare different phases of the relationship up to the JDP era. 
Historical Background 
 
When the Ottoman Empire welcomed the Sephardim Jews in 1492, they provided safe havens 
for them far from the atrocities they faced in Spain. This marked the start of a friendly and 
cooperative bilateral relationship between the Jews and the Turks. According to Israeli chargé 
d’affaires Amira Oron, this important moment of history has been taught in Israeli schools 
and the Israeli people still acknowledge and appreciate the Ottoman Empire’s help.1 Amikam 
Nachmani notes that “Historically, the Jews were never persecuted in Turkey, no Jewish 
blood had ever been spilled there by Turks and the Turks harboured no traditional enmity 
towards the Jews”.2 Even when the Ottoman millet system3 ended after the proclamation of 
the Republic of Turkey and Turkey’s nation-building process brought peace, the Jews’ 
situation in Turkey was much better than their situation in Europe.  
The Turkish-Israeli relationship entered a new era with the proclamation of the State of 
Israel in 1948. Jewish emigration from Turkey to Palestine before and after the proclamation 
occurred quite peacefully. Strengthening these ties further, Labour Zionism and Kemalism, 
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with their parallel struggles to secularise the two societies after centuries of religion-based 
identification and to reform their societies’ bureaucratic and ideological codes, saw each 
other as potential partners.4 Turkey’s de facto recognition of the State of Israel in March 
1949—their exchange of chargés d’affaires and Turkey’s de jure recognition in January 
1950—came to be seen by the Arab world as a betrayal.5 Turkey was the first predominantly 
Muslim-populated country to recognise the State of Israel. Comparisons were made between 
Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II’s earlier tough stance against Israeli territorial demands over 
Palestine in return for clearing Ottoman debts at a time of serious economic crisis and the 
Turkish recognition of Israel.6 Turkey’s response to such criticism was to refer to the 
Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel in February 1949 and negotiations over 
armistices between other Arab countries and Israel.  Turkey argued that those steps meant de 
facto recognition already.7 
The Cold War Era 
 
The era between the proclamation of the State of Israel and the 1990s was marked by a 
delicate balancing effort in terms of Turkey’s policy line regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
On one hand, Turkey was trying to distance itself from the Arab Middle East, mainly because 
of the old elite’s insistence on the Kemalist goal of cutting Turkey’s ties with its Ottoman 
past. On the other, it would have been costly in regional and domestic terms to antagonise the 
Arab world and rely on a relationship with Israel alone. Regionally, such a policy would have 
serious consequences, especially in terms of Turkey’s growing need for energy resources. 
                                                          
4 For a more detailed analysis on the ‘religious’ political parties in both countries, see Sultan Tepe, “Religious 
Parties and Democracy: A Comparative Assessment of Israel and Turkey”, Democratization, 12: 3 (2005), pp. 
283-307. 
5 Ofra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, “Old grievances, new fears: Arab perceptions of Turkey and its alignment with 
Israel”, Middle Eastern Studies, 37: 2 (2001), 50–92 at p. 50 and Bishku, 2006, p. 181. 
6 Bengio and Özcan, 2001, p. 57–58. 
7 Gruen, 1995, p. 45. 
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Domestically, the Palestine question has captured a great deal of attention in Turkey, not only 
among Islamist and conservative groups but also among revolutionary leftist groups, making 
it a valuable asset for achieving electoral success.  
Michael Bishku, a leading professor of history at Augusta University and an important 
scholar of Israel’s foreign policy and Turkey-Israel relations, summarises the relationship in 
the Cold War as follows: “During the late 1950s it [Turkey] collaborated with Israel, Iran and 
Ethiopia in a ‘peripheral alliance’ directed against the Arab world, but tried to keep those 
connections low key.”8 According to Amira Oron, Israel’s chargé d’affaires in Ankara, in an 
“Arab-Muslim ocean”, Israel’s David Ben-Gurion made the wise choice of fostering a 
doctrine of cooperation with like-minded countries—including Turkey and Iran—during this 
era. This doctrine laid the ground for Israel’s efforts to promote closer ties with Turkey, and 
acted as the basis of the future rapprochement between the two countries.  
During the 1960s, Turkey attempted to balance its relations with the Arab world and 
Israel. Over the following two decades, due to its dependence on hydrocarbons which came 
in part from the Arab world, Turkey attempted to move closer to the Arab states politically 
and economically, especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In this era the oil crisis acted as 
a further catalyst for rapprochement with Arab countries.9 Following the oil crisis, it was not 
only Turkey which revised its relationship with Israel and the Arab world. Oron states that 
Israel experienced a similar shift in foreign policy of most of the European powers including 
France, with which Israel had enjoyed a fairly close relationship up to that point.10 
Later in the 1970s, Turkey established relations with the PLO and was not particularly 
supportive of Sadat’s peace with Israel; part of that had to do with a continued distrust of 
                                                          
 8 Michael Bishku, personal communication, 26/2/2016. 
 9 Aytürk, personal communication, 12/3/2016. 
10 Amira Oron, personal communication, 25/5/2016. 
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Egypt’s intentions in the Middle East as well as the Turkish dependency on the Arab oil.11 
Bishku stated that: 
 
 In general, since the 1970s, Turkey’s closeness of connections with either Israel 
or countries in the Arab world tended to fluctuate in large part with the price of oil 
which affected economic conditions in the country; however, in general, since the 
1960s it has seen itself as attempting to balance those relations in principle.12  
 
In the Cold War era there were other important incidents that shaped the longer term 
trends in the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Turkey withdrew its chargé d’affaires due to the 
Suez Crisis in 1956, downgrading its diplomatic relations to second secretary status. In 1980 
Turkey closed its embassy in Jerusalem after the Knesset’s decision to declare the city (which 
was the first qiblah or prayer direction of the Muslims) as the capital of Israel. Turkey’s 
constant reiteration of its demands for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied 
territories was also a factor that damaged their bilateral relationship.13 
However, larger-scale Cold War settings held sway over these occasional points of 
tension. A quartet of countries—the US, Turkey, Israel and Iran (until 1979)—was shaped 
along structural lines that stemmed from the dynamics of the bipolar international system. 
This informal alliance was formed in order to defend the Middle East as a whole from the 
communist threat and to contain the threat if and when necessary. So, despite occasional 
crises, Ben-Gurion’s peripheral alliance doctrine and Cold War dynamics helped maintain a 
                                                          
11 Michael Bishku, personal communication, 26/2/2016. 
12 Bishku, personal communication, 26/2/2016. 
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strong relationship between Turkey and Israel during this era.14 This bilateral relationship 
was quite important for the US policy in the region, too. Even though the US maintained 
military presence at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, Israel’s geographical position at the heart 
of the Arab world was regarded by the US as a potential natural aircraft carrier and as a key 
asset in case of possible Soviet penetration into the region.15 This intertwining strategic and 
realpolitik calculations of a trilateral relationship pushed the two sides into maintaining their 
relationship, even as Turkey takes delicate steps with respect to the Arab world in order not 
to alienate Israel’s traditional enemies, on whom it relied for energy resources.  
The end of the Cold War switched Turkish attention from the Soviets on its northern 
borders to the south, due to heightening tensions in the Middle East coupled with Turkey’s 
own challenge of coping with the PKK. Thus, whereas Israel needed “second strike 
capability” in the region where it felt greatly threatened by its Arab neighbours as well as 
Iran, Turkey was striving to improve the effectiveness of its fight against the PKK and 
increase its deterrence against its immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, the relationship 
between Turkey and Israel seemed to benefit both countries, and paved the way for the 
bilateral military and defence-related deals in the 1990s. According to İlker Aytürk, a 
renowned scholar who studied Israeli politics and the Turkish-Israeli relationship, during the 
Cold War, the relationship was similar to a “secret affair” which would, according to Ben-
Gurion, gradually turned into a “full marriage” in the post-Cold War era. 16 
 
                                                          
14 Oron, 25/5/2016. 
15 İlker Aytürk, personal communciation, 12/3/2016. 
16 Aytürk, personal communication, 12/3/2016. 
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Making Sense of Changes in Turkey-Israel Relations 
Major International and Regional Developments as Critical Junctures 
 
a- The End of the Cold War, the Oslo Accords and Turkey’s Revision of Its Middle East 
Policy 
 
The end of the Cold War reduced Turkey’s fears that its political and economic moves 
in the region would trigger a regional conflict which would have global consequences 
because of regional powers’ alignment with rival camps. Almost simultaneously, the 
relationship between Israel and the Arab world became more relaxed, which in turn affected 
the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Aytürk argues that the pattern of the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship had been shaped in line with the changes in the Arab-Israeli relationship,17 an 
assumption proved valid by the timing of the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement after the positive 
achievements within this context in the 1990s. Thanks to the promising atmosphere of Arab-
Israeli relations in the 1990s, Turkey took advantage of the opportunity to improve its 
relationship with Israel from a more comfortable standpoint. This improvement began after 
the start of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process in 1991, continued with the Madrid Peace 
Conference, and was furthered by the 1993 Oslo Accords and the successful peace talks 
between Jordan and Israel in 1994.18 Improving relations between the Arab countries and 
Israel meant that a regional bloc of Arab countries with the potential to isolate Turkey would 
not be formed if relations between Turkey and Israel became closer still.  
Turkey found a partner in Israel that would also provide it with the necessary military and 
technological expertise it needed. This military support would also come from Israel without 
echoing the European and to some extent the US criticisms about Turkey’s fight against the 
                                                          
 17 Aytürk, personal communication, 12/3/2016. 
18 Meliha Altunışık, “Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the post-Cold War Era”, Middle Eastern Studies, 36: 2 
(2000), pp. 172–191, p. 174 and George E. Gruen, “Where is Turkey Heading? Implications for the United 
States, Israel, and Middle East Peace”, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National 
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PKK. Those criticisms had direct consequences such as the suspension of arms shipments by 
Germany and the US several times in the 1990s.19 Thanks to their shared concerns, Israel 
seemed to be the perfect candidate in Turkey’s search for an ally in the region on its post-
Cold War return to the region. This was not only due to both countries’ problematic relations 
with Iraq, Iran and Syria. Western reluctance to provide Turkey with its required military 
assets and capabilities within the context of its fight against the PKK acted as a further 
catalyst. Having Israel as an ally could multiply Turkey’s deterrence in its immediate 
neighbourhood, while also raising Turkey’s regional profile. 
The Turkish military proved an eager supporter of this partnership with Israel not just 
because Israel would be a more reliable provider of military hardware and arms than Europe 
or NATO allies. The military eagerly supported the rapprochement also due to its own critical 
ideological stance against Turkey’s Muslim neighbours. For the military, the relationship was 
also regarded as a counterweight against “Islamist” groups in Turkey in an era of growing 
concerns about a religious takeover of Turkey’s secular structure. Economic ties between the 
two countries became much stronger, and the military industry benefitted greatly from this. 
The most symbolic embodiment of this rapprochement and the military’s role in it, was the 
so-called “Generals’ Agreements” in 1996.  
 
 
The “Generals’ Agreements” and the Era of Strategic Partnership 
 
The powerful defence establishments of the two countries [Israel and Turkey] are 
the bureaucratic drivers of the relationship. Both have strong vested interests in 
                                                          
19 Robins, 2003, p. 195. 
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maintaining the centrality of the ties, the Turkish generals for ideological and 
strategic reasons, the Israelis primarily for matters of military-related commerce. 
         Philip Robins20 
Close contact between Israel and a predominantly Muslim-populated country—including the 
use of its airspace, joint military exercises and intelligence sharing—was exceptional, and 
such an intimate relationship carried the potential to alter regional power calculus by 
engendering a new axis.  
The era of rapprochement began with the first Turkish ministerial visit to Israel by 
Abdülkadir Ateş, the then Turkish Minister of Tourism, in 1992. Numerous visits followed 
over the next few years, right up to presidential level, starting with the Israeli President Ezer 
Weizman’s visit in 1994 as the first official presidential visit to Turkey, and Tansu Çiller’s 
reciprocal visit to Israel as the first serving Prime Minister of Turkey visiting the country.21 
The visits were followed by an important agreement in 1993 focusing on economic 
cooperation and educational exchanges.22 In this immediate post-Cold War era, the volume of 
Turkish-Israeli trade increased by 156 percent between 1992 and 1994, foreshadowing even 
higher future levels. Meanwhile, the number of Israeli tourists rose from 7,000 in 1986 to 
160,000 in 1992 and 350,000 in 1994.23  
Following these political, educational, social and economic overtures, military 
cooperation and defence agreements were penned in 1996. Even though Turkish officials had 
announced in 1992 that improving ties with Israel would not include military cooperation, the 
                                                          
20 Robins, 2003, p. 268. 
21 Ibid., p. 248. 
22 Daniela Huber and Nathalie Tocci, “Behind the Scenes of Turkish-Israeli Breakthrough”, IAI Working Papers, 
13:15 (2013), p.3–4. 
23 Altunışık, 2000, p. 174;  Lochery, Neill (1998), “Israel and Turkey: Deepening ties and strategic 
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1996 agreements between the two countries said otherwise. In fact, as early as 1994, the two 
sides concluded an agreement on intelligence sharing and police cooperation.24 
In 1996, Turkish defence minister Oltan Sungurlu announced the Turkish-Israeli 
Military Training and Cooperation Agreement of 21–23 February.25 This agreement provided 
Israel with access to Turkish airspace and envisaged military exchanges in the form of Israeli 
and Turkish pilots visiting one another. These visits would provide Israeli pilots with the 
experience of long-range flights which they lack due to their country’s size. The agreement 
also forsees eight joint air exercises a year (four in each state).26 It also referred to joint 
military exercises and intelligence sharing, and offered Turkish pilots training in advanced 
military air technologies. Permission was also granted for Israeli naval vessels to use Turkish 
ports, and military personnel and equipment exchanges would also take place.27 These newly 
gained capabilities were extremely important for Israel in case of a possible surprise attack 
coming from its neighbours, at which point it would have no choice but to use the “Anatolian 
plateau” as a base for retaliation and would definitely require the experience they can gain 
with joint manoeuvres and long-range flights.28 
Another agreement was signed on 26–28 August 1996 focusing on technology transfer 
and the education of researchers and scholars in the defence sector.29 Between 1996 and 
                                                          
24 Gruen, 1997, p.7. 
25 Robins, 2003, p. 258–265. 
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1997, the number of visits from both sides increased further, especially among the high 
commander cadre and ministers of defence, who spent a great deal of effort investigating how 
to achieve the military goals listed above as effectively as possible. In 1998, a further 
important step was taken by increasing the number of Turkish military attachés in Tel Aviv to 
three—the same number as Turkey’s main defence trading partners, namely the US, Germany 
and France.30 
 
The Economic Dimension of the Rapprochement 
 
The economic dimension was an important component of the rapprochement between Turkey 
and Israel in the 1990s. A significant amount of the era’s economic activity was related to 
arms sales and military modernisation projects. By encouraging and even pressurising policy-
makers for new deals, the Turkish military succeeded in reinforcing the economic dimension 
of the rapprochement. 
The Israeli Defence Industry was asked in 1996 to assist with a five-year project to 
modernise 54 Turkish Phantom F-4s. These outdated aircraft from the Vietnam War era were 
to be converted into “Phantom 2000s” with greater manoeuvrability, more fire power and 
better vision.31 The total project cost was an estimated $600–650 million, which included 
equipping the planes with Popeye-I missiles.32 The project was part of a broader project 
which included modernising Turkish artillery, making the deal worth $2 billion.33 In 1997, 
Israel also won a tender to modernise Turkish F-5s,34 despite heavy criticism from the then 
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Prime Minister Erbakan. He tried to prevent the deal with sharp criticisms about the interest 
payments. Critical voices from the military high command (including the then Air Force 
Commander and Chief of the General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı) put pressure on Erbakan, 
and the deal was signed, offering further proof of how the military was able to control the 
decisions of elected politicians during that era.35 
During the Yılmaz-Çiller government that preceded the coalition formed between 
Erbakan and Çiller,36 two defence ministers with close ties to their armed forces agreed on 
the co-production of Popeye II air-to-ground missiles, and the prospect for co-producing 
Delilah cruise missiles was negotiated the following year. A new free trade agreement was 
also signed and ratified under this government. Cefi Kamhi, scion of a well-known Jewish 
Turkish family, was appointed head of the parliamentary Foreign Relations Commission.37 In 
2002, during the coalition between Mesut Yılmaz’s Motherland Party, Bülent Ecevit’s 
Democratic Left Party and Devlet Bahçeli’s Nationalist Movement Party, Israel Military 
Industries (IMI) won a deal worth $688 million to modernise Turkish M-60 tanks.38 When 
the economic crisis of the early 2000s dramatically damaged the Turkish economy, another 
deal—by far the most ambitious of its kind and worth almost $20 billion, was in the 
pipeline.39 As previously mentioned, the two countries also signed a free trade agreement in 
1996 which resulted in an impressive increase in bilateral trade between 1996 and 2000, from 
$400 million to $2 billion.40 When studied over a longer period (1987–2001) this change is 
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seen to be even more dramatic, rising from a modest $54 million to $2 billion.41 Agreements 
on the prevention of double-taxation between the two countries in 1997 and on reciprocal 
bilateral investment played major roles in this rise.42 
During the same period, the share of the Arab countries in Turkey’s overall trade fell 
significantly, almost halving between 1987 and 1993 from around 27 percent to 14 percent in 
terms of exports and from 19 percent to 11 percent in terms of imports.43 In the face of 
Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with Syria and Iran, it was the Israeli economic 
partnership that kept hopes alive as far as the Middle Eastern dimension of Turkey’s 
economic interactivity abroad.  
 
Making Sense of the Rapprochement in the 1990s 
 
Israel and Turkey shared threat perceptions about Syria and Iran, and they both felt alienated 
or at least isolated in the region, sharing a deep-rooted feeling of being surrounded by hostile 
neighbours. In order to pursue their interests—be it avoiding an existential threat in the case 
of Israeli concerns about its Arab neighbours or increasing its relative advantage as well as 
improving its capability in its fight against the PKK in the case of Turkey—a strong strategic 
partnership was forged.  
While Israel saw Syria and Iran as existential threats, Turkey’s concerns about their 
support for the PKK and alleged Iranian efforts to export its regime helped bring the two 
countries closer. In the light of this atmosphere it came as no surprise when Turkey’s Chief of 
General Staff, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı, and Prime Minister Çiller stated in 1997 that Iran and 
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Syria were the “headquarters of terrorism” in their meetings with Israeli Foreign Minister 
David Levy.44 Along with these shared concerns, their “sense of otherness”45 and “fear of 
marginalization”46 constituted the basis of their motivation to establish and maintain a close 
relationship with each other. The timing, coupled with the positive atmosphere in the post-
Madrid and Oslo process, was perfect for such a rapprochement in the second half of the 
1990s. Oron rightly stated that the same shared concerns would not have made such a close 
relationship possible, for instance, back in the 1960s.47 
One of the most vital of Turkey’s motivations for this bilateral relationship was its fight 
against the PKK, a fight that reached its zenith in the 1990s and coincided with the peak point 
of its relationship with Israel. Within less than two decades, this question ironically was to 
turn into the main point of tension between the two countries, devastating the relationship, 
something which will be covered later in this chapter under the discussion of their clashing 
views over Northern Iraq. In the 1990s, EU countries and the US were acting at best 
reluctantly, and chose not to provide necessary technology and equipment transfers to 
Turkey. Their concerns stemmed from human rights issues, minority treatment and the use of 
excessive force in Turkey’s fight against terrorism. Such criticisms were directed extensively 
at Turkey in the 1990s, and resulted in a diminution in Turkey’s expectations of buying 
necessary military equipment from Germany, France or the UK. Turkish policy-makers 
therefore felt the need to seek other potential partners which would on one hand provide the 
necessary assets to tackle terrorism, and on the other not question the ways Turkey chose to 
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fight it.48 This international atmosphere left Israel as an ideal candidate, with its advanced 
military industry and supportive—or at least indifferent—stance regarding Turkey’s fight 
against terrorism.49  
Another shared position for both countries was a common discontent with EU policies. 
Due to the EU’s controversial stance on the Palestinian-Israeli question, Israel’s attitude 
towards the Union and its suspicions about the future steps and intentions of European 
countries forced Israel and the EU into a combative stance.50 On the other hand, the 1997 
meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference condemned Turkey’s military raids 
into Northern Iraq, whilst Arab countries constantly refused to recognise the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus. Adding to this feeling of regional disappointment, the same 
year brought disappointment to Turkey on another front, when the EU excluded it from the 
list of candidate countries to begin negotiations within in 1997 in Helsinki. This served to 
increase Turkey’s feelings of isolation.51 With respect to the Turkish and Israeli feelings 
about the EU, Yücel Bozdağlı argues that: 
 
 Although both are heavily integrated into the European economic order through 
their respective free trade agreements with the European Union, neither has been 
integrated into the political order and culturally they are not accepted as European 
either.52 
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As a further catalyst for the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement in this era, the Cupertino 
agreement between Greece and Syria in 199553 was perceived as a move to limit Turkey’s 
capability for manoeuvre in the region. The agreement was important in terms of Turkey’s 
regional power position, and was drawn up between the two countries with which Turkey 
was not enjoying particularly favourable relations at that time due to the crisis in the Aegean 
Sea with Greece and the question of Syrian support for the PKK. The agreement further 
reinforced Turkey’s “two and a half wars” strategy, which had been devised in preparation 
for simultaneous fights with Greece, Syria and the PKK if necessary. 
For Turkey, the relationship with Israel also provided the support of a strong lobby in 
Washington D.C.54 This lobby would not only help Turkey in its diplomatic fight against the 
Armenian claims about the tragic incidents of 1915. It was also expected to help Turkey with 
its needed economic support. Thanks to the influence of this lobby, Ariel Sharon assured 
Kemal Derviş—the former Minister of Economic Affairs between 2001 and 2002 who was in 
charge of Turkey’s recovery from the economic crisis of 200155—that Israel would take 
every necessary step to provide Turkey with necessary funds. This assurance was interpreted 
as a reference to direct funding from the US as well as from international monetary 
organisations in which the US wielded much negotiation power.56 
The bilateral relationship between Turkey and Israel provided a unique opportunity to 
end Israel’s regional isolation by reaching the “periphery of the Middle East”. This term was 
a conceptualisation which, included Iran up until 1979. In more general terms, the idea was in 
line with Ben-Gurion’s concept of “peripheral states” which underlined the importance of 
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neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Iran to Israeli security.57 The implication of this 
concept was that Israeli links with these countries may someday turn into a life-line in case of 
a conflict in the region by allowing Israel to conduct secondary strikes and avoid suffering 
despite its limited physical assets.58 Based on this strategic conceptualisation, all the 
governments in the State of Israel’s six decade history have shared the same pragmatic 
approach in their relations with Turkey, be it Labour or Likud.59 This was most apparent in 
the two agreements of 1996, which were negotiated during Rabin’s term and concluded under 
the Peres government.60 
But what would happen if Turkish and/or Israeli calculations underwent a change and 
their interests came into conflict? The answer came with the Iraq War of 2003, which brought 
with it a clash between the two countries over Northern Iraq.  
 
b- Reshuffling the Cards: the Iraq War and its Aftermath 
The Question of Northern Iraq and the First Major Blow to the Relationship 
 
Northern Iraq was one of the major points of divergence between Israel and Turkey in the 
aftermath of the Iraq War in 2003. Divergent views and a clash of interests over the region 
questioned the fundamental precepts and the very nature of their bilateral relationship.61 
Turkey and Israel had shared a common stance during the Gulf War in 1991, supporting the 
operation on a shared belief that Saddam Hussein should be firmly dealt with.62 However, the 
war sowed the seeds of the Northern Iraq question due to the emergence of a power vacuum 
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and the degree of autonomy the Kurds achieved under the new Iraqi structure. 
Unsurprisingly, the Iraqi Kurds’ achievements were not received positively by Turkey due to 
the potential spill-over effects on Turkey, the country’s continuing fight with the PKK, and 
the prospect of an independent Kurdish state.  
In 2001, within the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the prospects for 
Turkish-Israeli bilateral cooperation were bright. There were rumours that 12 percent of 
Israeli naval and air forces would be stationed in Turkey, and some of their Chariot-3 tanks 
would be deployed in south-eastern Turkey as well. Meanwhile, strengthening ties between 
Israel and Azerbaijan, and the powerful Israeli support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil 
pipeline (BTC) signalled a tripartite regional front in the post-9/11 era that stretched from the 
Caucasus to the Middle East.63 So it seems no coincidence that while the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship was entering troubled waters because of the Northern Iraq issue, Eric Edelman 
was appointed as the third American Jewish ambassador to Turkey in less than a decade, with 
Wolfowitz (who had a well-earned reputation among the American Jewish lobby) supporting 
this move in particular and the Turkish-Israeli alliance in general.64  
There has been growing contact between Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq, the US and 
Israel, especially since the Gulf War. Turkey’s objection to an independent Kurdish state in 
Northern Iraq clashed with Israeli policies in the post-Iraq War environment after 2003, 
which were perceived as supportive of the idea of an independent Kurdish entity in the 
region. Israel might have perceived a greater advantage in the presence of such an entity in 
the long-run, as it would limit its over-dependence on its relationship with Turkey, with 
which Israel had experienced crises in the more distant past and perhaps foresaw future 
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crises.65 Meanwhile, Turkish media and politicians accused Israel of supporting the PKK 
militants in the region, where it once helped Turkey to establish listening posts to fight the 
PKK more effectively.66 Turkey had strong concerns over the power vacuum that had 
emerged after the Iraq War—a vacuum that could threaten Iraqi territorial integrity and 
endanger regional stability in Turkey’s south and south-eastern regions—and adopted a 
stance against an independent Kurdish entity in the region. However, according to Michael 
Bishku:  
 
Israel would love to see the establishment of a Kurdish state, whether in Iraq alone 
or including Syrian territory as well. Such a state would probably establish formal 
diplomatic relations with Israel and provide a better geostrategic situation for 
Israel vis- à -vis Iran and adversarial Arab states.67  
 
Similarly, Aytürk argued that for Israel, a Kurdish state would be strategically significant for 
Israeli regional strategy which urges forging close ties with a non-Arab periphery.68 Amira 
Oron emphasised Israeli ties with the Kurds in Iraq that had existed since the 1950s and 
stressed the presence of a Kurdish population in Israel. She considered that Kurds have 
always been an important partner within the context of this periphery doctrine, despite 
Israel’s support for Turkish interests and the shared opinion that the PKK is a terrorist 
organisation.69 
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For Israel, establishing close contact with non-Arab entities in the region had been an 
important part of its grand strategy since the proclamation of the State of Israel. As such, 
many analysts considered that “there is nothing surprising about” Israeli desires to extend this 
policy line to the Iraqi Kurds. Tür further argued that it would be more surprising to see Israel 
not forging a relationship with the Kurds, considering the close contact the two sides enjoyed 
back in the 1970s.70 The assumption that Jews and Kurds had a moral affinity (or at least 
some kind of empathy towards each other since the two communities had both struggled to 
establish their own states) along with the existence of around 160,000 Kurds with Jewish 
origin—or vice versa—further contributed to Turkey’s concerns.71 In 2009, according to a 
poll conducted by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 67 per cent of Kurds viewed 
establishing diplomatic relations with Israel as an important forward step towards 
independence. Furthermore, the historical links mentioned by Bengio—such as Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani’s two secret visits to Israel in 1968 and 1975 and Israel’s support to the 
Kurds in Iraq during their uprisings—historically reinforced these concerns.72  
As far as Northern Iraq was concerned, the Iranian position was much closer to that of 
Turkey, and Turkish pressure on Syria to cut off its aid to the PKK before the war was 
successful.73 Considering the improvements in its relationships with Iran and Syria during the 
JDR rule up to the Arab Spring, the necessity for Turkey to return to its previous high level of 
cooperation with Israel diminished, as did the sense of isolation and otherness that Turkey 
had once shared with Israel. Similarly, the old sense of being sidelined in the Turkish-EU 
relationship also decreased following the EU decision to start official talks on Turkey’s 
accession in 2005—even though those accession talks did not offer high hopes or even short-
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term prospects for Turkey. Meanwhile, the gulf between Israel and the EU remained constant. 
Turkey and Israel’s shared sense of otherness therefore underwent a dramatic change.  
Over the following years, several other developments damaged the relationship further. 
For example, the relationship took a serious damage when Erdoğan drew parallels between 
terrorists and Israel due to the Israeli killing of civilians74 and after his Ha’aretz interview in 
2004, in which he likened the fate of Jews in Spain in the 15th century to the suffering of the 
Palestinians at the hands of Israel today.75 Adding to this tension, the JDP invited Khalid 
Mashaal, Hamas’ leader in exile, to visit Turkey in 2006. On several occasions Mashaal 
stressed the way Abdulhamid II defied the Zionists over Palestine and how he expected much 
more activism on Turkey’s side with respect to Hamas’ fight against Israel.76 Unsurprisingly, 
Mashaal’s comments faced severe criticism in Israel, while Turkey’s harsh criticisms of 
Israeli actions in Lebanon in 200677 further damaged the unique bilateral contact between 
Israel and Turkey. At the same time, Turkey’s policy-makers criticised Israel’s nuclear 
weapons programme heavily, accusing not only Israel but the West of “turning a blind eye to 
Israeli nuclear weapons”78 and referring to a nuclear Israel as a threat to regional peace.79 
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The Other Side of the Coin: Controlling the Tension up to 2010 
 
While bilateral tension was on the rise in the post-2003 period, there were still subtle signs of 
hope. In 2003, under the JDP government, the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül radioed 
down his condolences to Israel over a recent suicide bombing while flying with Arab leaders 
over Iraq. The JDP also expressed vocal support for Israeli endeavours to restart peace 
negotiations with Palestinians and stated that these negotiations could be hosted in Turkey.80 
After2003when the JDP came to power, for the following several years, official visits became 
as frequent and as high profile as they had been before. In 2003 alone, Israel’s Foreign 
Minister, Minister of Defence and President all visited Turkey. Following these visits indirect 
talks between Syria and Israel were re-started after an eight-year break following the Syrian 
refusal to continue talks with Israel that came in the wake of the Second Intifada in 2000.81 
After the bombing of a synagogue in Istanbul, Erdoğan’s meeting with the Chief Rabbi was 
the first of its kind at this level.82 In 2005, Erdoğan was awarded the Courage to Care Award 
by the Anti-Defamation League, a leading American Jewish organisation, due to his efforts at 
mediation in the region after Israel took the decision of withdrawal from Gaza, a decision 
which was received quite positively by the Turkish elite and the public.83 These acts calmed 
concerns about the possibility of an “Islamist” government takeover in Turkey, which would 
revise relations with Israel on religious grounds. 
In 2005, Erdoğan and Sharon even agreed to establish a hotline to share intelligence 
and cooperate more fully against terrorism. That same year Erdoğan made a visit to Yad 
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Vashem following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza. Erdoğan’s visit to the Holocaust Memorial 
during his visit to Israel was the first of its kind. In 2007, Shimon Peres became the first 
Israeli president to address the Turkish National General Assembly. In 2008, the two 
countries came quite close to finalising a comprehensive agreement on constructing pipelines 
to transport natural gas and water.84 In spite of the increasing number of events that set the 
two countries at odds, they both continued to conduct joint NATO military air exercises, 
particularly the “Anatolian Eagle” over southern Turkey—a meaningful choice of location 
designed to irritate Turkey’s southern neighbours. These exercises were conducted until 
2008, while naval exercises such as Reliant Mermaid were conducted until 2010. These joint 
exercises began between 2000 and 2001 and were conducted annually thereafter. 
Furthermore, in spite of the deterioration they experienced, as of 2008, Turkey was still 
playing a mediatory role between Syria and Israel in their indirect talks with one another.85  
In 2009, during a visit to the US, Erdoğan met with around fifty representatives from 
the American Jewish Organization, a meeting that Abraham Foxman, national director of the 
Anti-Defamation League, described as a very positive one. Foreign Ministers Kemal Babacan 
and Tzipi Livni also met, while President Abdullah Gül met with his counterpart Shimon 
Peres in Copenhagen in December, 2009 where they agreed to take necessary steps to restore 
the previous positive atmosphere.86 
However, in spite of the efforts to keep the relationship alive and well, occasional 
points of tension were . Erdoğan criticised the UN in 2009 in his General Assembly speech 
for not taking necessary measures with respect to the tragedy in Gaza. Erdoğan rejected 
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Israeli participation in the Anatolian Eagle exercise of 2009,87 defying American objections 
and protests, which eventually resulted in the American withdrawal from the exercise, too. 
The “low chair affair”, in which the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon 
intentionally seated Turkish ambassador Oğuz Çelikkol on a lower couch, refused to shake 
hands with him and made harsh criticisms before cameras, was yet another symbolic blow to 
efforts to fix the relationship, even though Peres’ pressure on Ayalon resulted in a later 
apology.88 Immediately after this incident, Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak visited 
Ankara, where the Turkish prime minister and the president refused to meet him personally, 
and he was eventually received only by the then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.89  
Although these efforts to maintain the momentum of the bilateral relationship did not 
succeed in subduing the tension completely, they were essential in preventing a complete cut-
off in relations and demonstrated both sides’ desire to maintain their contact. Rather than a 
complete “Islamist” severing of ties with Israel—as an ideology-based argument would 
suggest—even after a decade of JDP government and despite quite significant points of 
tension, both countries strove to protect the fundamental aspects of their relationship and 
make sure any clashes of interests were kept under control.  
 
c- The Iranian Nuclear Programme 
 
 
Another issue that caused tension between Turkey and Israel was the Iranian nuclear 
programme. Israel regarded the programme as an existential threat, whereas the Turkish 
stance, as explained in the previous chapter, supported the Iranian right to use nuclear 
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technology for peaceful purposes. Coupled with Turkey’s critical stance against Israel for its 
possession of nuclear weapons, the nuclear issue inflicted serious damage on the 
relationship.90  
The Israeli condemnation of Iran’s nuclear programme was based on a series of 
understandable criticisms and concerns. The former Israeli PM Ehud Olmert had stated that 
“Regarding the threat of nuclear Iran, all options are on the table”—a subtle threat based on 
the assumption that Iran could possess nuclear weaponry by 2010. Former Israeli Housing 
Minister Zeev Boim even attacked IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei, accusing him of 
being a “planted agent” serving “the interests of Iran”. Former Deputy Prime Minister Shaul 
Mofaz stated that “If Iran continues with its programme for developing nuclear weapons, we 
will attack it,” and “Attacking Iran, in order to stop its nuclear plans, will be unavoidable.”91 
Turkey’s stance was in stark contrast with Israel’s policy line and discourse. Both 
Davutoğlu and Erdoğan repeatedly underlined Turkey’s supportive stance on Iran’s peaceful 
nuclear programme and criticised the UN-imposed sanctions. During 2009, when 
international tension was at its peak and sanctions were in place regarding the Iranian 
programme (despite strong Iranian criticism), the number of statements from Turkey 
increased. Meanwhile, agreements worth $2 billion were signed between Iran and Turkey to 
establish a crude oil field in Iran, and Erdoğan visited Iran in 2009 where he stated that the 
two countries shared common views with respect to regional developments.92 Turkey also 
harshly criticised Israel for having nuclear weapons, and condemned its aggressive stance 
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against Iran. Erdoğan attacked Israel by stating that “those who criticize Iran’s nuclear 
program continue to possess the same weapons”, and continued, “I think that those who take 
this stance, who want these arrogant sanctions, need to first give these [weapons] up. We 
shared this opinion with our Iranian friends, our brothers.” He also stated that “Israel is a 
threat for its region because it has the atomic bomb”.93 Turkey’s pro-Iranian stance at the UN, 
as well as its significant role in the “nuclear swap deal” with Brazil caused more anger in 
Israel in 2010.94 The question of Iran’s nuclear programme and its links to the shift in Turkish 
grand strategy was presented in detail in the previous chapter, so this chapter will not go into 
further detail. However, the level of tension it engendered between Israel and Turkey was 
quite obvious. Israel perceived the programme as an existential threat,95 while Turkey 
adopted a supportive stance towards the Iranian nuclear programme based on its own interest-
based motivations. 
 
d- Operation Cast Lead and Its Aftermath 
 
In 2009, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead claimed more than 1300 Palestinian lives in Gaza, half 
of them civilians.96 The operation started in the last few days of 2008 with no warning, and 
lasted for 22 days. The severity of the operation caused dismay from the Turkish point of 
view, primarily due to the fact that the operation came at a time when Turkey was putting a 
lot of effort in the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations.  
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As well as being a tragedy in itself, the operation greatly challenged Turkey’s goal of 
acting as a key player in the region. During indirect talks between Syria and Israel, Turkey 
played a mediatory role which offered it a chance to raise its profile both as an impartial 
peace-maker and as a key regional player. However, Turkey’s capacity as a facilitator in 
conducting and monitoring the implementation of any decisions made was debatable from the 
very beginning, considering its failures to provide the required secrecy and questions about 
whether it possessed sufficient power to push for and monitor the implementation of a 
possible deal. With respect to the secrecy issue, the talks put a good deal of domestic pressure 
on both Assad and Olmert when the talks were publicised. Coupled with Israel’s domestic 
political atmosphere—which pushed Olmert to use these peace talks to cover corruption 
allegations against him—the possibility of success was very limited indeed.97 However, 
Operation Cast Lead had been precipitate and unexpected. Unsurprisingly, Turkey’s reaction 
to it was extremely negative. The peace talks, with Turkey’s mediation, were stated as being 
close to making real progress when the operation started.98 The first consequence of 
Operation Cast Lead was that Turkish efforts to lead talks between Israel and Syria within the 
context of the peace process were halted, a move that showed a loss of faith in Israel as a 
partner to achieving peace in the region. 
Erdoğan, who was Prime Minister at the time, stated that the operation was 
“disrespectful to us” while peace talks were going on, and after the operation the then Foreign 
Minister Ali Babacan stated that “continuation of the talks…is naturally impossible.”99 
Harsher rhetorical action was on its way. Erdoğan called the operation a “blow against peace” 
and a “crime against humanity”, demanding the expulsion of Israel from the UN, criticizing 
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the Israeli embargo on Hamas and accusing Israel of using excessive force not only against 
the militants but against civilians too.100 He later referred to the 6th Commandment of the 
Decalogue, “Lo tirtsach/Thou shall not kill”, both in English and in Hebrew, and went on to 
criticise the UN for allowing Israel to keep its seat.101 However, the tragic event also 
provided Turkey with an opportunity to gain popularity in the MENA region by speaking out 
and positioning itself against Israel, further raising its profile within the context of its return 
to the region, an opportunity it embraced wholeheartedly. Erdoğan undertook a Middle East 
tour in December without visiting Israel, and with the additional agenda of condemning Israel 
and gathering support for Hamas. Following the 2006 Palestinian election, Hamas has been 
seen by Turkey as the true and democratically elected representative of the Palestinian 
people. Within this context, Erdoğan’s then advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s meeting with Khaled 
Mashaal in Syria was quite important.102 During the Operation Cast Lead, Erdoğan stated: 
“Israel will be cursed for the children and the defenceless women who died under bombs. 
Israel will be cursed for tears shed by mothers”.103 This rhetoric caused great concern in 
Jewish circles, and five American Jewish organisations sent a joint letter to Erdoğan, stating 
their concerns about the possible rise of anti-Semitism in Turkey and about the increase in the 
number of copies of Hitler’s Mein Kampf being sold in Turkey.104 
In the immediate aftermath of the Israeli operation, the famous “Davos Crisis” inflicted 
a major blow the bilateral relationship. The crisis refers to the Davos Economic Forum in 
2009 where Erdoğan stormed out of a debate with Shimon Peres. With this, Turkey’s image 
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moved “from  role of a mediator to the role of a key defier of Israel in the region”.105 Before 
leaving, Erdoğan argued, “When it comes to killing you know very well how to kill. I know 
very well how you killed children on the beaches”. This incident instigated a “Davos 
syndrome” in Israel, which took the form of distrust towards Turkey, coupled with the return 
of a feeling of isolation in the region.106 The crisis gained Erdoğan a huge amount of regional 
popularity, to a degree that no other Turkish leader in the republican period had enjoyed 
before. The crisis can be seen as one of the most symbolic moments in understanding 
Turkey’s popularity among oppositional groups during the Arab Spring and Erdoğan’s 
popularity in polls—a popularity that dwindled after the halt of the Awakening in Syria and 
the Sisi-led coup in Egypt.107  
 
e- Developments that Further Deteriorated the Relationship in the post-Operation Cast 
Lead Era  
 
The Israeli-Greek Cypriot Relationship 
 
Several developments caused further worsening of the Turkish–Israeli relationship in the era 
that followed Operation Cast Lead. Israeli rapprochement with the Greek Cypriots was a 
major concern for Turkey. The relationship was considered to pose a significant threat to 
Turkey’s own relative power position in the Middle East and in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region, while closer ties between Israel and the Greek Cypriots carried the potential to 
provide Greece and Greek Cypriots with a relative advantage against Turkey. 
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The newly strengthened ties between Israel and the Greek Cypriots—especially related 
to arms sales and cooperation for the extraction of natural resources—caused discontent in 
Turkey. The Israeli exploration of the Leviathan natural gas field in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in 2010 resulted in a comprehensive energy exploration agreement between 
the Greek Cypriots and Israel, according to which they would delimit exclusive economic 
zones, plan joint exploration efforts and allow the participation of Israeli energy firms along 
the maritime border between the two countries. This rapprochement strengthened the position 
of the Greek Cypriots and indirectly Greece in the region at the expense of Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey. In response, Turkey threatened to increase its military presence in and around 
Cyprus, and began its own resource exploration programme to the north, east and west of the 
island. It also insisted on the necessity to include both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities in any discussion regarding the conclusion of any future agreements.108 
Overall, these reciprocal moves worsened relations further. The Israeli National 
Security Council warned Jewish citizens about growing anti-Semitism in Turkey and that 
visits to Turkey carried the risk of terrorist attacks against them.109  In 2009, the number of 
Israeli tourists to Turkey almost halved compared to 2008 levels, decreasing from around 
560,000 to 300,000. In 2010, numbers fell even lower to around 100,000.110  In 2009, Israel 
also refused Ahmet Davutoğlu’s request to enter the Gaza Strip from Israel, where he planned 
to meet Hamas leaders before meeting Israeli officials. This Israeli move against Davutoğlu 
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took place just a month before the planned Anatolian Eagle exercise of 2009 from which 
Turkey excluded Israel—a decision that does not in the circumstances seem coincidental. 
From the Turkish point of view, in terms of its own power position and of the Turkish 
Cypriots, the main concern was about its influence over Cyprus—a strategic asset for Turkey 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. Still, , the peak point of the deterioration in this era came with 
the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid.  
 
The Mavi Marmara Flotilla Raid 
 
The climax of the deterioration in the relationship between Turkey and Israel came with the 
Israeli commando raid on a Turkish aid flotilla on 31 May 2010. The flotilla had been 
organised by a Turkish charity organisation, the IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation/İnsan 
Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı).  
The flotilla was staffed by activists from around the world with the goal of putting an 
end to the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The raid claimed the lives of nine Turkish citizens. 
What made this incident unique was that since the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 
1923, no state had ever killed Turkish civilians. Erdoğan described the Mavi Marmara 
incident as “inhumane state terrorism”, a comment much harsher than the UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s statement calling the raid “completely unacceptable”.111 Beyond the 
rhetoric, certain other measures were taken. Turkey demanded a public apology, recalled its 
ambassador Oğuz Çelikkol, and refused to appoint a new ambassador to Israel. Diplomatic 
relations between the two countries were downgraded to second-secretary level, and Turkey 
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called for an international investigation. Turkey also suspended all military relations with 
Israel, cancelled all joint military exercises, and closed Turkish airspace to Israeli forces. An 
official communication sent from Turkey in 2010, inviting Hezbollah leader Nasrallah to visit 
Ankara, appeared to be a blunt way of showing Turkish anger at Israeli policy-makers over 
the flotilla incident.112 Turkey also succeeded in obtaining official UN condemnation for the 
raid—even though its wording was much weaker than Turkey had wanted.113 In the UN 
Palmer Report, it was accepted that Israel’s use of force was excessive, but the Israeli 
blockade of the Gaza Strip was accepted as legal, and the intentions of IHH activists were 
questioned.  
Public opinion in Turkey was also extremely negative with respect to Israel after the 
raid: a 2011 survey conducted by the BBC noted that 77 percent of respondents viewed Israel 
negatively while only 9 percent saw the country in a positive light.114 
Turkey’s demand for a public apology as a prerequisite for normalisation was rejected 
by Israel.115 However, in 2013, with US President Obama’s mediation, Netanyahu apologized 
to Erdoğan for the flotilla raid over the phone and they talked about normalisation.116 This 
apology played a significant role in more recent normalisation efforts, which will be 
investigated in more detail in the next section and in the concluding remarks of this chapter. 
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f- Towards a Pragmatic Re-evaluation of the Relationship: The Arab Spring and 
Beyond 
 
As previously mentioned, there were occasional efforts to repair the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship (or at least to keep it alive) even before the Arab Spring. Officials from both 
countries exchanged visits to negotiate whether and how the relationship could be fixed. The 
Arab Spring and beyond, however, offered a quite fertile ground for a substantial revision. 
While Turkey’s securitised relations with Syria and Iran dramatically improved in the 
period between 2002 and the Arab Spring, Israeli concerns remained constant due to the 
Syrian influence over politics in Lebanon, as well as the question of Iran’s nuclear 
programme.117 However, as far as Turkish perceptions were concerned, a dramatic change 
came about with the Arab Spring. First, Turkish-Iranian tensions over their clashing priorities 
heightened, then the impact of the Arab Spring on Syria caused deterioration in both the 
Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Syrian relationships. Within this context, the Turkish 
government’s rejection of the IHH’s request to send a second flotilla in 2011118 does not 
appear by any means coincidental.119 Following this, Netanyahu’s call to congratulate 
Erdoğan on his election victory the same year and his assertion of the desire to “solve all 
outstanding issues” between Turkey and Israel120 further indicated the two countries’ shared 
intention to keep the relationship under control for possible future normalisation. In 2012, 
Israel’s acceptance of Turkey’s role in Israel’s prisoner swap deal with Hamas and Israeli aid 
to Turkey after the earthquake in Van in late 2011121 were further signs of both sides’ desire 
to revise the currently negative atmosphere of the relationship.  
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As a further positive signal with noteworthy timing, Turkey had been a member of the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance in 2008. However, in 2012 the Holocaust 
was first commemorated in Istanbul’s Neve Shalom Synagogue with high-level official 
attendance including the then Governor of Istanbul, the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and 
the former speaker of the parliament, Cemil Çiçek. In 2013, the commemoration took place 
in Etz Ahayim Synagogue in Istanbul’s Ortaköy district. The then Head of Parliament Cemil 
Çiçek, the then Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 
and former Minister for European Affairs Egemen Bağış all sent messages to the ceremony. 
In 2014, it took place at Kadir Has University and speeches were sent by Bülent Arınç, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu and the former Minister of the European Union and Chief Negotiator 
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. In 2015 and 2016, the memorials took place in Ankara, first at Bilkent 
and then Ankara University, and included messages from current PM Ahmet Davutoğlu.122 
As a country which has observed the IHRA since 2008, the siting of these ceremonies in 
Turkey over consecutive years starting from 2012 is surely noteworthy, and its timing seems 
far from coincidental.  
For Turkey, the instability of Arab politics, as recently evidenced by the Arab Spring, 
was perceived as an opportunity to project more influence over the region in the face of an 
emerging power vacuum. “The futures of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are uncertain; the 
dangers on Israel’s and Turkey’s borders with Syria are growing, and events with Iran are 
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 166 
 
rapidly unfolding.” 123 This atmosphere required a revision in Turkey’s attitude towards the 
region due to potential risks of instability. Kutlay rightly argues that this controversial and 
unstable atmosphere required Turkey to improve its relations with other regional powers that 
were not at risk of collapsing, highlighting the need for normalising relations with Israel.124 
Amidst instability and unpredictable turn of events, Israel could again turn into a valuable 
partner in the medium term. This would especially be the case if regional turmoil were to 
spill over into Turkey or if it were to cause a U-turn in Turkey’s rapprochement with leading 
Middle Eastern powers which had been achieved in the last decade. Regarding the latter, it 
seems to be the case already due to the civil war in Syria. Under these circumstances, 
improvement (or “normalisation”) in the Turkish-Israeli relationship stands out as a valuable 
option in an atmosphere reminiscent of the regional dynamics 1990s. Once again, Turkey’s 
relationship with Iran and Syria suffered from major interest and security-driven clashes and 
its relationship with Iraq, especially after the Abadi’s election victory, gradually deteriorated 
too. Seeing the demise of the “zero problem” doctrine with regard to Turkey’s neighbouring 
states and moving towards a more ambiguous concept of “precious loneliness,”125 the 
Turkish–Israeli relationship was unsurprisingly revisited.126 More recently, Turkey has lifted 
its veto on Israel’s demand to have an office at NATO headquarters, which is another 
symbolic step towards cooperation.127 
At this point, it is also important to mention Turkey’s gradually improving relations 
with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) especially since Abdullah Gül’s 
                                                          
123 Cohen & Freilich, 2014, p. 49  
124 Mustafa Kutlay, 8/4/2016. 
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unprecedented direct call to the KRG President Massoud Barzani in 2009.128 The relationship 
further deepened following the Peace Process in Turkey, primarily through the leading 
political party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its leader, the KRG’s President 
Massoud Barzani. This relationship even helped Turkey’s ongoing fight against the PKK.129 
In 2011, as the first prime minister to do so, Erdoğan visited the KRG, and the following year 
Barzani attended the JDP’s general congress.130 Meanwhile other Kurdish parties, namely the 
PUK and the Gorran Movement were also searching for better relations with Turkey, 
probably in part due to their desire to strengthen their position against President Barzani.131 
Turkey’s increasingly deteriorating relationship with the Iran-backed Iraqi government, along 
with the KRG’s need for regional partners to support its autonomous status and trade its 
energy resources—in which Turkey is far from rich—has resulted in a new atmosphere of 
overlapping interest for the two parties. The KRG started to export crude oil to Turkey by 
truck in 2012, and began to use the pre-existing Iraqi-Turkish oil pipeline to pump its oil to 
Turkey in May 2014.132 In 2011, the KRG accounted for 70 per cent of the export volume 
between Iraq and Turkey.133 For the KRG, Turkey is an important gateway both for further 
trade and as a transit point, especially considering the KRG’s troubled political, military, and 
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economic landscape due to its fight with ISIS, economic difficulties and political 
controversies over Barzani’s presidency. Here, it is important to note that Turkey’s changing 
attitude regarding the question of Northern Iraq acted as a further catalyst to pave the way for 
normalisation with Israel since the question was a major point of divergence between the two 
in the past.  
Energy also played an important role in the normalisation of Turkish-Israeli relations. 
Israel’s Tamar and Leviathan fields are considered to offer an alternative source of 
diversification in Turkey’s search for energy security. Gareth Winrow states that “the 
prospects for a gas pipeline connecting Turkey with the Israeli Leviathan gas field in the 
eastern Mediterranean have improved with a possible rapprochement between Turkey and 
Israel and moves to resolve the Cypriot dispute.”134 In the past, Turkey and Israel had agreed 
upon the construction of the Med Stream, a connecting system which would carry not only oil 
and natural gas but also electricity and water between the two countries. However, the project 
was shelved in 2009, and the energy envoy of the Foreign Ministry of Israel, Adam Ron, 
argues that Israel has succeeded in finding alternative sources for water and electricity. 
However he concedes that a new project can and should to be considered as a component of 
recent normalisation. Israel seems optimistic about this, and Ron also mentioned the 
prospects of an Israeli contribution to Turkey’s nuclear and renewable energy projects so that 
Turkey can revise its energy mix and thereby limit its over-dependent energy profile.135 
According to Cenk Pala, gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean might contain as much 
natural gas resources as the entire Caspian natural gas field, which in turn could make a 
significant contribution to Turkey’s energy profile, reducing its primary dependence on 
                                                          
134 Gareth Winrow, personal communication, 22/2/2016. 
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Russia.136 Even though Turkey’s desire for a close energy relationship with Israel is strong, 
Israel’s option of selling its gas to Europe and Asia via the Greek Cypriot Government and 
Greece routes might challenge the bilateral energy relationship in the foreseeable future.  
Regarding this recent pragmatic re-evaluation and normalisation of the relationship, a 
significant turning point came in mid-2016. On June 26, 2016, the two sides announced the 
deal on which their normalisation will be based. This was based on the two countries’ 
negotiations after 2013 at various levels, which had grown to form a final reconciliation 
document in which both sides expressed their desire for an improved relationship and 
identified the main points that needed to be addressed in order to bring that about. According 
to the deal, Israel would pay 20 million US dollars compensation to the families of the people 
who lost their lives in the Mavi Marmara flotilla tragedy; Turkey would be able to send aid to 
the Palestinians via the Port of Ashdod and carry out humanitarian projects in Palestine; 
Hamas would only be able to have political representation in Turkey, and no legal action 
would be taken by the Turkish judiciary against the Israeli security forces that took part in the 
Mavi Marmara raid. Turkey, within the context of its humanitarian aid to and investments in 
Palestine, stated that it would start transferring necessary equipment in order to build a water 
treatment facility, energy plant, and a 200-bed Turkey-Palestine Friendship Hospital. Turkey 
and Israel would upgrade their diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level again and lift 
the sanctions they had imposed upon each other. Turkey’s Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, in 
addition to the points mentioned by his Israeli counterpart, stated that the first instalment of 
Turkey’s aid to Palestine would be send to Ashdod on 7 July 2016, and would reach its 
destination within a week.137 
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With respect to the timing of the normalisation efforts, which started in 2013 and 
reached its zenith in 2016, a few points seem worth mentioning.  The internationalisation of 
the Syrian civil war and the intensification of ISIS/DAESH’s terrorist activity in the region 
pushed regional powers to revise their regional and global policies. Within this context, 
Turkey was not an exception. Its relationship with the Syrian regime deteriorated, and 
bilateral relations with Iraq and Iran worsened to a great extent compared to the pre-Arab 
Spring years. Also, as an indirect consequence of the Syrian Civil War, the Turkish-Russian 
relationship took a serious blow when Turkey downed a Russian jet in late 2015. This tense 
period lasted until August 2016, when the two countries agreed to restore their relationship. 
The latter also caused a great deal of concern regarding Turkey’s energy security.138 Under 
these circumstances, Turkey’s ideal partner should be both regionally influential, rich in 
terms of hydrocarbon resources, and geographically beneficial to Turkey’s geopolitical 
position as a major transit route. Turkey’s realpolitik analysis, based on these two major 
needs, seems to have laid the groundwork for the Turkish-Israeli reconciliation.    
All in all, Turkish and Israeli efforts to fix the relationship show that both sides are 
aware of its strategic importance in an environment where threat perceptions and concepts of 
national interest can change rapidly. As the Arab Spring illustrated, and as stated by chargé 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 28/6/2016, Haaretz, <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.727500>, erişim 29/6/2016; “Israel and Turkey 
announce deal to repair relations after six-year split”, 27/6/2016, Washington Post, 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-turkey-announce-deal-to-repair-relations-after-six-year-
split/2016/06/27/aa2399ae-3bd5-11e6-9e16-4cf01a41decb_story.html>, erişim 28/6/2016; “Israel, Turkey 
strike deal to normalize ties”, 27/6/2016, CNN, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/26/middleeast/israel-
turkey-relations/>, erişim 28/6/2016. 
138 See Göktuğ Sönmez, Energy Dependency and a Route Map Within the Context of the Recent Turkey-Russia 
Crisis, ORSAM Review of Regional Affiars, No. 36, December 2015. With several months of diplomatic effort 
and a meeting between Erdoğan and Putin in August, 2016 in Moscow, the atmosphere between the two 
seems softened to a great extent. See and “Putin mends broken relations with Turkey's Erdogan”, 9/8/2016, 
BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37018562>, accessed 11/8/2016; “Russia's Putin and 
Turkey's Erdogan meet after damaging rift”, 9/8/2016, CNN, 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/09/world/russia-putin-turkey-erdogan-meeting/>, accessed 10/8/2016; 
“Erdoğan and Putin discuss closer ties in first meeting since jet downing”, 9/8/2016, The Guardian, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/09/erdogan-meets-putin-leaders-seek-mend-ties-jet-
downing-russia-turkey>, accessed 10/8/2016; “Russia and Turkey Vow to Repair Ties as West Watches 
Nervously”, 9/8/2016, New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/world/europe/putin-
erdogan-russia-turkey.html>, accessed 11/8/2016. 
 171 
 
d’affaires Amira Oron,139 when regional dynamics change, the two powers’ revised 
calculations act as a catalyst for closer contact. Still, even though both sides manifest a need 
for cooperation at pragmatic and practical levels, and even penned a normalisation deal, the 
renewal of more nebulous concepts such as mutual trust and confidence is something that 
could take some time.140 
The next section will investigate how domestic factors have impacted on the Turkish 
stance vis-à-vis Israel as multipliers, either obstructing or reinforcing Turkey’s ability to 
make adjustments to the two countries’ relationship. 
Domestic Level: Coalitions between Businessmen and Political Figures and Shifting Civil-
Military Power Calculus 
 
In terms of domestic factors that play important roles as multipliers in Turkey’s shifting 
attitude towards Israel, this thesis will analyse the two most significant ones. The first is 
Turkey’s economic pragmatism, even in the face of political tension, within the context of its 
journey towards becoming a trading state. This is reflected in the gradual shift of 
conservative businessmen associations towards a more pragmatic, neoliberal stance. The 
second is the decreasing influence of the military over civilian authorities’ policy-making 
processes, which has allowed elected civilian policy-makers to adjust and readjust Turkey’s 
attitude towards Israel more flexibly in line with changing interest-based calculations rather 
than being pressured by the military to continue following the securitised and ideology-based 
alignments of the previous years. 
 
Business: Pragmatic Economic Relationship amidst Political Tension 
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As Oron stated, Israel is an “island” in economic terms, isolated and lacking economic 
connection on the ground. As such, Turkey has been an important facilitator through which 
Israel can reach out to the world.141 From the very beginning of the JDP rule—and the post-
2008 era was no exception as far as the desire to maintain economic ties was concerned—the 
JDP has always presented a welcoming attitude towards Israeli investments and the flow of 
money. The JDP government has even faced harsh criticism from opposition parties in this 
regard, but challenged them by arguing that values and political developments were of 
secondary importance to conducting economic relations.142 However, it still came as a 
surprise to some when leading figures from the JDP—a so-called Islamist political party with 
an anti-Israeli ideological background—visited Israel in 2005, led by Erdoğan and 
accompanied by a crowded business delegation whose aim was to encourage further 
economic activity between the two countries.143 
It should be noted that even during times of political deterioration, bilateral trade 
volume has never experienced a particularly dramatic fall. Trade with Israel rose from less 
than $2 billion to $2.5 billion between 2000 and 2009. In spite of the famous Davos and 
flotilla crises, it rose to $3.5–4 billion in 2010 and $4–4.5 billion in 2011, defying the 
political deterioration.144 Even though $4-4.5 billion seems quite a modest figure considering 
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Turkey’s overall trade volume, this increasing trend is worth noting in order to demonstrate 
the level of pragmatism that still existed between the two countries even as political 
differences reached their height. Pipes refers to this era as “hostile on the political level but 
booming on the commercial level”,145 although Aytürk argued that $4-4.5 billion in terms of 
Turkey’s overall trade volume is almost nothing and quite expendable.146 However, I suggest 
that the increasing trend in bilateral trade and its underlying meaning is an extension of the 
pragmatism that separates economics from occasional political tension, and in analytical 
terms is therefore far from negligible. The idea that politics and economics could run 
separately even during those thorny times is one that needs further investigation. Zorlu 
Holding, which is widely regarded as a pro-government Turkish company, signed an $800 
million deal with Israeli Dorad Energies to construct natural gas stations in Israel in 2004.147 
This, and the projected Med Stream pipeline project, are examples of the pragmatic attitude 
of the JDP and the Turkish businessmen associations. These projects are far more ambitious 
than the $100 million deal with Ceylan Holding to construct a new terminal at Israel’s Ben-
Gurion airport, which was signed during one of the high points of the relationship in 1997.148 
desecIn the pre-JDP era, MÜSİAD demanded that the government cut off economic ties 
with Israel due to Israel’s treatment of Yasser Arafat, and it also demanded the cancellation 
of the high-profile M-60 tank deal. However, MÜSİAD made no similar demands during the 
JDP era.149 In addition to pro-JEDP Zorlu Holding’s ambitious natural gas deals, between 
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2005 and 2009, Turkey’s Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) under the 
leadership of a leading businessmen rightly known as quite pro-JDP, Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu, 
successfully initiated the Erez Industrial Zone Project in Gaza, also known as the Project on 
the Revitalization of the Palestinian Industrial Free Zone or the “Industry for Peace Initiative 
in Palestine.”150 The project facilitated closer contact between Israeli, Turkish and Palestinian 
business circles, allowing for a tripartite channel of communication and bringing associated 
economic benefits.  
A more recent statement from MÜSİAD about the organisation’s positive views on the 
normalisation efforts with Israel and Russia is also quite striking within this context, 
especially given the ideological stance of the organisation.151 It is known that TUSKON—
even during the era of political tension—was quite active in Turkish-Israeli economic 
relations, with several leading TUSKON member firms standing out as doing business with 
Israel, including Naksan Holding, Almera, Derma, Fixa Construction etc.152  
While in the 1990s economic contact stemmed from military purchases and 
modernisation programmes, Turkey’s path towards becoming a “trading state” resulted in a 
more diversified and desecuritised understanding of economic interaction. In spite of their 
conservative ideological orientation and occasional criticisms directed at Israel, conservative 
Turkish business associations with close ties to the JDP did not press for a severance of 
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<http://haber.mynet.com/guncel/musiad-israili-kinadi-513946-1>, accessed 26/05/2013; “MÜSİAD’dan İsrail 
Saldırısına Kınama”[“MÜSİAD Condemned Israeli Attack”], 28/12/2008/ 
<https://www.iha.com.tr/ekonomi/musiaddan-israil-saldirisina-kinama/48651>, accessed 12/07/2013. 
150 Aytürk, 2009, p. 70 and Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the 
new geographic imagination”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61: 4 (2007), pp. 471–488, p. 479. 
151 “Hükümetin İsrail ve Rusya politikasına iş dünyasından tam destek”, 28/6/2016, Dünya Bülteni, 
<http://ekonomi.dunyabulteni.net/son-dakika/556715/hukumetin-israil-ve-rusya-politikasina-musiad-ve-
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152 See “Türkiye İsrail'in Pazarı”, 1/6/2011, Özgür Gündem, <http://ozgurgundem.biz/haber/12715/turkiye-
israil-in-pazari>, accessed 13/6/2016 and “Bir tek onlardan ses çıkmıyor”, 22/7/2014, Sabah, 
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economic ties with Israel, and Turkey’s pre-established economic links with Israel ensured 
that economic interaction was maintained between the two countries. The more considered 
and pragmatic attitude of the businessmen—who had been expected to take a much more 
oppositional stance regarding bilateral economic interactivity with Israel—helped keep this 
channel open in the hope of the longer-term possibilities of mending ties. This attitude was 
very important in terms of keeping economic channels open and even showing an increase in 
trading volume, however modest it might be. 
 
The Military’s Loss of Influence 
 
 
The securitisation of Turkey’s politics in the 1990s was due in part to the military’s authority 
and its desire to stay in charge in order to act as a control mechanism against “Islamist” 
political groups inside Turkey by using the relationship with Israel as a counterweight. “For 
the military, ties with Israel were not just a useful tool for joint training, weapons 
procurement, and counter-terrorism, but also a means of demonstrating the secular nature of 
the Republic to domestic Islamists”.153 The military’s primary concerns were changing 
regional dynamics and the rising number of PKK attacks. Within the context of the re-
orientation of Turkey’s military, economic, and political focus in the 1990s, the military’s 
attitude also significantly contributed to the Turkish-Israeli alliance. The relationship between 
the two countries’ military officials, according to Oron, pushed the relationship to a higher 
level, that of a strategic partnership. The two sets of military officials who spoke the same 
language of security and military power could help “miracles happen”.154 Objections from 
politicians regarding the extent of this relationship or about over-priced military equipment 
deals were overlooked by the military as they bypassed elected civilian politicians. Pointing 
                                                          
153 Cohen & Freilich, 2014, p. 45. 
154 Amira Oron, personal communication, 25/5/2016. 
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to the self-appointed superiority of the military over civilian policy-makers, Deputy Chief of 
Staff of the Turkish armed forces Çevik Bir (who was also the architect of the Turkish-Israeli 
military agreements and was awarded the International Leadership Award by the Jewish 
Institute in Washington) referred to politicians as hats that come and go. Meanwhile, the 
state—the old establishment with the military as the most influential group within it—was a 
permanent reality. Bir also noted that the military had made it clear that it would not allow 
the Islamist Welfare Party to damage the Turkish-Israeli relationship.155 
One of the major problems that caused public discontent with Israel concerned the M-
60 tank modernisation deal in 2002. It was signed on the same day that Israeli forces 
surrounded Arafat’s headquarters. When asked about a possible delay of the agreement, Head 
of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu commented that those proposing such ideas are born 
enemies of Jews, and that such an option would be completely out of the question.156 Chief of 
Staff Ismail Hakkı Karadayı stated that he would visit Israel whether Erbakan (the elected 
coalition partner and deputy Prime Minister) liked it or not, and that he saw no need to meet 
Erbakan prior to going there. Such attitudes exemplify the way the Turkish military not only 
acted independently of elected politicians, but also did not hesitate to actively position 
themselves against them.157 
The military’s increasing influence in Turkish politics in the 1990s  stemmed from the 
increasing number of the PKK attacks and the political elite’s alarmist attitude towards the 
rise of the Welfare Party—two domestic concerns to which the military gave priority. The 
military succeeded in adding these to the agenda of the National Security Concept 
documents158 via their influence over politicians, which in turn meant that military concerns 
                                                          
 155 Altunışık, 2000, p. 183; Ulutaş, 2010, p. 5; Olson, 2001, p. 160. 
 156 Gruen, 2002, p. 318. 
157 Olson, 2001, p. 130. 
158 Ümit Cizre, “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey”, Middle East Journal, 57:2 
(2003), pp. 213–229; Pınar Bilgin, “Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation”, 
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became the primary concerns of the state. Such an atmosphere left elected politicians with 
almost no room to pursue policy choices independent from the military’s preferences. These 
dynamics show how the relationship between Israel and Turkey was based on Turkey’s 
security needs and new threat perceptions in the post-Cold War era, which were also 
reinforced by the military’s upper hand over politicians. Tschirgi rightly notes that “contrary 
to the view in the Arab world, and in Damascus in particular, the impetus of the alliance 
between the two countries did not come from Israel, but from the Turkish generals”.159 
As the military’s power gradually decreased in the JDP era, its ability to interfere in 
politics declined along with it—also thanks to the legal amendments in accordance with the 
EU acquis. The exclusion of Israel from the Anatolian Eagle and Reliant Mermaid operations 
without prior consultation with the military was an obvious example of this change. The 
increasing power of the elected civilian executive brought about by the new power calculus in 
the civil-military relationship. The pro-Israeli front inside Turkey suffered from the 
diminishing influence of one of its most ardent supporters, namely the military. 
This new environment allowed elected policy-makers to desecuritise Turkey’s 
relationship with its neighbours—with Iran and Syria up until 2013 and with the Kurdistan 
Regional Government in Northern Iraq since 2009, as well as challenging former policy 
directions, as was the case with Israel.  
In contrast to the 1990s, recent normalisation efforts came in the wake of changing 
regional dynamics in an era during which the military is much less influential over policy-
making. This shows that international changes and consequent power-driven concerns had the 
upper hand over domestic factors. The military recovered its public image to some extent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
European Journal of Political Research 44 (2005), pp. 175–201; Ayşe Aslıhan Çelenk, “Democratization of the 
National Security Discourse and the Political Parties in Turkey”, Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler 
Fakültesi Dergisi 33 (2009), pp. 119–134. 
159 Tschirgi, 2003, p. 111. 
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after the Erdoğan-Gülen rift and the recent U-turn in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, 
even though it is still a long way from the position it enjoyed before. A noteworthy 
development within this context is that some of the military personnel who were previously 
accused of being part of the Sledgehammer coup plans succeeded in regaining their positions 
after the coup attempt in July 15, 2016—which was widely believed to have been led by 
Gülenist officers. However, it is important to note that in addition to the joint position taken 
by political parties and the people, the anti-coup stance adopted by the vast majority of the 
military—including the Chief of Staff and the Commanders of Land and Air Forces as well 
as Special Forces and Gendarmerie—was what made the coup attempt fail. This shows how 
the reconfiguration of the civil-military relationship has succeeded in transforming the greater 
part of the military itself and ensuring its adherence to elected politicians—even though the 
military cannot in its entirety be assumed comfortable with Erdoğan’s policy line. To what 
extent this change fixed the image of the military and how this would affect normalisation 
between Turkey and Israel for the coming years is a question that would make an interesting 
subject for future research. In the face of this change, however, and the attempted coup, the 
military still refrained from making any public statements about the normalisation efforts or 
any other foreign policy-related matter, showing the consequences of years of efforts that 
have been put into reconfiguring civil-military relations.   
Concluding Remarks: Assessing the Strength of NCR vis-à-vis Primordialist/Naïve 
Culturalist Accounts 
 
Primordialist accounts widely use the Turkish-Israeli relationship as a case study to show 
how ideology has played the ultimate role in each country’s perceptions of the other and how 
fluctuations in their ideologies caused deterioration. Pipes suggests that the primary 
motivation behind the changing dynamics of the Turkish-Israeli relationship was without 
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doubt the “Islamist outlook of the JDP leadership”, saying that “it was all about ideology”.160 
According to Cornell, “The AKP leadership are ideologically convinced anti-Semites, who 
also find it to their political advantage at home to use Israel and Jews as a punching bag.”161 
I suggest that shared economic and practical interests, rather than ideological values 
and ideational factors, have been the main motivations behind the last decade’s deterioration 
and more recent normalisation efforts. The JDP did not pursue an “Erbakanist” anti-Israeli 
policy line—even though in an interview conducted by this author, Michael Bishku stated 
that the improvement in Turkey’s relations with the “Arab and Islamic worlds” was due to 
the “zero problems” doctrine working in conjunction with “Neo-Ottomanism and pan-
Islamism”.162 Instead, this chapter has shown that Turkey followed a much more pragmatic 
line towards Israel, even in an era of serious clashes of interest. Even during the Welfare era, 
when the current JDP elite were active within the Welfare Party, some prominent figures 
within the Welfare Party had chosen to follow a more moderate path, such as the then Mayor 
of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who visited the Chief Rabbi when he was elected as the 
mayor of İstanbul to avoid any concerns over his future policies vis-à-vis different ethnic and 
religious groups in the city. The Mayor of Ankara had extended an invitation to Israeli 
diplomats to a dinner he hosted for foreign diplomats, while Welfare Party MPs had also 
attended the event organised to honour Bernard Lewis’ 80th birthday—a man who is both a 
Turcologist and a leading Jewish figure.163  
Some scholars who approach this bilateral relationship from a primordialist and 
ideational viewpoint extensively refer to specific developments—such as Erdoğan’s naming 
of Israeli actions in Gaza as “state terror” in 2004, the JDP’s invitation to Hamas leader 
                                                          
 160 Daniel Pipes, personal communication, 14/2/2016. 
 161 Cornell, personal communication, 17/2/2016. 
 162 Bishku, personal communication, 26/2/2016. 
 163 Gruen, 1997, p.10. 
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Mashaal in 2006 and the Davos Crisis—as important turning points that defined the last 
decade’s deterioration.164 However, as mentioned in the relevant chapter of this research, the 
first signs of deterioration in the relationship came after the Iraq War in 2003 due to Turkey 
and Israel’s clashing visions of Northern Iraq. Similarly, rather than blaming the Davos 
Crisis, the reason for such a dramatic deterioration in the first place is important, and that was 
Operation Cast Lead.165 For Turkey, the operation marked the failure of its mediation efforts 
in the region. In turn, the relationship experienced a severe blow as Turkey felt its regional 
standing had been undermined. As such, it appears that that the critical junctures and 
developments focused on in this chapter—such as the question of Northern Iraq or Israel’s 
Operation Cast Lead—have proved much more useful in explaining the shift, rather than 
relying on ideological and/or cultural shifts. 
Some incidents such as the Turkish invitation to Shimon Peres in 2007 to address the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly, and the Turkish support for Israeli membership of the 
OECD in 2010166 at a time of high political tension, prove difficult to explain if it is assumed 
that Islamism or Neo-Ottomanist ideology is all that matters. Israel and Turkey seemed to be 
aware of the possibility that they might need each other at some point in the future due to the 
dynamic environment of the region, as the post-Arab Spring setting have clearly shown. 
Moreover, Turkey’s closer ties with the regional authority in Northern Iraq—once the main 
point of disagreement between Turkey and Israel—has also helped ease tensions in Turkish-
Israeli relations. A closer relationship with the KRG offered Turkey a way of maintaining its 
regional position whilst controlling the links between the PKK and Northern Iraq. The 
pragmatism of post-Arab Spring normalisation efforts were noted even by Cağaptay, who is 
in fact an ardent supporter of primordialist approach to Turkey, and argued that Turkey was 
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“Islamising” its grand strategy. Cağaptay argues that due to Turkey’s increasing concerns 
about the Assad regime and Iran’s bid for regional leadership, the Turkish-Israeli relationship 
had again found fertile ground for serious improvement.167 Turkey’s comparatively mild 
stance over the Israeli operation in Gaza in 2014168 compared to its stance during Operation 
Cast Lead does not seem coincidental in that respect. Ünver rightly adds an important 
dimension to this picture, stating that as long as internal conflicts and asymmetrical warfare 
continues in both countries, they will have to maintain good relations.169 
From the timing of the Turkish and Israeli efforts to mend their fences to the continuing 
and even improving bilateral economic relationship, the ideology-driven argument faces 
several serious challenges. Turkey’s new, extensively pragmatic and interest-driven grand 
strategic behaviour has sometimes caused politicians to clash with the public opinion. But 
even when public anger was at its zenith, for example after Operation Cast Lead or the Israeli 
flotilla raid, a working channel of communication was maintained. The two countries even 
continued to conduct joint military exercises until it become impossible to reconcile Turkey’s 
new grand strategy of power-maximisation with Israeli actions. This shows that public 
opinion, party politics, and the personal trajectories of policy-makers were of secondary 
importance to power and interest-driven calculations. This pragmatic approach has been 
significant in keeping economic channels open, rather than contributing to a further 
deterioration in the relationship using anti-Israeli rhetoric.  
One thing is obvious: in spite of all the tension between 2002 and 2011, neither Israel 
nor the JDP want a complete breakdown of the relationship between the two countries. This 
has been true even in the post-2008 period, when the JDP became much more powerful than 
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ever following its second general electoral victory. An account focusing primarily on identity 
and ideology such as the one proposed by Aytürk regarding the post-2007 period would 
expect the opposite result—that the JDP, with greater public support and a freer hand, should 
have been able to pursue a more ideological grand strategy. Instead, the level of pragmatism 
actually increased during that period. This can therefore be seen as a victory for pragmatism, 
which is contrary to the primordialist analyses that view the JDP era as a clear victory for the 
so-called “Islamist” grand strategy. The recent normalisation efforts are an important sign of 
this victory. It is far from coincidental that the process led to normalisation came at a time 
when it became obvious that Turkey’s “zero problems” foreign policy have failed to achieve 
its desired goals. 
In the next chapter I will analyse the relationship between Turkey and the EU. I will 
engage with the debate about whether the value-driven rhetoric of a “Christian union” 
attached to the EU or the power and interest-driven concerns of Turkey resulted in the post-
2005 stagnation of that relationship, in spite of the last decade’s overall impressive record 
with respect to the harmonisation efforts and reforms in line with the EU acquis. 
 
 183 
 
Chapter 5: The Turkish-EU Relationship: Stagnation, Realpolitik 
Stalemate, Bargaining and Mistrust  
 
The previous chapter analysed the changing dynamics of the Turkish-Israeli relationship. I 
presented critical junctures such as the Iraq War, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, Turkey’s 
position regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, and the Arab Spring and gradual revision 
of the bilateral relationship. In the domestic dimension, I investigated the rise of pragmatism 
within conservative businessmen groupings/associations as well as examining the impact of 
the military’s loss of influence over foreign policy choices. I concluded that rather than an 
identity-driven clash between Muslim and Jewish identities or Erbakan-like ideological sense 
of enmity, the shift in the relationship was primarily due to interest-driven adjustments.  
This chapter will investigate the ups and downs of the relationship between Turkey and 
the EU. Different international, regional and domestic developments will be analysed in order 
to explore the reasons behind the post-2005 stagnation and the gradual loss of momentum in 
the relationship despite the official start of accession negotiations in 2005. 
A closer look at the relationship between Turkey and the EU since 2002 shows that the 
peak point came with the official start of the accession negotiations in 2005. However, these 
negotiations provided few if any positive outcomes over the years that followed. A gradual 
stagnation and a loss of momentum, enthusiasm and hope about EU accession in Turkey 
began to define the relationship.  
So far, in terms of the Turkish-EU membership talks, only 15 out of 35 chapters in 
Turkey’s accession document have been opened for discussion. Of these, only one (the 
Science and Research chapter, closed in 2006) has been successfully closed, while eight 
remain blocked due to Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriots. 
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France blocked five more chapters in 2007, and in 2009 the Greek Cypriot Government 
blocked a further six.1 Since the consent of all member states is required for the opening and 
closing of each chapter, Turkey’s path to accession seems to be tightly linked to the question 
of Cyprus. Turkey’s stance is that opening its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriot 
Government would mean de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriot government as the only 
legitimate representative of Cyprus. Turkey has strong reservations about this as it would 
affect the status of Turkish Cypriots and  its own regional standing in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The current situation in terms of chapters opened, suspended and blocked can 
be seen in the table below (talks on the chapter on Financial and Budgetary Provisions also 
opened recently, in June 2016,2 in addition to this list): 
                                                          
1 Özge Zihnioğlu, "Bringing the European Union Back on the Agenda of Turkish Foreign Policy", Insight Turkey 
16: 3 (2014), pp. 149–164, p. 153. 
2 “Accession conference with Turkey: Talks opened on Chapter 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions”, 
30/6/2016, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/30-turkey-accession-
conference/>. 
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Given this stalemate on the economic front, the EU’s share in Turkey’s imports fell from 45 
percent to 38 percent between 2005 and 2015. In the same period, exports from Turkey to EU 
countries fell from 56 percent to 46 percent, in an era when Turkey’s volume of foreign trade 
almost doubled from $190 billion in 2005 to $351 billion in 2015.3  
While commitment to reforms continues, the EU has expressed disappointment with 
Turkey’s progress. From Turkey’s viewpoint, enthusiasm for EU membership has started to 
gradually fade in the aftermath of tension over the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
                                                          
3 See the Turkish Statistical Institute webpage on these figures and more on Turkey’s trade by country groups 
and by year, <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist>, accessed 17/3/2013.  
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Policy (CSDP), formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This 
dampening of enthusiasm was a consequence of realpolitik-driven discussions examined in 
this chapter. Later controversy about the accession of the Greek Cypriot Government as the 
sole representative of the island as a hotly debated issue in the Turkish public sphere further 
damaged the relationship. A poll conducted by the Turkish-German Foundation for Education 
and Scientific Research showed that support for EU membership was around 70 percent in 
2004,4 but had dropped to 34 percent by 2011. In the same poll, 74 percent of respondents felt 
that they had lost hope for EU membership. Since 2013, however, there has been a gradual 
increase; in 2014 support was around 45 percent and in 2015, it grew to approximately 60 
percent.5 But in 2015 the most recent poll also indicated that around 70 percent still think that 
there is no favourable prospect for Turkey’s membership. 6  
The main question that I will address is whether this stagnation stemmed from Turkey’s 
shifting ideological stance accompanied by “Christian club” rhetoric about the EU or from 
global and regional changes which required power and interest-driven adjustments in 
Turkey’s policies vis-à-vis the EU. 
Before addressing the question by analysing the impact of the research’s selected 
international and domestic factors, I will briefly present the historical background of the 
Turkish-EU relationship in the following section to provide a better picture of the changes 
and continuities over time. 
                                                          
4 “Cyprus, Turkey, and the European Union: A Meditarranean maelstrom”, The Economist, 10/12/2009, 
<http://www.economist.com/node/15065921>, accessed 23/11/2013. 
5 Ionnais Grigoriadis, personal communication, 19/3/2016; İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, Türkiye Kamuoyunda 
Avrupa Birliği Algısı-2015, 
<http://50yil.ikv.org.tr/belgeler/ikv_turkiyenin_AB_ye_bakisi_tr/html/index.html#24/z>, accessed 1/3/2016; 
Kadri Gürsel, “Turks turn to EU with renewed enthusiasm”, Al-Monitor, 10/9/2014. 
6 “Membership support to EU dropped: Poll”, Turkish Daily News, 20/8/2012. 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/membership-support-to-eu-dropped-
poll.aspx?pageID=238&nID=28158&NewsCatID=341>, accessed 24/09/2013. According to the same poll, it is 
even less with 17 percent in 2012. Also see “Turkey: poll; 74% of people “lost hopes to join EU”, 
<http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2013/10/08/Turkey-poll-74-people-lost-
hopes-join-EU-_9427375.html>, accessed,24/09/2013. For a similar poll, see Barysch, 2011, p. 5. 
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Historical Background 
 
Turkish policy-makers’ quest for “Westernisation” or “Europeanisation” can be traced back 
to the late Ottoman era. “Westernisation” was regarded as a means of keeping the country 
together, to keep up with growing Western military power, and to restructure state 
mechanism.  
Nineteenth and twentieth century reforms in the Ottoman Empire stemmed mainly from 
European pressure in the aftermath of the Crimean War, when the Ottoman Empire de jure 
became a part of Europe within the context of the Concert of Europe structure.7 With this, the 
Empire also became a diplomatic part of Europe. The process brought with it the decision of 
the great powers at the Paris Conference in 1856 that the Ottoman Empire’s territorial 
integrity was highly important to Europe, and would be protected by the same powers, 
providing them with significant leverage over the Empire.8  
The Tanzimat era of the Ottoman Empire, between 1839 and 1876, included the 
Tanzimat and Islahat edicts and introduced a new constitution with a more Westernised legal 
approach. The era can be seen as a turning point for institutionalisation efforts to Westernise 
Turkish bureaucracy and its legal structure and as well as some particular topics such as 
political representation and citizenship.9 This was the era when the Ottomans found 
themselves seriously struggling to keep up with the West, and the Ottoman Empire grew 
more and more dependent on Western powers to protect its very existence, either via 
balancing strategies under which it benefitted from great power rivalries or through requests 
                                                          
7 Virginia Aksan, 2005–2006, p. 21 and Kaloudis, 2007, p. 46. 
8 Larrabee & Lesser, 2003, p. 45. 
9 Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman to Turk: Continuity and Change”, International Journal, 61: 1 (Winter 2005–2006), 
pp. 19–38, p. 21–22. For more information on the edicts and the era, also see Musa Gümüş, “Anayasal 
Meşruti Yönetime Medhal: 1856 Islahat Fermanı’nın Tam Metin İncelemesi”["Transition to Constitutional 
Monarchy: A Full Text Analysis of the Islahat Edict of 1856”], bilig 47 (2008), pp. 215–240; Stone 2010, p. 88–
108.; Altunışık & Tür, 2005, p. 2–3; İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the 
Empire](İstanbul: Alkım, 2006). 
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for protection against aggressors. The first wave of Westernisation thus came about because 
of pragmatic concerns on the part of the Ottoman elite between the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the first two centuries of what Norman Stone referred to as “the long defensive” of 
the Empire.10 The elite assumed that in order to keep the Empire together, Western 
technology and bureaucracy should be largely imitated and serious clashes with the great 
powers should be avoided.11 
As far as the Republic of Turkey is concerned, Westernisation has been a clear 
preference since its proclamation, and gradually became a security-driven necessity, too. 
Efforts to Westernise the country were primarily regarded as a civilizational project, a 
process intended to transform the society. The process focused not merely on bureaucratic 
and military areas, but also included the adoption of European norms and values, including 
dress code and legal systems.  
In terms of power and security-related realpolitik concerns, Turkey campaigned quite 
eagerly for NATO membership during the 1950s, mainly due to the perceived threat of Soviet 
aggression. Turkey is also an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
member and an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU). Turkey is 
“unwashed by Atlantic waters”,12 so its membership of these organisations has left the 
geographical objections it occasionally faces regarding its participation in European 
integration open to question. Drawing from this, Turkey applied for associate membership in 
the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, the beginning of an exhausting quest to 
be a part of the European political and economic integration process. Turkey’s application in 
                                                          
10 Stone, 2010, p. 104 
11 See Ahmet Gündüz, “19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Reformlarında Etkili Olan Sosyal, Ekonomik, Politik ve Askeri 
Faktörler”[“Social, Economic, Political, and Military Factors on the 19th Century Ottoman Reforms”], 
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of the Empire]; Walter F. Weiker, “The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform”, Administrative 
Science Quarterly 13: 3 (1968), pp. 451–470.  
12 Christopher Hemmer&Peter Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, 
and the Origins of Multilateralism”, International Organization, 56: 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 575–607, at p. 590.  
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1959 spawned to the Ankara Agreement in 1963 between the EEC and Turkey, foreseeing a 
Customs Union and kicking off a process which envisaged membership according to the 
Union’s Article 28.13 The Agreement was the first institutionalised link in terms of Turkey’s 
political efforts to be included in the European integration project. However, that newly 
established link between Turkey and the EEC was referred to as a “connection without 
commitment” at the time.14 It seems no coincidence that Greece signed its association 
agreement with the EEC in 1961, and the timing of this might well be the result of a desire on 
Europe’s part to avoid further disappointment for Turkey.15 
The Ankara Agreement was followed by the Additional Protocol in 1970, which mainly 
centred on the necessary steps needed for Turkey’s accession to the Customs Union.16 The 
military’s interventions in Turkish politics in 1971 and 198017 and Turkey’s Cyprus operation 
in 197418 prevented substantial progress regarding Turkey’s accession. With the slow 
recovery of Turkey’s democracy in the 1990s, Özal’s election victory over the military’s 
“guided democracy”19, and the ensuing Özal-led reforms towards liberalisation, relations 
began to improve. This recovery process resulted in Turkey’s application for full EEC 
membership in 1987 and the signing of the Customs Union Agreement between the two 
                                                          
13 The article reads as follows: “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify 
envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, 
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Middle Eastern Studies, 7:12 (1998), 3–18, at p. 4 and Turkey and the European Union, Strategic Comments, 
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15 Ireneusz Fidos, personal communication, 17/5/2016. 
16 Kaloudis, 2007, p. 41. 
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International Journal on World Peace, 15:3 (September 1998), pp. 3–28, p. 7–10.  
18 On the question of Cyprus, for more detailed information, see Costas Melakopides, 2006, pp.73-101; 
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and Cyprus: Power Balances and ‘Soft Power’ Calculations”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12: 1 
(2012), 97–114; Nugent, 2000; Oliver P. Richmond, “Shared Sovereignty and the Politics of peace: Evaluating 
the EU’s ‘Catalytic’ Framework in the Eastern Mediterranean”, International Affairs, 82: 1 (2005), pp. 149–
176. 
19 Svante E. Cornell, “Turkey: Return to Stability?”, Middle Eastern Studies, 35:4 (October, 1999), pp. 209–234, 
at p. 210). 
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parties in 1995—an agreement which came into force in 1996 and made Turkey the first 
country to participate in the Customs Union without accession.20 Starting from the late 1990s, 
harmonisation has been a major goal in Turkey’s agenda. Coupled with the JDP’s 
commitment to reforms since the very foundation of the party in 2001, Turkey’s intensive 
reform record—especially up until 2005, which is regarded as the “golden age of 
reforms”21—resulted in the start of official accession negotiations in 2005.  
In the next section, several major international developments will be analysed. These 
critical developments played important roles not only in the process up to the official start of 
the accession negotiations in 2005, but also in engendering a stagnant relationship in the post-
2005 era.  
 
Making Sense of Changes in Turkey-EU Relations 
Critical Junctures: Major International and Regional Developments 
 
Certain major developments at the international level had knock-on effects on Turkey’s 
power- and interest-driven calculations, and resulted in a revision of Turkey’s policies vis-à-
vis the EU. For the EU, these incidents provoked different responses too, affecting its policy 
line regarding Turkey. These incidents and historical events include the end of the Cold War, 
9/11 and its aftermath, the EU’s ESDP project, the tension over the Greek Cypriot accession, 
and the Syrian civil war and the question of the Syrian refugees came with it. How and why 
                                                          
20 Deniz Gökalp and Seda Ünsar, “From the Myth of European Union Accession to Disillusion: Implications for 
Religious and Ethnic Politicization in Turkey”, Middle East Journal, 62: 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 93–116, at p. 98. 
21 Ziya Öniş, “Sharing Power: Turkey's Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP Hegemony”, Insight 
Turkey 15: 2 (2013), pp. 103–122, p. 109. The term was used in my conversations with Nathalie Tocci, Paul 
Kubicek and Ireneusz Fidos, who all referred to the era with more or less the same words. 
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these developments affected the Turkish-EU relationship will be investigated in detail in this 
section.  
a- Late 1990s and Early 2000s: Souring Relations and the Goal of “Re-Unification of 
Europe” 
 
The end of the Cold War provided Turkey with opportunities in its immediate 
neighbourhood, while the EU prioritised the goal of “re-unifying Europe” by switching its 
attention to the former Soviet satellite countries in Eastern Europe. Even though the Özal era 
sent positive signals in terms of democratization and liberalization, not only Turkey’s, but 
also “the EU’s attention shifted”, too.22  
After the dissolution of the USSR, Turkey revisited its grand strategy, especially 
regarding the former Soviet area and the Middle East. The demolition of bloc-based barriers 
enabled Turkey to evaluate the benefits of new bilateral links that had been impossible to 
establish before, and marked the start of a new era that offered Turkey windows of 
opportunity that could be utilised across multiple regions, thus altering the weight of the 
European integration in its foreign policy agenda.23 In this way, the geopolitical orientation of 
Turkey’s grand strategy appears to be on its way towards a transformation from its previous 
“West-only” orientation.  
Turkey’s ambition to play a more active role in multiple theatres coincided with the 
EU’s prioritisation of the goal of European reunification. At the 1997 Luxembourg Council, 
the EU’s prioritisation of Central and Eastern European countries resulted in the exclusion of 
Turkey from the list of candidate countries. The EU instead gave candidate status to Hungary, 
                                                          
 22 David Phinnemore, personal communication, 17/4/2016. 
23 See Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and Central Asia”, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.) Central Asian 
Security: The New International Context, (Washington , D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 199–219; 
Aydın, Mustafa, “Between Euphoria and Realpolitik: Turkish Policy toward Central   
 Asia and the Caucasus” in Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds.) (2003), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st 
Century, (Hants: Ashgate Publishing Company), pp. 139–160; Kibaroğlu, Global Security Watch-Turkey: A 
Reference Handbook, p. 61–68; Graham Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the 
Muslim World (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), p. 129–145. 
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Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Bulgaria, and accepted the Greek Cypriot Government as the representative of the whole 
island and a future member.24 The EU was swift to utilise its own window of opportunity, and 
moved hastily to “re-unite Europe” as soon as possible due to the possible recovery of 
Russian influence in the Central and Eastern Europe.25 This decision to side-line Turkey was 
taken despite strong US support for Turkey to be included in the accession list and Turkey’s 
threats to block NATO expansion if candidate status was not granted. Turkey’s 
disappointment was evidenced by its suspension of political dialogue with the EU following 
the 1997 Luxembourg Council. The decision was even referred to as the erection of a new 
“Berlin Wall” by the then Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, and it was argued by the 
government that the decision was based on “partial, prejudicial, exaggerated assessments.”26 
According to Fidos, along with the EU’s prioritisation of the central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs), the change in the very nature of the integration project might also be a 
possible reason for such an outcome.  
Before the 1990s, political and human rights-related factors were much less important, 
and economic and security concerns dominated discussions. However, starting from the 
1990s, some other areas such as human rights issues, democracy, market liberalisation and 
minority issues gained greater significance in the EU enlargement criteria. Given the post-
Cold War atmosphere, the EU based its policy line on a system of “layers” during this era. 
These layers were related to geographical proximity and significance, and given these new 
                                                          
24 Luxembourg Council Presidency Conclusions, 12–13 December 1997, 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm>, accessed 
23/02/2013. 
25 On this era, also see Ronald D. Asmus, “Europe's Eastern Promise: Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement”, 
Foreign Affairs, 87: 1 (2008), pp. 95–106,at p. 95–99. 
26Christos Kassimeris and Lina Tsoumpanou, “The Impact of the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey's EU Candidacy”, The International Journal of Human 
Rights, 12:3 (2008), pp. 329–345, at p. 334. On the impact of the end of the Cold War over Turkish-EU 
relationship, also see Barry Buzan & Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey”, Survival, 41:1 (Spring 
1999), pp.41–57, at p. 42 and p.47 and Hale, 2013, p. 179. 
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priorities, possibility of Turkey’s accession to the EU in the short to medium-term was 
significantly diminished, and the unspoken opinion was that Turkey “could wait”.27 
The shockwaves from the 1997 exclusion of Turkey at the Luxembourg Council caused 
the lowest point in the relationship between Turkey and the EU. One of the results was 
Turkey’s vetoing of European powers’ European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)—the 
predecessor of the ESDP scheme proposed in an agenda-setting meeting of NATO at a 
Washington D.C. conference in 1999.28 
It was probably to improve the deteriorated relationship and to improve Turkey’s stance 
regarding the ESDI—and also to preserve the EU’s “sticks and carrots” hold over Turkey—
that the Helsinki Council of 1999 provided Turkey with candidate status. However, Turkey’s 
ability to comply with the famous Copenhagen Criteria (functioning democracy, rule of law, 
protection and respect for human rights and minority rights, a functioning market economy 
and the ability to accept and apply all the acquis rules) remained in doubt. Turkey’s efforts on 
these grounds and its achievement of candidate status are regarded as clear progress in 
Turkey’s quest and an ongoing desire to become a part of the European integration project—a 
quest that was now more than four decades old.29 Fidos also argues that the timing speaks for 
itself indeed. In 1998, the CEECs started negotiations and were already moving forward 
towards full membership by 1999. Perhaps now it could be Turkey’s turn.30  
In short, the immediate post-Cold war era up until 1999 was marked by European focus 
on its “historic opportunity” to re-unify a continent which had been “divided for over 40 
                                                          
27 Ireneusz Fidos, personal communication, 17/5/2016. 
28 Birol Yeşilada, “Turkey's Candidacy for EU Membership”, Middle East Journal, 56:1 (Winter 2002), pp. 94–
111, at p. 96–97. 
29 Heather Grabbe, “European Union Conditionality and the "Acquis Communautaire", International Political 
Science Review (July 2002), pp. 249–268, p. 251 and European Council Meeting in Copenhagen (June 1993), 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf>, accessed 
23/07/2013, p. 13. 
30 Ireneusz Fidos, personal communication, 17/5/2016. 
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years” and establish a new order with “peace, stability and prosperity under the aegis of the 
EU.”31 This coincided with an era in which Turkey strove to interact with many other regions 
in line with perceived improvements in its relative power position. However, this new 
atmosphere in the Turkish-EU relationship was to plague the relationship for the next decade 
with a lack of trust, pushing Turkey to revisit its relationship with the EU and put a higher 
emphasis on the post-Cold War windows of opportunity it was finding in its more immediate 
environs.  
 
b- 9/11 and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
 
The question of identity-related incompatibility between the EU and Turkey is a decades-old 
problem for both sides, and one that has become more apparent since the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. With Islamophobia on the rise, the question of Muslim identity featured almost daily 
in news reports in many western European countries.32 Moreover, relatively pro-Turkey 
leaders like Schröder and Chirac were replaced by leaders such as Merkel and Sarkozy as 
right-wing rhetoric began to enjoy a higher profile throughout Europe.33 The rise of Turco-
scepticism significantly contributed to the emergence of a mindset that was plagued by 
distrust and disappointment.34 Discourses on identity had the potential to provide Turco-
sceptic groups with electoral support, especially from right and extreme-right constituencies. 
The rise of Islamophobia in the post-9/11 era contributed to the strengthening of value-driven 
discourses. Within this context, the post-9/11 era helped some European leaders gather more 
                                                          
31 Erhan İçener, David Phinnemore & Dimitris Papadimitriou, “Continuity and Change in the European Union’s 
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32 Banu Gökarıksel and Anna Secor, “New Transnational Geographies of Islamism, Capitalism and Subjectivity: 
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34 Ireneusz Fidos, personal communication, 17/5/2016. He afterwards, added that whereas Sarkozy’s poly line 
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support for their culture-based interpretation of Turkey’s accession via the use of different 
imagery based on “terrorists from the East”. References were made to the Ottoman siege of 
Vienna in 1683, and the image of the Ottomans was put forward as the “terror of Europe” or 
in Richard Knolles’ words, the “terror of the world”. Even Burke’s address to the UK’s 
House of Commons in the 18th Century where he argued that Turks were worse than savages 
and that any Christian power should be preferred over them were echoed to strengthen this 
mood.35 
On the other hand, revisiting Turkey’s potential role within the context of the future of 
the West’s security structure was a hot topic in the post-9/11 era. It seemed more important 
than ever to readdress the question of whether Turkey as an EU member would be an asset 
linking Europe with the Muslim world (thereby helping to defuse its threat) or a liability and 
a transit route for instability and even terrorists. Either way, in the years after 9/11, Turkey’s 
significance as a flank country required further re-evaluation within the context of the 
broader question of its role for Western security in the immediate post-Cold War era.  
The EU, with a renewed interest in the military dimension of its organisation, pushed 
for the realisation of the ESDP more eagerly in the wake of 9/11 in response to international 
terrorism. Turkey’s strategic value could prove useful in broadening the EU’s geopolitical 
scope and providing it with better access to several regional theatres. This process 
necessitated Turkey’s cooperation as an important NATO member, despite the country’s 
exclusion from the ESDP scheme. The EU was required to use NATO assets in order to keep 
its military wing operational and effective, and this resulted in a controversial atmosphere in 
the Turkish-EU relationship. The timing of the start of official accession negotiations in 2005 
between the EU and Turkey seems far from coincidental within this context. It was important 
                                                          
35 Fatoş Tarifa & Benjamin Adams, 2007, pp. 52–74, p. 62 and Nuri Yurdusev, “Perceptions and Images in 
Turkish (Ottoman)-European Relations” in Ismael and Aydın, 2003, pp. 77–102, p. 85. 
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not letting the “sticks” outweigh the “carrots” for Turkey in the short term, and not to alienate 
the country. Any sense of alienation could result in Turkey’s insistence on its stance against 
the ESDP scheme as the EU’s ambition to act as a global player reached its zenith.  
 
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) and Its Impact on the Turkish-EU Relationship 
 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the atrocities and tragedies that followed caused the EU to 
consider a military tool that would effectively operate under a broad geopolitical scope to 
deal with the new world and its flashpoints. This desire increased over time due to the 
conflicts in the former Soviet space, the Gulf War, and finally the 9/11 attacks. 
The idea of an EU with a broader scope, stronger deterrence and an effective military 
tool did not emerge solely from the 9/11 attacks, but their impact as a significant push to 
operationalising this scheme was important. For the EU, the attacks were a wake-up call to 
accelerate its plans for  an effective military tool. As terrorism became ever more 
transnational and no country seemed as safe as it had been before, the EU felt the need to 
deploy military power abroad in order to stop the threat of terror or its spill-over effects 
before they found a way into Europe. The EU realised that in order to protect itself more 
effectively and act as a real global player, it should increase its presence in the MENA region, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Albert Hourani noted that “whoever rules the Near East 
would rule the world,”36 although the flipside of that argument appears to indicate that any 
entity that becomes over-involved in the region would find itself caught in the middle of 
countless new problems. Either way, the EU sought to widen its scope to these regions, and 
                                                          
36 Richard N. Haass, “The New Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, 85: 6 (November-December 2006), pp. 2–11, p. 3 
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the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)37 
were clear examples of this desire. The ESDP scheme, as the military leg of this desire, was 
designed with the purpose of broadening the EU’s military scope.  
The motivation for having a presence in new areas of conflict found its most concrete 
form in the ESDP scheme, which was renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) after the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The CSDP was proposed in order to help achieve 
one of the EU’s most important goals as stated in its Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP): “To strengthen international security and preserve peace”. The EU’s “headline 
goals” were laid out at the Helsinki Council in 1999 and declared operational in Laeken in 
2001. Within this context, it was agreed that the EU should possess the potential to deploy a 
60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force within a 60 day period, and that the force should be 
capable of sustaining itself for one year.  
The link between the EU and NATO was probably the most controversial issue on the 
agenda. Since most EU members are also NATO allies, and the EU may need to avail itself 
of NATO assets at some point in the future, a strong link should be forged and maintained 
between the two organisations—especially as France and the UK questioned whether and 
how to link the new structure to NATO and sought clarification of the pros and cons of the 
ability to conduct operations without the need to cooperate with NATO. This debate became 
a more serious issue which surfaced at the St. Malo Summit of 1998 and remained on the 
agenda for many years to come. While France opted for a more independent body, the UK 
insisted on closer contact with NATO. There were divergent views on how to define the 
extent of ESDP operations, the concept of peace-making and how to combine military and 
civilian elements within the core institutions of the EU. Gradually, the ESDP/CSDP was 
                                                          
37 Sevilay Kahraman, “Turkey and the European Union in the Middle East: Reconciling or Competing with Each 
Other?”, Turkish Studies, 12: 4 (2011), pp. 699–716, p. 701–702. 
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given a duty to act within the limits of the “Petersberg Tasks”, referring to humanitarian and 
rescue efforts as well as peacekeeping and combat-force prerequisites, which included peace-
making.38 
In terms of Turkey’s security concerns during that era, there were important parallels 
between the EU’s security-related priorities and Turkey’s own threat perceptions. This was 
especially true in terms of international terrorism, the illegal arms trade, drug smuggling and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). These threats were considered 
major security concerns in both the EU’s European Security Strategy (ESS) document and 
Turkey’s Defence White Paper in 2000. However, the ESDP’s Civil-Military Cell and 
Operation Centre (OpsCen) was only capable of battalion-sized military and civilian 
operations, compared to NATO’s ability to conduct decisive operations in hot conflict zones 
(along with many other capabilities). As such, the ESDP had to rely on NATO’s assets when 
its limited manpower or equipment constrained its ability to act effectively.39 This is where 
Turkey—as NATO’s second largest military force—came into play with its critical approach 
to the ESDP scheme.40 
There were several key reasons underlying Turkey’s critical approach to the project. 
Given Turkey’s exclusion from the decision-making process of operations for which its 
NATO assets might be needed, there was also a concern about possible EU operations in the 
                                                          
38 Seiju Desai, , “Turkey in the European Union: A Security Perspective – Risk or Opportunity?”, Defence 
Studies, 5:3 (2005), pp. 366–393, p. 370; Stephanie Hofmann, “Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of 
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39 Hofmann, 2009, p. 46. 
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and EU-Turkish Relations”, Southeastern European Politics 3: 1 (2002), pp. 43–61; Steven Blockmans, 
“Participation of Turkey in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Kingmaker or Trojan Horse”, 
Center for the Law of EU External Relations Working Paper 41 (March 2010). 
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Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean (including Cyprus), which would directly threaten 
Turkey’s power position.41 If this were to happen, Turkey’s relative advantage would be 
threatened, and its power position and security might be compromised. During the late 1990s, 
following the 1999 “earthquake diplomacy” and during the JDP era,42 the Turkish-Greek 
relationship had gradually improved, but considering the ongoing disputes over the Aegean 
and Cyprus, it still held the potential for crisis. If tensions with Greece or the Greek Cypriot 
government were to boil over, Turkey might have found itself up against a united European 
army that had the right to call upon Turkey’s own troops under Article 5 of the NATO 
Charter.  
As well as this possibility, Turkey had been a major contributor to NATO, and the use 
of Turkey’s assets despite refusing it a role in the decision-making process was regarded 
unacceptable. Of the sixteen flashpoints identified in NATO’s contingency plans—from 
Kosovo to Nagorno-Karabakh, from Chechnya to Abkhazia and South Ossetia—thirteen 
were in close proximity to Turkey. As such, Turkey considered its participation in any 
decision-making process that could result in NATO using its own assets in these theatres 
vital. Turkish forces could be compelled to act in operations that could have an indirect 
negative impact on Turkey’s own interests and security. If operations went ahead in such 
regions without considerable prior diplomatic deliberation, the ensuing problems would carry 
the potential to spill over into Turkish affairs, leading to a situation in which Turkey was left 
with no option but to fight against its own interests due to its commitments under the NATO 
Charter.43 The ultimate question was whether Turkey should allow the use of its military 
resources in an operation where it had no say in the decision-making process, even if 
Turkey’s own interests were not at stake, or worse, the operation itself threatened them. 
                                                          
 41 Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 98–100. 
 42 Larrabee & Lesser, 2003, p. 85. 
43 Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 98–100 and Serdar, 2003, p. 68–71. 
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The famous 2003 “Berlin Agreement”, which allowed the EU to use NATO assets and 
organised the way in which the two would interact and cooperate, was a turning point within 
this context. The “Berlin Plus” agreement provided NATO with its right of “first refusal” in 
conflicts. This right was supported by the UK and the Netherlands.44 Meanwhile, Turkey’s 
concerns were also addressed, with the reiteration of principles agreed in the UK-US-Turkey 
document of 2001 (known as the Ankara Document)45 which assured Turkey that ESDP 
forces would not be deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean and would not be used against 
any NATO ally.46 Since then, Turkey has participated in several ESDP/CSDP missions, 
including those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Palestine. Turkey has also expressed 
willingness to contribute to missions in Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.47 
In its original form, the EU’s ambitious ESDP project had the potential to threaten 
Turkey’s relative power position in the region if operationalised in Turkey’s neighbourhood 
without prior consultation. Once these concerns had been addressed by the EU, the two sides 
succeeded in finding a middle ground. The ESDP crisis had come about through a clash of 
power- and interest-driven concerns, and was settled by the EU’s provision of required 
assurances to Turkey. Still, looking the process from the perspective of the current 
atmosphere, it can be stated that if both sides could have known that the ESDP “barely got off 
the ground”,48 controversies about it would not have damaged the relationship to the extent 
they did. However, evaluating past events based on present circumstances and data would be 
a fatal error according to both IR and History 101. 
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c- Start of the Official Accession Negotiations between the EU and Turkey in 2005 
 
In the post-9/11 era, the newly optimised relationship between Turkey and the EU reached its 
height once the ESDP crisis had been settled. October 3, 2005 marked the official start of 
Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU. However, and much to Turkey’s irritation, it 
was decided that the process would remain open-ended.  
According to political Islamist discourse, Turkey’s values were coming under serious 
threat from reforms and its cultural codes demanded by the EU, and a Pan-Islamic Ummah-
based narrative should be pursued as an alternative to the EU membership. This line of 
thought—an Erbakanist Islamist anti-EU rhetoric which identified the EU as a “Christian 
club”, saw it as a danger to Turkey’s values and even referred to it as a Zionist tool49—was 
clearly rejected by the JDP. As early as 2002, Erdoğan and leading JDP staff organised a 
series of visits to Europe to gain support for Turkey’s candidate status among European 
leaders. The JDP promised future reform packages, seven of which were to be put in place in 
just one year between 2002 and 2003 in line with the acquis. It also assured European heads 
of state that it would follow a more accommodating path regarding the question of Cyprus.50 
The EU had set a major set of criteria centred around democratisation, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights. These criteria were set not only at the Copenhagen Council in 
1993 but also as membership preconditions in Article F of the 1992 Treaty of European 
Union and in Article O of the amended 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam. The JDP strove towards 
these values, and received quite positive feedback within the EU, resulting in positive signals 
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for the future by 2004 and 2005. There were six specific points that Turkey needed to 
accomplish in order to achieve membership: 
 
 democracy and the protection of human and minority rights  
 a functioning market economy which would be able to compete within the EU market  
 the institutional and administrative capacity to implement the acquis 
 good neighbourly relations  
 commitment to solving the Cyprus problem  
 the fulfilment of its obligations under the 1963 Ankara Treaty, i.e. the extension of the 
Customs Union to the Greek Cypriot regime.  
 
The last point has been the hardest for Turkey to address.51 The first three points basically 
summarised the Copenhagen Criteria, and there was broad agreement in regard to 
surmounting these hurdles within Turkey. However, the JDP’s unprecedented efforts to fulfil 
the last three points resulted in fierce fighting with the old elite on the question of Cyprus as 
well as closer relations with Greece and Armenia.  
With the ESDP crisis settled and Turkey’s reforms appreciated by the EU, the Turkish-
EU relationship seemed quite promising. In this atmosphere, the start of official accession 
negotiations was a clear indication of this change. However, even during this period, 
Turkey’s realpolitik concerns about Cyprus acted as a major obstacle. Turkey was quite 
concerned about the Greek Cypriot government’s accession as Cyprus’s sole representative 
which critically damaged its relationship with the EU. The newly achieved membership 
status of the Greek Cypriot government allowed it to obstruct Turkey’s path to membership 
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by vetoing the opening of certain chapters because of Turkey’s opposition to opening its ports 
and airports to it. Turkey, on the other hand, insistently defended its official position  that 
opening ports and airports would mean de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriot 
government, which would in turn pose the danger of tilting the power balance against Turkish 
Cypriots on the island. Turkey considered its presence vital on Cyprus within the context of 
its profile in the Eastern Mediterranean and relative advantage against both Greece and the 
Greek Cypriots.  
Overall, the question of Greek Cypriot membership to the EU without reaching a final 
settlement on the island significantly affected Turkey’s attitude toward the EU. On the other 
hand, post-2004-2005 era, up until the Syrian refugee crisis, due to enlargement fatigues and 
global financial crisis as well as the economic crisis in Greece, was marked a more inward-
looking profile for the EU, as an additional factor slowing down the progress in the EU-
Turkey membership process. 
 
d- The EU’s Fifth Enlargement Wave: The Cyprus Question and Stalemate 
 
 
The EU’s 2004 enlargement, also known as the Fifth Enlargement Wave, had two important 
implications. The first was the successful finalisation of the process of accession of Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).The second was the full membership status given 
to the Greek Cypriot government as the sole representative of Cyprus. Cyprus was accepted 
for EU membership as a unitary body with no discussion on how to include Turkish Cypriots 
in the process and no serious attempt to settle the decades-old dispute regarding the island. 
This, while comparatively much less important on the global or European stage, caused a vast 
amount of lasting damage to the Turkish-EU relationship.  
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The Cyprus dispute has always been an important facet of the Turkish-EU relationship. 
The crisis began in 1967 with an increasing number of attacks by Greek Cypriots on the 
island’s Turkish Cypriots, but escalated after Turkey’s 1974 military intervention. Settlement 
of the crisis has been a key issue not only for Turkish and Greek foreign policies but also in 
the agendas of the UN and the EU.  
Turkey’s intervention in 1974 was in response to a coup d’état on the island by the 
Greek Cypriots with the support and encouragement of the military junta in Greece. After the 
coup, Greece sought to annex the island, a process which put the lives of the Turkish Cypriots 
in danger. Turkey intervened militarily to preserve the constitutional order and peace on the 
basis of its status as one of the three guarantor powers along with Greece and the United 
Kingdom.52 The result was the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—a 
republic recognized only by Turkey. The EU demanded a peaceful settlement, and constantly 
referred to this as a prerequisite for Turkey’s accession. The Cyprus question was raised at 
several EU conferences, such as the Helsinki Council in 1999 and the Accession Partnerships 
of 2001, 2003, and 2006.53 The EU stressed the importance of settling disputes with 
neighbours through the ICJ at the 1997 Luxembourg Council meeting, which sent an implicit 
but clear message to Turkey regarding its dispute with the Greek Cypriot government and 
                                                          
52 For studies on the crisis see Fiona Adamson, “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: 
Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis”, Political Science Quarterly 116:2 (2001), pp. 277–303; CihanGöktepe, “The 
Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations”, Middle Eastern Studies 41: 3 (2005), pp. 
431–444; Thomas Ehrlich, “Cyprus, the "Warlike Isle": Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis”, Stanford 
Law Review 18:6 (1966), pp. 1021–1098; Michális S. Michael, “The Cyprus Peace Talks: A Critical Appraisal”, 
Journal of Peace Research 44:5 (2007), pp. 587–604; George Kaloudis, “Cyprus: The Enduring Conflict”, 
International Journal on World Peace 16: 1 (1999), pp. 3–18; MeltemMüftüler-Baç and Aylin Güney, “The 
European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961–2003”, Middle Eastern Studies 41: 2 (2005), pp. 281–293. 
53 Ali Resul Usul, “The Justice and Development Party and the European Union: From Euro-scepticism to Euro-
enthusiasm and Euro-fatigue” in Ümit Cizre ed., Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the 
Justice and Development Party (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 174–198, at p. 184. 
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Greece. This was no less irritating for Turkey than the decision to exclude it from the list of 
candidate countries at the very same Council.54 
There were other flashpoints between Turkey and Greece besides the Cyprus question, 
which further complicated the puzzle. The countries have clashed on the limiting of the 
continental shelf, the demarcation of territorial waters, air space and the militarisation of the 
Aegean islands. These separate disputes all worked to reinforce tensions between the two 
countries. Basically, the major disputes were due to the problematic geographical location of 
the Aegean islands. The islands themselves were a critical factor in terms of the continental 
shelf as well as setting up controversy over territorial waters due to their close proximity to 
Turkey’s shores. This not only presented a major security concern, but also complicates the 
question of the extraction of energy resources in the region. As such, the dispute had a strong 
economic dimension, too. Turkey favoured a 6-mile airspace exclusion zone over Greek 
territorial waters, as opposed to the general 12-mile rule, while Greece insisted on its 
unilateral decision to increase its airspace to 10 miles. The result was occasional aerial 
dogfights over the Aegean. Even though the Lausanne and Paris Treaties of 1923 and 1947 
forbade the militarisation of the Aegean islands, Greece continued to militarise and fortify its 
positions there, citing Turkey’s 1974 military intervention in Cyprus as a reason for its 
move.55 
In 2004 the Annan Plan for Cyprus56 brought hopes for settlement in the form of a bi-
zonal and bi-communal federation.57 Turkey, with the goal of obtaining a bi-communal and 
                                                          
54 Heinz‐Jürgen Axt, “Relations with Turkey and Their Impact on the European Union”, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, 5: 3 (2005), pp. 365–378, p. 367–368. 
55 On the Aegean dispute, see Yücel Acer, The Aegean Disputes and International Law (Hants: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2003); Leo Gross, “The Dispute between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental 
Shelf in the Aegean”, American Journal of International Law 71 (1977), pp. 31–59; Haralambos 
Athanasopulos, Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International Law (North Carolina: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2001); Larrabee & Lesser, 2003, p. 74-77. 
56 Hale, 2013, p. 198–200. Regarding the details of the plan, Hale notes that “The Treaty of Guarantee provided 
by the 1960 agreements would remain in force. There would be a bi-cameral federal legislature… the 
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bi-zonal federative structure on the island, eagerly supported the plan, and 65 percent of 
Turkish Cypriots voted for it. The Turkish Cypriots’ support for the plan was welcomed by 
the UN Secretary General, who in his 28 May 2004 report, stated: 
 
I would hope that the members of the Council can give a strong lead to all states 
to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary 
restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots…58 
 
Another statement this time from the EU, echoed this appreciation.  
 
The Turkish Cypriot community have expressed their clear desire for a future 
within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community…59  
 
However, 75 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected it in a referendum.60 This came no surprise, 
since by “assuring the Greek Cypriots they could be admitted to the Union anyway, they [the 
EU] provided them with no incentive to reach a settlement with the Turks.”61 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Presidential Council would ha e six voting and three non-voting members, with members drawn from 
proportionately from each community. This would elect a President and Vice-President, one from each 
community, who would rotate in office every 20 months…the Turkish Cypriot territory would be reduced to 
28 percent of the island and there would be a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops, to leave 950 
Greek and 750 Turkish soldiers.” 
57 Chrysostomos Pericleous, “Cyprus: A Last Window of Opportunity?”, Insight Turkey 14: 1 (2012), pp. 93-108. 
58 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good Office in Cyprus, 28 May 2004, 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2004/437>, accessed 15/02/2014, at p. 2. 
59 2576th Council Meeting-General Affairs-Luxembourg, 26 April 2004, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_PRES-04-115_en.htm>, accessed 08/07/2013. 
60 Theophylactou, 2012, p. 104. 
61 Hale, 2013, p. 180. 
 207 
 
statements quoted above engendered no substantial action to end the Turkish Cypriots’ 
isolation. Turkish disappointment was exacerbated by the Greek Cypriots’ acquisition of veto 
power as an EU member state, which would directly affect Turkey’s accession process and 
have a negative impact on the relationship between Turkey and the EU. The question asked 
by Hale thus remains, “How a country could be admitted if about 20 percent of its population 
were left outside the EU?”62 The EU delegation’s head of political affairs to Turkey, Ireneusz 
Fidos, shared this criticism about the EU’s handling of the Greek Cypriot membership 
process, but criticised Turkey’s stance because changing Turkey’s general policy line would 
hurt only Turkey for the sake of a very small self-declared republic, rather than the EU or the 
Greek Cypriots.63  
As Amanda Paul noted, “The lack of strategy and vision of EU leaders has been 
compounded by the hurdle of the decades-old Cyprus problem, almost totally deadlocking the 
process [of Turkey’s membership]”.64 Similarly, the University of Duisburg’s Professor 
Heinz-Jürgen Axt argues that the point Turkey lost hope in the settlement of the Cyprus 
dispute and the Greek Cypriots’ membership marked the critical juncture at which the 
“positive Turkey-EU relationship lost its momentum.”65 In order not to lose its leverage over 
Turkey completely due to this deadlock and to keep communication channels open, the EU 
endorsed a new “Positive Agenda” for Turkey, instigating eight working groups to assist 
Turkey’s harmonization efforts. These efforts include eight specific chapters: visas, mobility 
and migration, energy, trade and the customs union, political reforms, fight against terrorism, 
foreign policy dialogue and participation in EU programs.66  
                                                          
62 Hale, 2013, p. 180. 
63 Ireneusz Fidos, personal communication, 17/5/2016. 
 64 Amanda Paul, "Turkey's EU Journey: What Next?", Insight Turkey 14:3(2012), pp. 25-33, p. 26. 
65 Heinz-Jürgen Axt, personal communication, 14/3/2016. 
66 Erhan İçener& David Phinnemore, "Turkey and the EU: Looking Beyond the Pessimism", Insight Turkey 16: 3 
(2014), pp. 37–46, p. 42. 
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In spite of signing the Ankara protocol in July 2005—which referred to Turkey’s 
extension of its Customs Union agreement to new EU members—Turkey stated that it would 
not recognise the Greek Cypriot government, nor would it open its ports or airports to it.67 As 
a result, the EU suspended the talks on all eight chapters and decided that no chapter would 
be officially ratified before Turkey fulfilled all of its obligations.68 In the following years the 
number of suspended chapters increased due to new Greek Cypriot and French vetoes, raising 
the number of suspended chapters to seventeen.69 
The question of Cyprus has therefore been a key point to understanding how the 
Turkish attitude towards the EU has changed in line with its interests and relative advantage-
related concerns. Even though the two sides had succeeded in repairing their relationship to 
some extent after the EU’s prioritisation of CEECs in the immediate post-Cold War era,70 the 
tension both sides experienced over the ESDP/CSDP scheme and the Cyprus question 
changed the dynamics of the relationship once again. Turkey’s concerns over its relative 
advantage vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus resulted in a deadlock in the Turkish-EU relationship. 
The island has been regarded as a forward military asset providing Turkey with a further 
military deterrent against Greece and the Greek Cypriots, an important trade route offering 
Turkey a presence in the Mediterranean, and a stepping-off point to the MENA region in 
                                                          
67 Marcie J. Patton, “AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What has happened to the EU process?”, Mediterranean 
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68 Ahmet Sözen, “The Cyprus challenge in Turkey-EU relations: heading towards the defining moment?” in Fırat 
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(New York: Routledge, 2014) , pp. 46–64, p. 46 
69 Katinka Barysch, “Turkey and the EU: Can stalemate be avoided?”, Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, 
(2011), 
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general. While reform efforts continued and there were significant levels of economic 
interactivity, disappointment and distancing marked the political front of the relationship.  
Recent efforts to reach a settlement over the island should be mentioned here, since 
they might change not only the dynamics of the Cyprus question, but also the Turkish-EU 
relationship. In a joint statement by Turkish and Greek leaders in 2008, both affirmed their 
desire to establish a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality” with a 
“Federal government with a single international personality as well as a Turkish Cypriot 
Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status.” Since 
then, the two leaders have engaged in an intense period of negotiations and meetings 
covering six main points discussed by six working groups. When Ban Ki-Moon visited the 
island in 2010, he read a joint statement on behalf of both leaders, underlining their desire to 
reach a settlement. The process was expected to produce a comprehensive plan to be put to 
referenda to engender a permanent solution in 2012. Even though it was neither side’s first 
choice, support for a federation seems quite high on the island—around 75-80 percent on 
both sides—coupled with a desire to achieve a comprehensive solution in the short-term, with 
around 60-65 percent overall support. However, the issue still remains unsolved and the 
short-term chances of settling it are in doubt despite the progress that has been made so far. 
Questions remain, especially regarding future power-sharing arrangements, relations with the 
EU, and economic affairs.71 Both Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akıncı, the current leaders 
of the Greek and Turkish communities, seem optimistic and enthusiastic about reaching a 
settlement on the island. European Commission Chief Jean-Claude Juncker, based on the 
recent optimism about a settlement in January 2016, even stated that a settlement could be 
achieved within the next six months—a deadline already missed at the time of writing. 
Juncker stated “I am very confident that in the first six months of this year we will come to a 
                                                          
71 See Ahmet Sözen, “Heading Towards the Defining Moment in Cyprus: Public Opinion vs Realities on the 
Ground”, Insight Turkey 14:1(2012), pp. 112–116. 
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final agreement on the reunification of that island”, and added “I hope 2016 will be the year 
that we can finally resolve the Cyprus issue.” It was stated that the UN was aiming to put a 
referendum in place in the spring or by the summer at the latest.72 However, there has been 
no substantial progress towards that end yet. But it would be quite valid to expect a 
significant improvement in the Turkish-EU relationship if a comprehensive settlement is 
reached which would also mean lifting the Greek Cypriot vetoes over opening and closing of 
various chapters. 
It is also important to note that following its new wave of enlargement, the EU has had 
to become more and more inward-looking in order to control the enlargement process without 
inflicting serious damage to the Union itself in legal, political, and economic terms. 
Additionally, the global recession and Greece’s debt crisis, as well as the Union’s efforts to 
agree on a comprehensive constitution when divisions within became more visible, has 
further reinforced this inward-looking approach. Along with the crisis over Cyprus, these 
developments forced the EU to at least postpone its goal of “acting as a global player” and to 
focus on its internal issues. In this atmosphere, unsurprisingly, neither the post-ESDP crisis 
era nor the start of official accession talks has engendered significant results in terms of the 
Turkish-EU relationship.  
 
e- Deterioration and Bargaining: Post-2013 Era 
 
The post-2013 era needs to be examined more closely in terms of the relationship between 
Turkey and the EU. Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director of the Instituto Affari Internazionali, 
who studies the Turkish-EU relationship and Turkey’s foreign policy, states that while the 
                                                          
72 See “Cyprus settlement deal 'within reach'”, 18/1/2016, Politico, <http://www.politico.eu/article/cyprus-
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<http://www.ekathimerini.com/205102/article/ekathimerini/news/eu-very-confident-of-a-cyprus-
settlement-this-year>, accessed 3/1/2016; UN Cyprus Talks webpage, <http://www.uncyprustalks.org/> 
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2002-2005 period represented the “golden age” of reform, there was a slowdown between 
2005 and 2011 and a tendency towards reversal since 2011.73 Professor Ioannis Grigoriadis 
from Bilkent University makes a similar differentiation: “successful compliance” between 
2002 and 2005, “growing inertia” between 2005 and 2011, and “rapid decline” since 2011.74 
Fidos makes a similar distinction referring to the era between 2007 and 2010 as a time of 
disillusionment preceding an era of rising negative trends.75 Most accounts ascribe the 
turning point to the constitutional referendum in Turkey, which changed Turkey’s judicial 
atmosphere. However, the referendum, among other things, brought quite important 
achievements in terms of the EU’s acquis-related reforms. Therefore, I put primary emphasis 
on 2013, when Turkey started to face serious difficulties in its Syria policy which had future 
implications on its relationship with the EU that were related to the refugee crisis and the 
Gezi Park protests. These developments questioned Turkey’s commitment to freedom, 
democratisation and its role as a regional “impartial socialiser” in European eyes. Freezing 
the “Peace Process” did not help this image either.  
In this regard, a few key points need to be considered, starting with the criticisms in the 
aftermath of the Gezi protests and freedom of the press issues. The Gezi protests began in 
May 2013 as a “green” protest for the preservation of the Gezi Park, where the municipality 
was planning to re-construct the Taksim Military Barracks (Topçu Kışlası, first constructed in 
late 19th century). The municipality’s desire was to build a cultural centre and a shopping 
mall, a small hotel and a few meeting rooms with its exterior form architecturally designed to 
imitate the old barracks.76 According to a poll conducted by KONDA, only around 5 per cent 
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of the protesters considered that environmental goals were their primary motivation,77 
showing the movement’s true nature as an movement in opposition of what they regarded a 
“civil dictatorship,” relying on mass social reaction and support. The power of the Internet 
was visible throughout the protests, where 69 percent of the protesters were kept informed via 
social media.78 After the police intervened, individual protests quickly turned into a mass 
movement marked by sporadic violence and vandalism on the part of the protesters. The 
protests over the summer of 2013 represented a short-lived outburst rather than a long-lasting 
political movement engendering a new actor with a possible “new Left” identity.79 However, 
coupled with allegations of corruption,80 Turkey’s international profile has been going 
through a tough time as a democratic, liberal model and its reputation has worsened 
according to Bill Park.81 In the meantime, in the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom 
Index, Turkey dropped from 98th of 175 countries in 200582 to 149th in 2015.83  
The freezing of the “Peace Process” resulted in further questioning of Turkey’s reform 
efforts and commitment to democracy and freedoms. As such, it came as no surprise that the 
EU’s annual progress reports on Turkey contained important references to post-Gezi 
developments and the Peace Process, highlighting the EU’s concerns about democratization 
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and reforms in Turkey.84 According to Ünver, the post-2013 environment in Turkey also 
results from the elite’s sense of being surrounded, which has engendered occasionally 
aggressive responses.85 Cornell, summarising these criticisms in one sentence, argued that: 
 
The 2013 controversies led directly to Erdogan’s regime transitioning from a 
hybrid, semi-democratic system to an outright repressive, authoritarian system 
that manipulates the democratic system with absolutely no intention to abide by 
the results of a free expression of popular will.86  
 
Kubicek’s assumption about the overall facts of the relationship after 2010 seems worth 
mentioning here:  
 
My sense is that from 2010-2014 in particular, Turkey-EU ties hit a new low, 
with blame on both sides as the EU refused to open accession chapters and not 
grant visa-free travel, and on the Turkish side, in part due to Turkish interest in 
the Middle East (and less interest in Europe) and because of Turkey’s 
deteriorating democratic record, which makes the prospect of Turkish 
membership much more difficult to envision.87 
 
Here, the phrase “hit a new low“ refers to the previous low point had come with the ESDP 
discussions and the controversy about the Cyprus question as discussed above.  
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As Fidos has argued, the EU has turned into an entity which is currently going through 
a rather difficult time and has had to adopt an inward-looking approach. However, the 
refugee crisis has reminded the EU that even when pursuing a successful inward-looking 
policy line, there are still regional and international challenges that need to be addressed. In 
this atmosphere, discussions between the EU and Turkey over the handling of the refugee 
crisis, with the prospects of lifting visa regimes and opening new chapters, has helped 
resurrect the political dimension of their relationship. Still, it is important not to overlook the 
fact that public faith in EU membership is still quite low in Turkey—even though support for 
membership has been on the rise recently—thereby diminishing the cost of remaining outside 
the EU for political parties in Turkey and decreasing the leverage of EU encouragement. It is 
also widely perceived that by struggling to resurrect the relationship just because of the 
refugee crisis, the EU has weakened its democracy, human rights leverage and rhetorical 
power in the bilateral relationship. This image plays into the hands of Turkish EU-sceptics, 
showing the EU’s turn to an over-pragmatic approach as soon as its interests is at stake. 
Sharing this assumption, Tür mentioned her disappointment with the EU’s attitude during a 
period marked by bargaining between the EU and Turkey, questioning the EU’s own 
commitment to the values and norms it has purported to defend for decades.88 Meanwhile, the 
coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 brought harsh criticism from Turkey about the 
response from EU countries, which was considered too late and too weak. On the other hand, 
Turkey viewed EU criticism of about the arrests, suspensions and imprisonments following 
the attempted coup as harsh. The three-month state of emergency declared across Turkey was 
perceived as something that would further complicate the relationship, in which each side’s 
commitment to democratic values and norms were being questioned by the other. Unless 
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there is a sudden and proactive change of heart on the part of the EU and Turkey, stagnation 
and deadlock seem to be the prevailing trend for the foreseeable future. 
The next section will investigate the way selected domestic factors have impacted the 
Turkish-EU relationship. 
 
Domestic Level: Coalitions between Conservative Businessmen and the JDP and Shifting 
Civil-Military Power Calculus 
 
In economic terms, even though the comparative shares of other regions over the last decade 
have reached much greater levels, the EU is still Turkey’s number one trading partner. Future 
energy transportation projects, in which Turkey might play a key transit link role, have the 
potential to reinforce this picture of economic interdependence. Even though the EU’s share 
in Turkey’s trade decreased in the last decade, this cannot only be attributed to a grand 
strategic shift. Professor Erdal Tanas Karagöl, a leading academic and researcher on 
economics at SETA, rightly argues that the global economic crisis of 2008–2009, which 
affected the EU’s economic capabilities, encouraged Turkey to keep a closer eye on other 
regions to compensate for potential loss in trade with the EU.89 TOBB University’s Mustafa 
Kutlay also added that higher levels of competition in the European market due to the 
increasing competitiveness of rising economies have also negatively affected Turkey’s ability 
to consolidate its levels of trade with the EU.90  
The Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet area (including Russia) 
have become more important in terms of Turkey’s economic scope abroad, with both a higher 
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share and a stronger demand for closer economic ties.91 However, it is neither feasible nor 
desirable for Turkey to attempt to reverse the orientation of its economic interactivity abroad 
in such a dramatic way that economic interaction with those regions replaces Turkey’s strong 
ties with the EU. As such, conservative business associations with close links to the JDP have 
never ignored the significance of the European market. They have refrained from challenging 
the EU dimension of Turkey’s economic activity with value-driven rhetoric. Instead, they 
work to maintain a presence in Europe via their branches and associated companies, and 
strive to achieve the CE-mark for their goods. 
As far as the military’s decreasing influence over civilian policy-making is concerned, 
it is important to note the military’s paradox regarding Turkey’s “Westernisation project”, of 
which they claimed to be the forerunners. Since the 1990s, the hawkish wing of the military 
has become more and more irritated with the reforms demanded by the EU, knowing that 
liberal components of the integration project would allow different religious and ethnic 
groups to become more active in politics. The military’s reactionist stance came to be seen as 
an obstacle to reforms demanded by the EU. However, as a result of the military’s gradual 
loss of power, the JDP has found it much easier to implement reforms and amend necessary 
laws in order to bring Turkey’s legal structure and institutions more into line with the EU. 
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Domestic Coalitions between the JDP and Conservative Businessmen and the Turkish-EU 
Economic Relationship 
 
TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association)—and more recently MÜSİAD and 
TUSKON with their more conservative outlook and links with the JDP—have helped Turkey 
move towards becoming a trading state. The JDP has a reputation as a “pro-private sector 
party”,92 and half of the party’s Executive Board describe themselves as “businessmen” or 
“merchants”.93 The party has a lot of businessmen MPs, including several former heads of 
MÜSİAD, and it has challenged the pre-existing sense of Kemalist étatism in the economic 
sphere,94 helping Turkey reduce the EU’s concerns.  
The two conservative business associations, MÜSİAD and TUSKON (up to 2013 for 
the latter), succeeded in utilising the pre-established links with conservative and Islamist 
political figures and parties. These links included strong connections with the leading cadre 
of the JDP, which may hold a certain degree of influence over the ruling party’s choices. 
With this influence, commitments to conducting business with the EU—and even increasing 
it to further integrate with the EU’s trading mechanism and comply with the standards for 
goods and services—has meant a lot over recent years in terms of keeping the economic 
dimension of the Turkish-EU relationship alive.  
MÜSİAD has an ideological tendency to stress the importance of improving 
economic relations with predominantly Muslim countries, and has enjoyed intimate ties with 
the Welfare Party, whose approach to the European Union has been sceptical at best. 
However, it accepted the need to become a part of the market both in Europe and the US. 
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Despite attempting to redirect some of Turkey’s economic interactivity with EU countries to 
its neighbouring regions, neither MÜSİAD nor TUSKON pushed for a dramatic change in the 
economic interactivity with the EU. That particular attitude actually shows how Turkey’s 
conservatives, including businessmen groupings, have evolved to reflect a pragmatic 
approach.  
Based on the experiences of the 1997 post-modern coup—in which conservative 
Anatolian businesses suffered along with the Welfare Party—business groups seemed to 
understand the potential benefits of adopting European norms and values. Their two-decade 
journey toward pragmatism since that year deserves a good deal of attention in their shifting 
attitude towards the EU.95 The conservative businessmen’s experiences stemming from the 
process of the February 28 coup may have taught them two things to account for their 
pragmatic approach to the EU. Firstly, the military does not only intervene in politics when it 
deems necessary, but also targets the economy by putting pressure on the businessmen with 
religious or conservative affiliations and/or close ties to the ruling party.96 Secondly, in order 
to revise the civil-military power calculus, EU membership could prove highly useful, with 
its attendant demands for reforms in the civil-military relationship and market liberalisation. 
This may explain why Turkey’s conservative business associations gradually came to terms 
with the EU and abandoned their previous oppositional stance.  
Just before the JDP era began, MÜSİAD began to lean more and more towards further 
democratisation, human rights and liberalisation, the key focus areas of its report on 
Democratic and Constitutional Reform in 2000.97 In several other publications, MÜSİAD 
also underlined the need for political, bureaucratic and economic reforms in order to further 
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democratise Turkey.98 This tendency might also be a result of the more pragmatic assumption 
that a higher profile and stronger representation of groups like MÜSİAD—which had been at 
the periphery of the old domestic power calculus—would depend on such a transformation. 
In order to open up space for peripheral groups including conservative SMEs and 
conservative political parties, and to normalise civil-military relations, democratisation was 
put on the agendas of these associations, bringing them closer to the pro-EU line. This came 
about not only because of the perceived benefits of the accession process (such as limiting the 
military’s influence) but also because of their own ambitions to grow from smaller firms to 
much bigger companies which could export and import competitively within the European 
market. According to Fidos, the process could be referred to as the “Europeanisation of the 
conservative businessmen”—something that needs further encouragement and which will be 
an increasingly important dimension of future integration efforts.99  
There are concrete examples of conservative businessmen associations’ changing 
attitudes from a religious rhetoric that labelled the EU as a “Christian club” to seeing it 
instead as a valuable economic partner. MÜSİAD has been a member of the European 
Confederation of Associations of SMEs since 2003, and it strongly encourages its member 
companies to achieve the CE marking—a designation of conformity for products showing 
that their specifications are in line with the EU’s requirements and can be sold within the 
EU.100 MÜSİAD has branches in several European cities such as London, Berlin and The 
Hague, as well as partner organisations all over Europe.101 It opens stands for member 
companies at business fairs in numerous European cities each year, including Cologne, 
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Hanover and Milan. In the Turkish city of Konya alone, 16 MÜSİAD member businesses 
obtained EU funding in 2006, and since 2005 the organisation itself has obtained funding 
from the EU as an NGO.102 In one of many similar visits, MÜSİAD visited Brussels in 2012 
with a group of 35 businessmen, who did not only contact their counterparts there, but also 
meet Stefan Füle, the former EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy. During this visit, the group also attended a conference at the 
European Parliament about the Middle East and Turkey’s role in it, in which Egemen Bağış 
was also a participant.103 
TUSKON also has an office in Brussels,104 from which it organised a summit with the 
European Policy Centre (EPC) in 2011 to discuss the common interests of the EU and 
Turkey. European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Füle 
and European Commissioner for Trade Karel de Gucht, as well as deputies of the European 
Parliament Graham Watson, Anneli Tuulikki Jäätteenmäki and Sandra Kalniete, attended and 
made statements. At this summit, the then Minister of European Union Affairs Egemen Bağış 
and the then Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan also addressed the audience, highlighting the 
close ties forged between the conservative businessmen association and the JDP.105 The head 
of TUSKON, Rızanur Meral, also stated at this summit that “the EU reforms would be the 
reference point for Turkey’s transformation”, and that Turkish businessmen would do their 
best to support and contribute to the EU-Turkey relationship.106 
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All in all, for reasons both political and economic, Turkey’s conservative businessmen, 
once staunch allies of the anti-EU Welfare Party, have calculated that it would be potentially 
devastating in the long run to dramatically change the dynamics and volume of the bilateral 
economic interaction between Turkey and Europe. Instead, they consider it wiser to diversify 
the routes of Turkish money flow without damaging the strong economic link with the EU, an 
economic stance which is quite similar to the mentality employed by the foreign policy-
makers of the new Turkish grand strategy. This approach emphasises pragmatism over 
ideological discourse, coupled with a political pragmatism that sees the links between the 
potential benefits of Turkey’s further advance towards greater democracy—with higher levels 
of participation from the periphery including different religious and ethnic groups—and a 
much better working market economy.  
 
Military-Civil Power Calculus: Reforms and Discontent on the Rise amongst the Old Elite 
Including the Military 
 
In its quest to reconfigure the civil-military relationship, the EU accession process provided 
the JDP not only with motivation and encouragement, but also with an effective instrument. 
Echoing this assumption, Heinz-Jürgen Axt argues that reforms are used by the JDP primarily 
in instrumental terms in order “to secure support by businessmen, to overcome military’s 
strong influence, and to modernize the country”.107 Svante Cornell shares this assumption, 
arguing that “The AKP’s interest in the EU is inversely related to its consolidation of power. 
When it has been weak, it has appealed to the EU; as it strengthened its controls, so it 
dumped any ambitions of EU integration.”108  
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The acquis-oriented reforms that Turkey carried out did not receive approval from 
every circle within Turkey. Not surprisingly, the Copenhagen Criteria enraged the old elite 
and the military due to the emphasis on minority rights, gradually triggering reforms resulting 
in the abolition of the death penalty (an amendment to be applied to PKK leader Öcalan) and 
discussions over Article 312, which bans incitement to religious and ethnic hatred. The 
Criteria also angered the military due to the demand for reforms designed to address Turkey’s 
problematic civil-military power calculus. For the EU, “the military tutelage” has been “one 
of the central obstacles towards democratic consolidation”.109 This demand can be seen as 
aiming to limit the military’s ability to intervene in civilian politics,110 which is in line with 
Phinnemore’s suggestion that “a large role for the military is incompatible with the 
democratic norms supposedly underpinning the EU”.111 
Certain legal amendments, changes and the introduction of new laws and regulations 
laid the ground for a great deal of discontent among the old elite, of which the military has 
long been the backbone The old Turkish elite based its ideologies and mentality on French-
type Jacobinism112 and laicism, with a top-down understanding of reform and an alarmist 
attitude towards any other ideological affiliation. This included religious or non-Turkish 
ethnic ideology, and resulted in a re-evaluation of the EU membership process in a more 
critical light. Thus, the military, once staunch Westernisers, had been transformed into Euro-
sceptics. Soli Özel notes that:  
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Democratisation of the Turkish political order does indeed mean a profound shift 
in the balance of power and this process entails the loss of power and privilege 
for those on the losing side. Therefore the most virulent anti-Western positions as 
well as proposals for a non-Western strategic option come from some 
Westernised elites, including retired military officials.113 
 
Showing this discontent and the military’s changing stance, the then Chief of the General 
Staff Hilmi Özkök tried to justify the asymmetry in the Turkish civil-military relationship by 
saying that every country has its own characteristics.114 He also objected to the EU’s “carrot 
and stick” policy.115 In this environment, a religious rhetorical attack even came from the 
military ranks when General Halil Şimşek, speaking at a Military Academy-organised 
seminar, called the EU a “Christian club” that was shaped by “Christian values and under the 
Vatican’s influence.”116 This statement would not have surprised anybody if it had come from 
Erbakan in the past. However, it came from the military, which has long been the self-
appointed guardian of the “secular and unitary state structure” of Turkey. This was a clear 
sign that the military’s irritation had reached a point where it no longer hesitated to use its old 
enemy’s rhetoric to garner the support it needed. 
Turkey’s signing of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Protocols 6 
and 13, and the resulting abolition of the death penalty introduced the necessary means to 
promote judiciary independence, closer investigation and strict measures against torture in 
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interrogations and reforms related to prison system.117 This caused a great deal of anger for 
groups which considered such changes to pose a danger to the state’s fight with “ethnic and 
religious domestic threats”. Among the EU’s demands concerning the democratization aspect 
of the Copenhagen Criteria was a call to increase the number of civilian members of the 
National Security Council and an increase in the influence of these civilian members in 
defining national security concepts. The Copenhagen Criteria also demanded higher levels of 
civilian control over military promotions, budgets and dismissals, the removal of military 
members from non-military councils such as YÖK (Council of Higher Education)118 and 
RTÜK (Radio and Television Supreme Council), as well as civilian supervision of military 
courts.119 
The 2003 reform package included legal changes to ensure civilian control over the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and National Security Council (NSC) budgets. This was an 
important step forward limiting the military’s free hand over what proportion of the state 
budget is transferred to itself.120 The NSC, a structure that was established as an advisory 
body, had become a powerful military tool which was used to control civilian politics. The 
NSC even had the right to veto candidates that political parties chose for upcoming 
elections.121 Moreover, a parallel military legal system for military officials added a legal side 
to its political and economic position, which had long been a concern for the EU regarding 
Turkey’s judicial system.122 In 2006, increasing civilian control over military courts and 
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restrictions over their jurisdictional capabilities reached the point at which trials of civilians, 
regardless of the nature of the accusations, were prohibited from being conducted in military 
courts, significantly limiting the judicial autonomy of the military.123 
As far as the military’s ability to intervene in politics is concerned, one of the most 
important demands from the EU was to amend Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces 
(TAF) Internal Service Law, Article 85 of the Internal Service Regulations, and Article 2a of 
the Law on the NSC. These three articles gave the Turkish Armed Forces the duty to defend 
not only the country but also the regime against “both internal and external threats.” The EU 
considered that the articles implicitly justify military intervention. In fact, they had been used 
to justify interventions in the past, effectively allowing the military to act as a “shadow 
government” that could give orders to political leaders, amend the decisions of ministers and 
monitor whether their “advice” was put into practice by civilian authorities.124 In terms of the 
Kurdish question, Kurdish broadcasting was permitted with the 2001 National Programme for 
the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) in spite of the military’s strong opposition to it. Article 8 
of the Anti-Terrorism Law was repealed, making a clear distinction between armed acts of 
terror and intellectual criticisms of state structure and policy, thus clarifying a previously 
blurred dividing line. The number of civilian members in the NSC increased and a civilian 
head was elected. All these things angered both nationalists and hawkish military officials.125 
A statement made by the then Chief of General Staff, İlker Başbuğ, shows the parallels in the 
objections of nationalists and the military to the EU reform packages: “If the cultural rights 
are transformed into group political rights then fragmentation may occur. This is directly 
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related to Turkey’s security because it destroys the unitary structure.”126 In a similar vein, as 
a response to the NPAA, the Commander of the Armed Forces Academy, Brigadier General 
Halil Şimşek stated that it was breaking up the country in the name of “cultural rights”, 
“broadcasting in the mother tongue” and “educational rights.” Despite criticism from the 
military, the acquis-driven reforms were carried out one after another in rapid succession, 
further distancing the military from its previous pro-EU sentiments.127 The EU’s emphasis on 
the accountability of the Army to the Minister of Defence, not to the Prime Minister (in 
accordance with the general practice in member states of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe as well as NATO and the EU)128 was no less alarming for the military 
officials, who had hitherto enjoyed an autonomous and influential role in Turkish domestic 
politics. Ideally, “the military quantifies the risk, the civilians judge it,”129 whereas in Turkey 
the military not only quantified risks, but also pressured civilians to take the steps they 
considered necessary and judged the civilians on their policy decisions. In the face of the 
changing civil-military relationship and increasing civilian control over the military, the 
possibility of a junta striving for an intervention into the civilian political realm proved to be 
present anyway, considering the coup attempt of 15 July 2016. However, most of the military 
took an anti-coup stance for the first time in modern Turkish history, which was one of the 
key factors that helped the government thwart the attempted coup. This showed how years of 
effort to transform the military and reconfigure the civil-military relationship—even when 
some elements did not approve of the JDP’s political line—was largely successful. 
All in all, as a result of the above-mentioned amendments, the military lost a great deal 
of its power in terms of political influence and policy-making. This changed the military’s 
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attitude towards the EU membership process, which they blamed for changes and 
amendments in its stature and capabilities. After decades of pro-Westernisation polemicizing, 
the military was trapped by its own rhetoric, preventing it from making a full-frontal attack 
on the EU accession process. Instead, it chose to oppose some of the amendments and 
reforms one by one whenever it deemed necessary. The EU had changed in the post-Cold 
War era, and political conditionality and pressure for domestic reforms became as important 
as the economic dimension of the European integration process. However, in Turkey the 
military and the Kemalist elite had not changed to the same extent, or had chosen to be more 
rigid in terms of changing their stance.130 This state of affairs was a little ironic when one 
considers that most of the JDP’s leading cadre came from Erbakan’s Islamist political parties, 
which were once the forerunners of anti-EU campaigns.  
The controversial situation in which the military found itself trapped was referred to as 
the “Kemalist dilemma”; while Europe was a civilizational target within the context of the 
elites’ “civilizing mission”, the same elite gradually came to regard it as a threat to Turkey’s 
independence and unitary structure.131 This dilemma came about partially a result of Turkey’s 
memories of the First World War and the aftermath of the Independence War. These events 
culminated in the so-called “Sévres Syndrome” within the Turkish public and the elite, which 
was even visible in the statements made by the rather dove-ish former Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit. He criticised the EU’s request for reforms regarding Cyprus, the Kurdish question and 
the Armenian dispute, describing the process as trying to revive the Sévres Treaty and 
humiliate Turkey.132 The roots of the syndrome were described by Bernard Lewis as follows: 
“…the Treaty of Sévres was very harsh, and would have left Turkey helpless and mutilated, a 
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shadow state living on the sufferance of the powers and peoples who were annexing her 
richest provinces.”133 Even though the comparison between WWI memories and the problems 
relating to Turkey’s quest for accession seems a little far-fetched, it was clear that the ruling 
elite and the public suffered significantly from this syndrome, even affecting their approach 
to the latter.  
Although it is questionable to ascribe all the credit for the normalisation of an abnormal 
civil-military relationship in Turkey to the EU accession process, the EU can be credited with 
helping bring about the change much sooner and more easily. This came about as a result of 
the EU’s criticism of the civil-military relationship in the Turkish context and the reforms it 
demanded. Either way, Turkey was freed from the rigid stance of the military and its self-
appointed mission to “civilise” the country via a largely outdated reading of European 
civilisation. As Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director of Instituto Affari Internazionali, confirms, 
the demise of military influence was one of the key factors that contributed to a reform 
process134 which, along with the economic dimension, kept the relationship alive during a 
period of realpolitik stalemate.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Assessing the Strength of NCR and the post-2013 Environment in the 
Bilateral Relationship 
 
In contrast to the National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Welfare Party, which 
pursued an anti-Western agenda, the JDP has maintained Turkey’s commitment 
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to the Western security structure and the EU, and emphasised EU membership as 
an important pillar of its foreign policy. 
Angel Rabasa & Stephen F. Larrabee 135 
 
The timing of the stagnation in the Turkish/EU relationship is thought-provoking. It took 
place in an era when debates over Turkey’s “potential” in surrounding regions were livelier 
due to changes in power- and interest-driven perceptions, and when Turkey’s interest-driven 
concerns about the ESDP scheme and the Cyprus dispute were heightened.  
Even during the era when the JDP’s commitment to reforms and further 
democratisation in line with the acquis was praised by the EU, some realpolitik questions 
plagued the relationship with tension. This contradicts the picture drawn by primordialist 
accounts, which primarily focus on ideological tension between the two.  
Turkey’s irritation over its side-lining in an era of new windows of opportunity in the 
immediate post-Cold War era and its concerns about the EU’s stance on the question of 
Cyprus pushed the two sides into opposing positions. Turkey has also found itself disagreeing 
with the EU due to the emerging ESDP scheme. The ESDP crisis has shown Turkey’s 
significance for the EU as a leading NATO ally which would help the Union project its own 
power on a global scale. The crisis has also shown the limits of decades-old Westernisation 
rhetoric in Turkey, and how this rhetoric can be defeated at times when its interests are at 
stake. During the ESDP/CSDP discussions, Turkey insisted on pursuing its own interest-
driven policy line rather than offering concessions without receiving necessary assurances, 
even at the expense of a stalemate and stagnation in its relations with the EU. Neither long-
standing Westernisation discourse nor the potential loss of momentum in the reform process 
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due to the stagnating relationship with the EU could overweigh power and interest-related 
concerns, as shown in the case of the Greek Cypriot accession. This was happening despite 
the fact that it could also cost the JDP in terms of both international support and its wide 
domestic electoral base, which included pro-EU groups. Paul states that Turkey moved to an 
approach on the acquis reforms that could be summarised as “we will do what we want when 
we want to,”136 echoing Heinz Kramer’s suggestion, quoted by Hale: “the very moment the 
Turkish political leadership lost trust in the readiness of the EU to stand by its commitments, 
it started to change its policy”.137 
The pragmatic attitude adopted by conservative businessmen, in spite of their role in 
channelling some of Turkey’s economic interactivity with the EU to neighbouring regions, 
gradually allowed the adoption of a more pro-EU line. Their stance was reinforced via their 
branches in Europe as well as at meetings and fairs with their EU counterparts, and efforts to 
harmonise their businesses with EU standards. This attitude economically reinforced 
Turkey’s “balancing efforts” in the geopolitical orientation of its grand strategy. Turkey’s 
biggest trading partner is still the EU, and the EU’s share in Turkish trade still stands at more 
than 40 percent, even in the post-2005 stagnation period.138 
From the late 1990s, while previously ardent supporters of EU accession process 
such as the military began to approach the EU membership with more suspicion, other 
groups, including the conservatives, came to regard it as a goal worth pursuing and also 
as a way of changing the centre-periphery power calculus in Turkey. With the EU’s 
demand for reforms and further democratisation, the military and the old Kemalist elite 
realised that the EU process reflected a more contemporary reading of European 
civilisation. This reading placed more emphasis on minority rights, democracy, market 
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economy and religious freedoms, as opposed to the old elite’s adherence to the 
European norms and values in the nineteenth and early twentieth century which took 
the form of an étatist, Jacobinist, and aggressive laicist approach.139 The military’s 
demise as a key policy-maker removed a significant obstacle that stood in the way of 
Turkey carrying out reforms in line with the EU acquis and maintaining the country’s 
legal and bureaucratic commitment to EU the norms. Even in 2010—one of the high 
points of Turkey’s fading enthusiasm and loss of reform-based momentum—a 
“democratization package” was passed via a referendum in September which was 
applauded by the EU. This amendment package was third of its kind after the 
amendments in 2004 and 2007, but had a broader scope. The package included 
important changes to the judicial system, including the authorization for civilian courts 
to try military personnel for “crimes against the security of the State, constitutional 
order and functioning”, thus implicitly referring to coup plots.140 Despite all reform 
efforts, a coup attempt was carried out by a group within the military in July 2016. The 
attempt not only led to questioning the effectiveness of the EU-demanded reforms, but 
due to the ensuing arrests, suspensions and the 3-months state of emergency, also 
resulted in severe criticisms about Turkey’s democracy from the EU capitals. A key 
positive side of the tragic incident was that most of the military followed an anti-coup 
stance and supported the democratically-elected government. 
Within this context, Turkish leaders’ disappointment about the EU’s late and weak 
responses to the 2016 coup attempt is important in order that the EU does not to lose its 
norm-based leverage, not only in terms of pushing for further reforms but also for urging the 
JDP to maintain its commitment to the rule of law in the aftermath of the attempt. The EU’s 
                                                          
 139 Haas, 2012, p. 208–209. 
140 Hale, 2013, p. 192–193. For a more detailed analysis of all three amendment packages, see Vahap Coşkun, 
“Constitutional Amendments Under the Justice and Development Party Rule”, Insight Turkey 15: 4 (2013), 
pp. 95–113; Ergun Özbudun, “Turkey's Search for a New Constitution”, Insight Turkey 14: 1(2012), pp. 39–50. 
 232 
 
norm-oriented approach has been discussed already in the bilateral “bargaining” process over 
Syrian immigrants. Added to that, in the civil-military relationship dimension—coupled with 
the insufficiency of the acquis-related reforms to avoid a coup attempt however small-scale it 
was carried out—this image of the EU’s silence would not help the bilateral relationship in 
the future. 
All in all, expectations that Turkey, under a so-called Islamist government, would turn 
its back on the EU and the West in general on ideological and value-based grounds have 
proved groundless. It is true that Turkey has acted much more proactively in its neighbouring 
regions, extending financial activity to regions in which it was previously non-existent. 
However, its stance regarding the EU and the acquis, even during the “Merkozy” era,141 did 
not undergo any substantial change. Still, the Merkozy era,142 coupled with the Greek Cypriot 
government’s veto right and distractions on the EU’s part caused by the global financial crisis 
of 2008-2009 and the Greek debt crisis of 2010-2011, effectively worked together to halt 
membership process, although not on paper.143 Turkey put a great deal of effort into 
harmonisation, adopting a softer power-oriented policy regarding the Iraq War and the 
Iranian nuclear programme whilst encouraging democratisation and market liberalisation in 
the MENA region. In this context, it is possible that Turkey realised that a higher profile in its 
environs and in regions in which it had not enjoyed a presence before would pay off. From 
that standpoint, involvement in the Caribbean and Africa and in regions where it had 
previously enjoyed only a limited economic presence (such as the Middle East and former 
Soviet countries) would help Turkey not only in terms of its position on the global stage but 
                                                          
141 A term used to refer to the era when Merkel- and Sarkozy-led governments in Germany and France caused 
a great deal of stagnation in terms of the Turkish-EU relationship due to their at best distanced position with 
respect to the question of Turkey’s membership, coupled with rising Islamophobia and Turco-scepticism in 
Europe and their repeated use of the term “privileged partnership” instead of membership for Turkey. 
142 Paul Kubicek, in personal communication with the author, also highlighted the impact of this era by 
referring to the new leaders of France and Germany as one of the reasons of Turkey’s turn to its 
surroundings. 
143 Hale, 2013, p. 187–190.  
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also in terms of its bargaining power with the EU. Turkey’s disappointments on several 
fronts—particularly regarding its immediate neighbourhood after the Arab Spring, however, 
might leave this possible increase in its bargaining power open to question for some time in 
the future. The post-2013 rise in support for EU membership—even though belief in eventual 
membership is still quite low—shows people’s increasing sensitivities about “human rights 
and democracy promotion” as Grigoriadis suggested,144 and a belief in the importance of the 
EU dimension of Turkey’s grand strategy in the face of Turkey’s losses on other fronts. 
Whether Turkey’s efforts to devise and pursue “strategic flexibility”, aiming at improving 
some of the deteriorated relations (as in the cases of Israel and Russia), would help Turkey 
compensate for these losses, and how this possibility might have an impact on the average 
Turkish citizen’s support for EU membership, would be important questions that future 
research would need to address. Addressing the latter would help test whether this rise in 
support for EU membership stemmed from the demand for more democracy or cost-benefit 
analysis of the people.  
Expectations about a Welfare Party-like foreign political stance that would strictly 
contest being part of Europe on religious grounds have proven far from realistic.145 To the 
contrary, the JDP era has been an important period in terms of legal and institutional 
harmonisation with the acquis.146 According to Paul Kubicek, the mixed relationship with the 
EU during successive JDP governments results from: 
 
                                                          
144 Ioannis Grigoriadis, personal communication, 19/3/2016. As it was mentioned earlier in the chapter With a 
gradual increase after 2013, in 2014 support was around 45 percent and in 2015, it is around 60 percent. 
145 On the attitude of the Welfare Party towards the EU, see Şaban Tanıyıcı, “Transformation of Political Islam 
in Turkey: Islamist Welfare Party’s Pro-EU Turn”, Party Politics 9: 4 (2003), pp. 463–483. 
146 See Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Political Reforms in 
Turkey, (M&B Tanıtım Hizmetleri ve Tic. Ltd. Ankara: 2007). 
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…disappointment with the EU, the lack of a real membership perspective, the 
EU’s own economic troubles that make it look less desirable (and the strength of 
the Turkish economy)... anti-Turkey rhetoric, the problem with Cyprus, closing of 
chapters in talks, gave the notion that Turkey does not need Europe or that 
Europe offers little, that Turkey is a ‘rising power’ on its own.147  
 
In the following chapter I will discuss the overall explanatory power of neoclassical realism 
to analyse and explain the changes in Turkey’s behaviour. I will present a conclusive 
summarising analysis on each case study. This will be followed by a discussion on the 
sustainability of Turkey’s new grand strategic behaviour in the light of the current state of 
affairs both at the regional and international levels and within Turkey. Lastly, the 
contribution of this research to the literature and broader research agendas now and  in the 
future will be discussed. 
                                                          
147 Paul Kubicek, personal communiation, 20/2/2016. 
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Conclusion: From “Zero Problems” to “Precious Loneliness” and 
“Strategic Flexibility” 
 
“New Turkey” and Shifting Grand Strategic Formulations 
 
It [Turkey] has matured as a country and now has the self-confidence to play a 
global role; the end of the Cold War has freed it from a policy straitjacket and 
given it the chance to pursue broader interests; it sees a wide range of political 
and economic opportunities and wants to seize them. 
Stephen Kinzer689 
 
At some point in history there comes a time where you stand by the truth all alone 
when the world keeps silent against coups and slaughters. If this places you in a 
different position than the rest this is a ‘value-centred loneliness’ and this actually 
is a precious loneliness. 
         İbrahim Kalın690 
 
 
                                                          
689 Kinzer, 2010, p. 201. 
690 “Turkey not ‘lonely’ but dares to do so for its values and principles, says PM adviser”, 26/8/2013, Hürriyet 
Daily News, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-not-lonely-but-dares-to-do-so-for-its-values-and-
principles-says-pm-adviser-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53244&NewsCatID=338>, accessed 1/2/2015. 
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“Turkey has a lot of problems. We have regional problems... So what will we do? 
Very simple: We’ll increase the number of our friends and we’ll decrease the 
number of our enemies.” 
         Binali Yıldırım691 
 
Over the last two decades—especially during the last one—Turkey has pursued an 
increasingly activist grand strategy when compared to its limited manoeuvrability during the 
Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey found itself in a very different position—one 
that has become even more complex over the last decade, in which its relative power position 
has been subject to important occasional changes. These changes in attitude did not emerge 
all at once during the JDP era, but had their roots in the immediate post-Cold War period. 
However, the JDP era has witnessed the climax of this shift.  
In the post-Cold War era, especially up until the Arab Spring’s extension to Syria, 
Turkey came to be seen as an example of the “rich man analogy”, referring to “a man who 
woke up one morning and found himself in possession of a big treasure.”692 The country 
enjoyed a much broader geopolitical scope in terms of diplomatic representation, political 
involvement and an unprecedented rise in trade and investment levels.693  
                                                          
691 "New PM signals shift in foreign policy: More friends than enemies", 24/5/2016, Hürriyet Daily 
News,<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-pm-signals-shift-in-foreign-policy-more-friends-than-
enemies.aspx?pageID=238&nID=99616&NewsCatID=338> 
692 Bengio and Özcan, 2001, p. 62. 
693 On the increasing levels of economic activity between Turkey and the Middle East see Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami and Süleyman Elik, “Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East”, Turkish Studies 
12: 4 (2011), pp. 643–662, p. 654; the Ministry of Finance’s statistics at: 
<http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=7155BE01-D8D3-8566-45208351967592CF>, accessed 
08/06/2013; Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of 
Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran”, Security Dialogue 39 (2008), pp. 495–515. On the Turkish-Russian 
trade volume, see “Turkey-Russia Eye Increased Trade, Joint Auto Production”, 
<http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-US/infocenter/news/Pages/261113-turkey-russia-joint-auto-production.aspx>, 
26/11/2013, accessed 8/12/2014 and Foreign Ministry’s statistics on “Turkey´s Commercial and Economic 
Relations With Russian Federation”, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-
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Along with power- and interest-related revisions in Turkey’s behaviour vis-à-vis other 
actors, an enabling domestic environment has also been an important component of the new 
picture. Two principal domestic factors—the coalitions between conservative business circles 
and political leaders and the increasing autonomy of the elected civilian executive thanks to 
the demise of the military—have played the role of multipliers.  
Nevertheless, Turkey’s activism towards having “zero problems with neighbours” 
brought not only opportunities in its surroundings, but also a gradual increase in risks and 
occasional losses, especially since the Arab Spring. The regional and international landscape 
that emerged after the Arab Spring gradually pushed Turkey to embrace its “precious 
loneliness” before more recently changing its grand strategic formulation to “strategic 
flexibility”694, referring to an effort to increase its manoeuvrability once more by fixing 
damaged ties with particular actors. Putting some serious effort into normalising its 
deteriorating relations with Russia and Israel in the summer of 2016, Turkey seemed to be 
coming to terms with the reality that the regional dynamics would no longer allow it to 
pursue a “zero problems” policy line, whereas loneliness, however precious it is, would 
significantly damage its goal of acting as a key player. Achievements and/or losses stemming 
from these more recent shifts in Turkey’s grand strategic positioning, as well as how the 
recent turn to “strategic flexibility” would be pursued, will pave the way for future research. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with-russian-federation.en.mfa>, accessed 6/12/2014. According to these, trade with Russia increased from 
around $4 billion in 2002 to $35 billion in 2012. Also see, Foreign Ministry’s briefs, “Turkey´s relations with 
the Latin American and the Caribbean Countries” at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-relations-with-the-
latin-american-and-the-caribbean-countries.en.mfa> and “Turkey-Africa Relations” at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa, accessed 30/06/2014. In line with these, according to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stats, trade with Africa increased from almost $3 billion in 2002 to almost $20 
billion in 2012, and in the same era, trade with the Caribbean increased 9-fold to reach around $8 billion. In 
the same period, in both regions, the number of Turkey’s diplomatic representations—including embassies 
and consulates—almost doubled and now Turkey has representations in almost all countries in both regions. 
See Sorumluluk ve Vizyon: 2014 Yılına Girerken Türk Dış Politikası [Responsibility and Vision: Turkish Foreign 
Policy towards 2014], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/sorumlulukvevizyon-2014.pdf> accessed 20/1/2015. 
 694 Şaban Kardaş, "Normalleşme Dalgası ve Stratejik Esneklik", 2/7/2016, Star. 
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In terms of a theoretical framework, NCR proves useful in explaining both the ups and 
downs in Turkey’s particular bilateral relationships as well as its overall grand strategic 
positioning in an era when both international and domestic factors have been subject to 
change.  
Summarising the Analysis and the Explanatory Power of Neoclassical Realism 
 
In order to explore whether ethno-religious ambitions or interest-driven behaviour was the 
main catalyst for Turkey’s new grand strategic behaviour, three cases were analysed: the 
Turkish-Iranian, Turkish-Israeli and Turkish-EU relationships. These three cases represent 
three major cultural paradigms—Muslim solidarity, Muslim-Jewish hostility and 
Muslim/Turkish vs. Western/Christian tension. In terms of primordialist analyses, all of these 
relationships have been frequently considered based on the tensions or affinities between 
these labels. However, after analysing the relationships in detail over the previous chapters, 
my conclusion is that self-interested state behaviour is the primary motivational factor behind 
adjustments in Turkey’s attitude. The next section will briefly summarise the analyses on 
each of the three cases, highlighting the explanatory power of NCR.  
 
1) The Turkish-Iranian Relationship 
 
From a culturalist point of view, Iran has been the ideal candidate for a culture- and ideology-
based analysis of Turkey’s shifting attitudes towards particular actors. Such accounts have 
interpreted the recent rapprochement on common religious grounds. It was expected that 
governments with similar ideological viewpoints would strive for a closer relationship. Due 
to the religious backgrounds of the leading figures of the JDP, a close contact in the name of 
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religious solidarity similar to that which marked the Erbakan era was expected, even though 
Iran represents a Shi’a Muslim identity.  
Rather than an ideology-driven rapprochement, the relevant chapter showed that it was 
the shared concerns of Turkey and Iran regarding the post-Iraq War atmosphere which laid 
the foundations for their rapprochement over the last decade. The rapprochement came after 
several decades of distrust, rivalry, and occasional hostility since 1979, followed by Turkey’s 
shift in focus towards the Middle East after the Cold War. This new focus not only pushed 
Turkey to increase its deterrence against its neighbours, but also forced the country to 
reconsider its relations with them. With the Iraq War of 2003, Turkey realised that as far as 
the questions of post-war Iraq and Northern Iraq were concerned, it had more in common 
with Iran than it did with other powers, including Israel and the United States. Moreover, in 
order to limit the impact of external intervention on the whole region and to prevent spill-
over effects—which would threaten its own regional power position and domestic stability—
closer contact with Iran seemed to be the most pragmatic choice. Turkey’s support for the 
Iranian nuclear programme for peaceful ends was again an interest-based decision which 
further reinforced the two countries’ rapprochement. However, again due to interest-driven 
divergences and both sides’ desire to achieve relative advantage over the other, the two 
countries experienced several points of tension, such as Turkey’s decision to be a part of 
NATO’s BMDS scheme and their disagreements during the Arab Spring and beyond. Once 
Turkey realised that its own interests clashed with those of Iran, it adjusted and re-adjusted its 
attitude toward Iran. In spite of an overall improvement in the relationship, the post-Arab 
Spring environment also brought to the surface their divergences and continuing rivalry for 
regional superiority against each other.  
On the domestic front, Turkey’s conservative business associations not only received 
practical encouragement from policy-makers to pursue their goals and support state policy 
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choices abroad as a “practical hand”, but also used their cultural affinities to establish closer 
economic ties with other predominantly Muslim-populated countries in the MENA region, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Within this context, Iran has long been a key destination for 
these conservative businessmen since the early 1990s. In the JDP era, in line with the 
increase in their overall activity abroad, their role within the context of the Turkish-Iranian 
economic relationship increased too. 
As another important domestic component, changing civil-military power calculus in 
Turkey affected Turkey’s ability to adjust and alter its policy line regarding Iran. The 
possibility of closer contact between Turkey and the post-revolutionary Iran had long been 
regarded as a serious threat by the military. The military was quite successful in backing its 
stance with security-related concerns such as alleged efforts of Iran to export its regime to 
Turkey and to threaten its unitary structure by supporting the PKK. In the 1990s, the military 
was quite influential within the context of Turkey’s foreign policy-making. The result was 
that Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped in accordance with mostly security-driven 
evaluations made by the military as well as an aggressive secular attitude targeting 
neighbouring Muslim countries. Unsurprisingly, the military’s influence as the leading actor 
in the anti-Iran camp in Turkey contributed to the negative atmosphere in the Turkish-Iranian 
relationship which had already been plagued by distrust, especially since 1979. The military’s 
gradual loss of power as a key policy-making actor led to the demise of the impact of its 
preferences regarding foreign policy choices. This acted as a positive multiplier, contributing 
to Turkey’s desire to revisit its relationship with Iran towards an overall rapprochement in the 
era under the JDP rule, even though realpolitik concerns, after the Arab Spring, showed the 
limits of this rapprochement.  
The Turkish-Iranian relationship therefore illustrates that neither rapprochement nor 
growing tensions after the Arab Spring could be attributed simply to the ideological or 
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cultural motives which are assumed to have pushed Turkey into reshaping its relationship 
with Iran in line with its Islamist or Neo-Ottomanist ambitions. Instead, all the changes 
discussed in the chapter on Iran basically stemmed from the way Turkey perceived the power 
structure in both regional and global terms, and how it decided to revise its policies 
accordingly in response to changing dynamics. As a consequence of the changes at 
international level, Turkey revised, adjusted, and re-shaped its policy line regarding Iran. 
Meanwhile, the selected domestic factors outlined in this research played the role of 
multipliers, helping policy-makers carry out these steps. 
 
2) The Turkish-Israeli Relationship 
 
According to ideology and culture-centred accounts, Turkey’s new grand strategic 
approach—its “Neo-Ottomanist” and/or “Islamist” policy line, is assumed to have pursued a 
rigid attitude towards Israel, following the footsteps of Erbakan. A strategic partnership that 
enjoyed a golden era in the post-Cold War years due to the positive achievements in Arab-
Israeli relations and Turkey’s return to the “arc of crisis”, underwent a tectonic shift 
stemming from ideological and cultural tension due to leading JDP figures’ Islamist 
backgrounds and their early political careers in Erbakan-led Islamist political parties. 
However, it is striking to note that the relationship was no less positive for each side 
compared to immediate pre-JDP years until Turkey and Israel clashed over the question of 
Northern Iraq—a clash that resulted from their own interest-driven calculations. But even 
after this first major setback, cooperative efforts and desire to fix the relationship have been 
far from absent.  
Israel and Turkey’s clashing views over Northern Iraq were the first critical juncture 
towards understanding the deterioration in the relationship between the two countries over the 
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last decade. While Turkey regarded the possibility of an independent Kurdish entity in the 
region as a direct threat to the power configuration of the region and its own interests, it also 
felt threatened by the risk of spill-over, considering its own sizeable Kurdish population. The 
Israeli position, however, is believed to be quite supportive of an independent Kurdish state 
in the region. Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009), as an Israeli step towards consolidating its 
own security and power position, put Turkey’s efforts to raise its profile in the region in 
danger by abruptly ending the indirect Syrian-Israeli peace talks which were being mediated 
by Turkey. The Syrian-Israeli peace talks provided Turkey with a great opportunity to present 
itself as a key regional player and impartial broker. Operation Cast Lead struck a blow to 
Turkey’s profile and marked the start of a further deterioration, followed by more symbolic 
crises. These crises include the Davos incident and Israel’s deadly flotilla raid. Israel’s close 
ties with the Greek Cypriots and Turkey’s support for the Iranian nuclear programme while at 
the same time criticising Israel for possessing nuclear weapons, did not help their 
deteriorating relationship either. 
 The two domestic factors discussed in the chapter on Israel also played their roles 
within the context of the Turkish-Israeli relationship during the JDP years. In terms of 
economic interactivity between Turkey and Israel, investments from businessmen close to the 
JDP were present throughout this era. Israel’s attitude towards economic initiatives from 
Turkey has always been welcoming, and vice versa, illustrating the pragmatic approach of 
Turkey’s conservative businessmen associations, and the ability of both countries to put 
distance between ideology and economic relations. The idea that economic relations can 
continue even in the face of political tension, and should have little to do with religion, past 
conflicts and/or divergent foreign policies, has driven the economic aspects of Turkey’s new 
grand strategy all along, and the Israeli case is one of the best ways of showcasing this. This 
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pragmatism is one of the important factors that avoided a complete collapse of the Turkish-
Israeli relationship.     
The impact of the decline of military control over policy-making is equally visible in 
the new dynamics of the Turkish-Israeli relationship. The old elite, including the military, 
believed that developing a close relationship with Israel would not only distance Turkey from 
its predominantly Muslim neighbours, but also eliminate the risk of a possible religious 
takeover of the regime. The increasing number of PKK attacks in southern Turkey back in the 
1990s reinforced their arguments in favour of a closer relationship with Israel due to the need 
for advanced military technology and equipment transfer. The old elite’s securitised rhetoric 
directed against Iran, Iraq and Syria due to their alleged support for the PKK and possible 
efforts to destabilise Turkey also contributed to the strategic partnership forged between 
Turkey and Israel. The JDP era marked the peak of the military’s demise in terms of its 
influence over civilian authorities. This helped Turkey to adopt a much more flexible 
approach to its relationship with Israel in response to rapidly changing calculations of power, 
as opposed to the partly ideology-driven, military-supported golden age of the 1990s. 
Overall, the game has been primarily interest-driven over the last decade. When its 
power position was challenged, Turkey revisited its relationship with Israel and made major 
adjustments. However, the relevant chapter also discussed the numerous efforts that were 
made to fix the relationship during that era, despite the deteriorated atmosphere. Neither 
country saw the other as expendable in a region where alliances and enmities as well as 
overall stability and security could so easily alter. Pragmatism, therefore, amidst changing 
dynamics almost on a daily basis, governed the dynamics of this particular relationship too. 
Recent normalisation efforts, which reached their zenith with the reconciliation deal on 26 
June 2016, came at a time of Turkey’s loss of manoeuvrability in the region, further 
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reinforcing assumptions about the pragmatic sources of change in the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship.   
 
3) The Turkish-EU Relationship 
 
From a primordialist viewpoint, the “Middle-Easternisation” of Turkey’s grand strategy with 
“Neo-Ottoman” or “Islamist” tendencies would have given rise to the “Christian club” 
narrative regarding the EU. However, it is striking that the highpoint of the Turkish-EU 
relationship was actually witnessed during the JDP era. In this era legal, bureaucratic and 
institutional harmonisation reached its highest level and the official accession negotiations 
began. For a political party about which culturalist accounts tend to highlight Islamist and 
anti-Western roots,695 it is striking that the JDP was the political party that achieved the most 
in the Turkish-EU relationship in Turkey’s decades-old quest for membership. 
The EU’s prioritisation of the CEECs in the immediate post-Cold War era coincided 
with a time when Turkey was evaluating its newly emerging opportunities in its own 
neighbourhood. Regarding the prioritisation of the CEECs, Turkey felt side-lined and got 
extremely disappointed. Turkey began to question the EU dimension of its grand strategy in 
an era when the former Soviet space and the Middle East came to be regarded as promising 
regions for the country to raise its profile. This, coupled with the EU’s later efforts to speed 
up the process of operationalising the ESDP scheme damaged the Turkish-EU relationship. 
Controversies over the project—which was once expected to have great potential, but proved 
disappointing over time—marked an important critical juncture. Turkey had serious concerns 
                                                          
695 See Martina Warning and Tuncay Kardaş, “The Impact of Changing Islamic Identity on Turkey’s New Foreign 
Policy”, Alternatives, 10: 2–3 (Summer-Fall, 2011), pp. 123–140. On the ‘logic of identity related to that point, 
also see Tarık Oğuzlu & Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Is the Westernisation Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who’s to 
Blame?”, Turkish Studies, 10: 4 (2009), pp. 577–593, p. 580. 
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about the ESDP, stemming from its own power- and interest-based calculations.696 Another 
major blow to the relationship was the EU’s handling of the Greek Cypriot accession process. 
Ever since Turkey began EU membership negotiations in 2005, it insisted on rejecting the 
extension of its Customs Union agreement to the Greek Cypriot government. This insistence 
stemmed from Turkey’s decades-old policy of not recognising the government as the island’s 
sole legitimate authority. Cyprus has been regarded an important part of Turkey’s regional 
power position within the broader MENA region and a significant military asset to 
maintaining its relative advantage over Greece and the Greek Cypriot government. Turkey’s 
EU accession process has thus come to a standstill until a comprehensive settlement 
regarding the Cyprus question can be reached. Recent efforts to re-energise the relationship in 
the wake of the refugee crisis do not seem very promising at present.  
Regarding the two selected domestic factors, the changing attitude of the conservative 
businessmen’s associations with strong links to the JDP played an important role. Even 
though conservative SMEs were among the most ardent supporters of Erbakan and his strict 
anti-EU rhetoric in the past, their journey towards pragmatism and sympathy towards 
European norms and values has been an important one in terms of maintaining the European 
dimension of Turkey’s international economic activity. It is true that some of the EU’s share 
in that process has been channelled to neighbouring regions thanks to the activity of 
conservative businessmen’s associations abroad, but the geographical scope of Turkey’s 
economic activity has been broadened, and this has naturally affected the EU’s share in 
Turkey’s international economic portfolio.  Despite this, The EU still remains Turkey’s 
leading economic partner. It seems unrealistic to expect any change there, even in the long 
                                                          
696 These concerns include the risks of spill-over of the use of ESDP in its immediate neighbourhood, of the 
project’s use against itself in the Aegean and the subsequent loss of its relative advantage in the Aegean and 
with respect to Cyprus. Thus, Turkey used its power in NATO to make sure its concerns were addressed 
rather than desperately pursuing its Westernisation project at all costs, damaging the relationship to a great 
extent. 
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run, due to the more pragmatic approach that has gradually been adopted by conservative 
businessmen in their desire to integrate themselves further into the EU and its norms and 
values.  
The second domestic factor analysed in this research was the changing dynamics of the 
civil-military relationship in Turkey. As far as the military’s position is concerned, it was one 
of the most enthusiastic supporters of “Westernisation” as a “civilizational project” since the 
early years of the republic. However,  particular reforms demanded by the EU—especially 
those which targeted the civil-military relationship in Turkey—aroused concerns among the 
hawkish military officials, especially after the end of the Cold War due to the increasing 
importance of political criteria in the accession negotiations. They realised that by helping 
liberalise Turkey’s politics they would in fact be limiting their own influence, which they had 
enjoyed for decades. Pursuing their own “project” would therefore eventually mean shooting 
themselves in the foot. The Turkish military found themselves caught in a dilemma—they 
must either destroy their decades-old image as “Westernisers” or face destruction themselves. 
The JDP’s strong commitment to harmonisation and to undertaking the necessary reforms in 
line with the acquis contributed to a further decline in the military’s influence over civilian 
policy-makers. The military’s much reduced and limited impact resulted in a rise in self-
confidence for the new ruling elite—“the new Westernisers”—in line with significant 
improvements in their autonomy. Despite this change, the coup attempt of July 15, 2016 
showed that attempts could still be made by particular groups within the military to intervene 
directly in the political realm. However, the anti-coup stance shown by most of the military 
proved the extent to which the civil-military relationship and the military’s attitude had 
transformed over time. This change was the key to understanding the government’s freer 
hand to carry out necessary reforms over the years. Still, the incident and its ramifications—
including the arrest and suspension of thousands of people—were followed by discussions 
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about Turkey’s adherence to democracy and liberties, which will remain a key focal point in 
the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future.697  
All in all, the post-2005 stalemate did not stem from an Erbakan-like anti-Western or 
anti-EU rhetoric,698 but from purely interest-based calculations. Harmonisation efforts have 
remained in place, further challenging a primordialist reading of the stagnation. The new era 
is marked by a Turkish-EU relationship shaped by interest and power, replacing the old 
Turkish mentality of prioritising the identity-driven dimension of Turkey’s ambitions towards 
Westernisation.   
In all three case study chapters I conclude that interest- and power-driven revisions are 
the primary motivations behind the shifts in Turkey’s attitude towards each of the actors 
discussed, while ideas and values entered the picture only indirectly, through influential 
actors such as conservative businessmen.  
 
Sustainability of Turkey’s Activism 
 
Turkey’s grand strategic activism, its components, the motivation behind it and its theoretical 
analysis have all been addressed in this study. However, the degree to which it is sustainable 
is a subject which I will briefly touch upon in this section. Some concluding points on 
sustainability will be made to open space for future research. 
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One primary and two secondary factors were discussed as the key variables affecting 
Turkey’s policies vis-à-vis certain actors and its grand strategy in general. These were the 
external changes “seducing” Turkey’s animus dominandi, coalitions between 
“internationalist” business groups and political elites, and civilian relief from military 
pressure in policy-making and implementing revised policy choices.  
Since I have explained Turkey’s grand strategic shift in the light of the variations in 
these three factors, it follows that the sustainability of this shift will be dependent on their 
future changes and continuities.  
 
Changing Regional and International Dynamics: From “Zero Problems” to “Precious 
Loneliness” and to Having “More Friends and Fewer Enemies” 
 
Turkey’s steps in response to changing external dynamics are based on interest-driven 
calculations and the country’s ability to maintain economic and political flexibility, rather 
than setting fixed policies vis-à-vis certain actors. These aspects are the key to measuring the 
sustainability of the country’s pursuit of power-maximisation. The utilisation of new 
windows of opportunity is important in this context, rather than the adoption of irrational, 
ideological or over-securitised positions that would deprive the state of its ability to act in 
line with changing interest-based calculations. The Western dimension is still Turkey’s 
greatest asset in political and economic terms, not only because of institutional, economic and 
political ties, but as one of the major sources of receptiveness for Turkey’s activism in its 
own environs. Without dramatically damaging this asset, Turkey might need to continue its 
insistence on a multi-regional approach. This approach would doubtless prove a wise option 
in order to compensate for losses in particular regions due to occasional crises, conflicts, and 
political tensions which seem to be the norm in Turkey’s surroundings, rather than 
exceptions.  
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Within this context, some important challenges that need to be monitored at regional 
and international levels include the damaged relationship between Syria and Turkey and the 
civil war in Syria, where the high level of international involvement calls for the re-
securitisation of the bilateral relationship. Turkey’s expectation was that Assad would fall 
quickly, after which the new ruling elite would have provided Turkey with a higher influence 
in Syria once a new government had been formed. But Russian and Iranian support has 
proved highly helpful for Assad, helping him hold on to power and regain some of the 
territory the regime had previously lost. Instability continues in the region due to the current 
reversal of the Arab Spring, which was once perceived as providing Turkey with a great 
opportunity to act as a “model” in the broader MENA region.699 
 The civil war in Syria has proved damaging to both the Turkish-Iranian relationship 
and—after Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet in November 2015—the Turkish-Russian 
relationship. Within this context, considering Turkey’s dependence on Russian energy 
resources—especially natural gas—the future relationship between Turkey and Russia 
deserves a good deal of attention. It is important to note the interdependent nature of the 
Turkey-Russia energy relationship, as Turkey, after Germany, is the second biggest consumer 
of Russian natural gas.700 The Russian role in the construction of Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear 
terminal deepens the critical nature of this dimension.701 As a sword that cuts both ways, 
Turkey’s energy picture (which is a balancing act between its reliance on Russian natural 
resources and Russia’s need for revenues in return for them) leaves a big question mark 
hanging over the future of the relationship.702 Turkey, in the foreseeable future, does not have 
the opportunity to compensate for the possible loss of Russian supplies, which account for 
more than 25bcma, by obtaining alternative sources—although in this respect, options 
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including Qatar, the KRG and Iran are widely discussed, as well as the recent TANAP 
project.703 Thus, in spite of the recent tension between Turkey and Russia, the dynamics of 
their relationship would require a revision in the medium term.704 Recent normalisation 
efforts in the summer of 2016, followed by renewed talks about the Turkish Stream pipeline 
project, do not seem coincidental within this context, and once more serve to prove the 
dominance of economic interests over political or ideological ones.705 
As a second development to be monitored within the context of how international and 
regional developments can affect the sustainability of Turkey’s new grand strategy is the 
increasing instability and insecurity in its immediate neighbourhood. Ongoing civil conflicts 
and collapsed, failed or failing state structures also produce spill-over effects,706 such as 
contributing to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)707, which so far has 
conducted several mass bombing attacks in Turkey. Bombings include Suruç on 20 July 
2015, which claimed more than thirty lives, Ankara on 10 October 2015, claiming more than 
one hundred lives, Sultanahmet on 12 January 2016 and one close to Taksim Square on 19 
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March 2015 which claimed around ten lives. ISIS/Daesh also kidnapped all personnel from 
Turkey’s consulate in Mosul (including the Consul General) on 11 June 2014, and kept them 
captive for more than three months.708 Within the context of Turkey’s fight with ISIS, it listed 
the organisation as a terrorist group in 2013 and has been a member of the anti-ISIS coalition 
since 2014. Moreover, Turkey now has a no-entry list of 37,000 people, has prevented 7500 
people coming to Turkey from Europe, has extradited 3000 people and arrested 700 more, 
prevented 40,000 people from joining ISIS and stopped 223,000 people entering Syria 
illegally. Turkey has established Risk Analysis Units at its border with Syria, and thanks to 
them 1300 people have been added the no-entry list out of 6000 people the units have 
investigated. Turkey has also built 300kms of wall and 161kms of barbed-wire fencing, as 
well as 74km of barriers along its Syrian border. The lighting along 422kms of the Turkish-
Syrian border has been upgraded so that the border can be patrolled more effectively.709 
However, while instability prevails in the region, neither Turkey nor any other power’s 
individual fight against ISIS will remove the threat completely. As Turkey experiences a 
mass flow of refugees, as well as bombings in different parts of Turkey from Ankara to 
Istanbul and Gaziantep, and even rocket attacks carried out by ISIS against Turkish city of 
Kilis on the Syrian border, regional and domestic implications of the existence of the ISIS 
will continue to be challenging in the foreseeable future. 
Another important front would be Turkey’s policy line regarding Iraq and the KRG. 
With respect to Iraq, Turkey’s support to the Muslim Brotherhood’s branch of the Iraqi 
Islamic Party (IIP) damaged not only its relationship with the Shi’a elite ruling Iraq but also 
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with Iran, whose support has been critical for that elite from day one. Turkey’s Syria policy 
has also faced strong criticism from the former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, who accused 
Turkey of trying to draw NATO forces into the Syrian conflict just to defend Turkish 
interests, even though there is no direct threat to the country.710 More recently, within the 
context of upcoming Mosul operation to re-take the city from the ISIS, the exchange of harsh 
criticisms between Turkey and Iraq due to Turkey’s military presence and training program 
in Bashiqa military base as well as the possibility of direct Turkish involvement dealt a 
serious blow to the bilateral relations.711 Turkey’s close ties with the KRG further endanger 
its relationship with the Baghdad government due to disagreements between the two over 
energy revenues. Turkey might also need to keep a closer eye on its relationship with other 
groups within the KRG, especially considering the PUK’s control of energy rich regions 
including Kirkuk and Gorran’s role as a kingmaker (as was the case in 2014) between the two 
leading political parties, the KDP and the PUK.712 If we conclude that the PUK-Gorran 
agreement of mid-2016 takes a common stance against Barzani’s KDP,713 Turkey’s closest 
ally in the region, it would be valid to argue that Turkey’s future policy-making regarding the 
KRG would present a challenge. 
As another point, the toppling of the Moursi-led government in Egypt (once considered 
a leading partner for Turkey) and the consequent deterioration in the Turkish-Egyptian 
relationship, has affected Turkey’s standing in the region negatively. Turkey’s expectation 
was that Moursi’s election victory would result in a closer relationship between Turkey and 
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Egypt as well as offering Turkey greater influence via close links between the JDP and 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. However, the al-Sisi-led coup in 2013 not only undermined 
this expectation, but also resulted in a fractured Turkish-Egyptian relationship which put an 
end to the goal of establishing an “Ankara-Cairo axis”714 which would have increased 
Turkey’s influence further in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, Turkey’s 
close relationship with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)—which is the Iraqi branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood—and its supportive stance regarding Hamas has led to questions being asked 
about its supposed neutrality. Criticisms about Turkey’s policy line transforming from pro-
democracy and pro-reform to “pro-Brotherhood”715 might further weaken Turkey’s position. 
Overall, Cornell rightly argues that Turkey has overestimated its influence in the Middle 
East,716 an overestimation that was proved unfounded after later trends towards the reversal 
of the Arab Spring. 
The comprehensive deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries in July 2015717 is another 
issue that will be at the top of Turkey’s agenda for the foreseeable future. With sanctions 
lifted, Iran’s economic growth might result in a further rise in its regional power, meaning 
that it can open further channels to its proxies in the region from Iraq to Syria as well as to 
Lebanon, which could possibly put Turkey’s regional standing in greater danger. While Iran 
can offer a much more vibrant economic environment for Turkey to utilise, the new picture 
would possibly further contribute to the intensification of the recent regional rivalry between 
the two countries. 
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To summarise, these developments signal a need for the re-evaluation of Turkey’s 
windows of opportunity in the region. Turkey’s ability to devise and adjust policies in line 
with emerging issues will directly affect the damage its grand strategy takes from the 
changing dynamics in its surroundings. Whether Turkey will eventually find itself on the 
losing side in the region in its “age of striving for hegemony” or whether it would be 
successful in overcoming its “precious loneliness”718 with the more recent “strategic 
flexibility”719 approach will primarily depend on its performance on this front. Bill Park 
argues that Turkey has been gradually falling out with its neighbours since the Arab Spring, 
primarily due to intemperance and its own inability to assess its role in events.720  
In any case, it is clear that the country is now experiencing more problems with its 
neighbours than its “zero problems” foreign policy was designed to experience. Turkey now 
has far fewer countries in its immediate neighbourhood with which it enjoys favourable 
relationships. Whereas it was ranked as the country with the most positive perception in the 
Middle East in 2011 and 2012, with an average of 75 per cent, in 2013 its ranking was 4th 
with 59 per cent.721 For Turkey, in an age of toppling authoritarian regimes that surround it, 
maintaining its “zero problems” policy with its neighbours is an extremely unrealistic 
ambition. While Turkey sided with the people and their demands for democratization and 
reform in the MENA region, turning its back to that policy line—particularly in Syria—
would have meant backing an authoritarian regime which ruthlessly kills its people and has 
caused “the biggest migration flow in late history,”722 with around five million refugees 
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fleeing the country. Of these, around three million have taken refuge in Turkey.723 Still, as 
Hale mentions, even though Turkey has not been able to achieve “zero problems”, it “could 
hardly have done otherwise” in an era when its “neighbours are in conflict with each other”. 
The “zero problems” approach was “worth attempting” and was “better than alternatives,”—a 
reference to Turkey’s once paranoid and xenophobic approach to its surroundings.724 As 
Hugh Pope states, it marked “Turkey’s move away from a reflexive defensive foreign 
policy…toward outreach and faith in win-win outcomes”.725 
From this failed attempt to achieve “zero problems” with neighbours down to the 
concept of “precious loneliness” in which Turkey admitted that its foreign policy approach 
has resulted in fewer friendly partners, a major turning point seems to be on its way. 
Realising its loss of manoeuvrability in the region, Turkey has from mid-2016 put a great 
deal of effort into fixing its deteriorated relationships with Israel and Russia, as mentioned 
previously. Coupled with this, once Binali Yıldırım became the new PM after Davutoğlu’s 
resignation in May 2016, Turkey reformulated its grand strategic doctrine, which in 
Yıldırım’s words, now aims at having “more friends and fewer enemies”. Considering that 
achieving the goal of “zero problems with neighbours” is almost impossible in a region where 
almost every regional player is in direct or indirect conflict with others, this reappraisal seems 
quite understandable. The change also indicates an important realisation that “precious 
loneliness”, however precious it is, is not a policy line that Turkey can maintain or benefit 
from in the long-run. Its troubled relationships with Israel, Russia and Syria, and distanced or 
conflicting relationships with Iran, Iraq and Egypt at the same time proved quite a costly 
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positioning. How this change towards “strategic flexibility” or its policy of “increasing the 
number of friends and decreasing the number of enemies” will proceed, what achievements it 
can accomplish and which partners Turkey will choose in the future are key questions which 
need closer attention and stand out as thought-provoking and perhaps controversial topics for 
future research agenda.   
The Domestic Dimension: Shattering and Emerging Coalitions, and Louder Critical Voices 
 
 
Several developments need to be monitored at the domestic level, too, in order to assess the 
future of Turkey’s grand strategy.  
There are many important economic factors to be considered in terms of the domestic 
dimension. The first point is the recent fight which has broken out between the JDP and 
TUSKON due to the association’s links to Fethullah Gülen.726 New coalitions may be 
required to compensate for this breakdown in the relationship, and in terms of domestic 
coalitions, a search for new allies seems necessary. On the other hand, DEİK (Turkey’s 
Foreign Economic Relations Board) and TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination 
Agency)—through which most of TUSKON’s penetration was achieved in the past—is still 
quite active in the regions such as Africa and the Caribbean. As such, newer business 
associations, in cooperation with these two government organisations, would possibly be 
encouraged to replace TUSKON and avoid a potential loss in these regions.727 
The government’s closer ties with some recently rising conservative business 
associations such as ASKON (Anadolu Aslanları İş Adamları Derneği/Anatolian Tigers 
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Businessmen Association) can be considered as showcasing such an attitude, but in the 
meantime, Turkey’s annual growth rate has fallen to around 3-4 percent since 2011.728 Before 
then, it had been steady at around 8–9 percent since 2002 (with the exception of 2009 due to 
the global financial crisis). The Turkish Lira’s exchange rate has fallen by around 50 percent 
against both the Dollar and the Euro between 2011 and 2015.729 According to Mustafa 
Kutlay, assistant professor at TOBB University, because of Turkey’s lack of R&D, education 
and hi-tech investments as well as major changes in regional politics starting with the Arab 
Spring, Turkey has experienced an era of significant challenges and a general economic 
slowdown. While Turkey’s economic interactivity in the MENA region suffered during the 
Arab Spring and beyond, the European market became much more competitive than it had 
been during the financial crisis.730 Moreover, Turkey’s troubled relationship with Russia 
threatened its economic profile abroad for around 9 months between November 2015 and 
August 2016 as well as the sustainability of the economic dimension of its grand strategy. 
The recent reconciliation with Russia and Israel in the summer of 2016 might cause some 
improvement in this pessimistic picture. This and other fluctuations should be closely 
monitored in order to assess the future of the Turkish economy’s power, as the future of 
domestic coalitions and possible financial problems would significantly affect Turkey’s 
ability to pursue its policy choices abroad.  
Another domestic factor requiring closer investigation is Turkey’s commitment to 
democratisation and reforms. Any setbacks to democracy would carry the risk of empowering 
the old alarmist elite, further damaging Turkey’s already slowing reform efforts in line with 
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the acquis and sparking a new wave of securitisation regarding not only foreign policy issues 
but also domestic rivalries and economic activity abroad. It would also threaten the rhetorical 
and economic encouragement Turkey has received from the West and the receptiveness it has 
enjoyed in its surrounding regions. Even though the JDP era has witnessed the most active 
period of reforms, democratisation, and harmonisation with the demands of the EU acquis, 
maintaining this momentum would have a direct impact on the sustainability of Turkey’s 
profile. This seems more important than ever now, considering the increasing amount of 
controversy and criticisms since the Gezi protests, which were discussed in the chapter on the 
Turkish-EU relationship. Within this context, Turkey’s commitment to the rule of law would 
also be subject to close scrutiny due to the wave of arrests, suspensions and the state of 
emergency after the coup attempt in July, 2016.  
Over the last decade, efforts to reduce military influence and improve relations with 
neighbouring countries that had been regarded as threats for decades have helped Turkey 
desecuritise its policy-making. Since the beginning of the JDP’s second term, it seems that 
the civil-military relationship has fallen more and more in line with democratic norms. One 
thing that should be monitored with respect to the question of sustainability could be the 
judicial decision to acquit more than 200 military officers jailed for their involvement in the 
alleged Sledgehammer coup plot and their role in the post-modern coup of 28 February 
1997.731 Whether a recovery of the military’s image might affect the new dynamics of the 
civil-military relationship and once again empower the military against the elected civilian 
policy-makers is an important question. Here, however, it should also be noted that “the 
problem was that the military was not put back in the barracks by democratic or legal means, 
but by the badly flawed undemocratic methods of the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations, 
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themselves a work of the Gülenist movement”.732 Thus, it was revealed that the majority of 
the trials were not based on authentic evidence, and most of the convicted military officials 
were in fact innocent. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who previously supported the trials, also 
admitted that the government itself was deceived by judges affiliated with the Gülen 
movement, who produced false, fabricated and forged evidence.733  
Along with several key developments in the last decade, the legal amendments related 
to the position, responsibilities, and rights of the military within the broader establishment 
based on the EU acquis had already changed the very nature of civil-military relations in 
Turkey.  However, the July 2016 coup attempt showed that particular groups within the 
military can still strive to intervene directly. The majority of the military took an anti-coup 
stance during the coup attempt, and harsh criticisms from high-ranking military officers were 
directed at plotters. The military’s pro-democracy stance in the aftermath was a clear 
indication of its transformation over the last two decades. This transformation, rather than 
legal amendments, seems to be a more effective force, at least until civil-military dynamics 
and legal restraints in line with EU practice have became more deep-seated. Within this 
context, so far, several important measures have been taken which will help re-configure the 
civil-military relationship. Military high schools have been shut down, war academies will be 
merged under a new National Defence University, while land, air and naval forces will be 
brought under the Ministry of Defence. The Coastguard and the Gendarmerie General 
Command will be brought under the Interior Ministry and military hospitals will be brought 
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health.  
It is clear that in general terms Turkey possesses a higher ability and broader room for 
manoeuvre to devise and adjust policies compared to the situation that prevailed during the 
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Cold War era and in the 1990s. However, Turkey still faces complex challenges, and will 
quite possibly continue to do so at both international and domestic levels. Altunışık and Tür 
argue that in the immediate post-Cold War era, Turkey had to deal with multiple difficulties 
in order to become an influential player. These included economic fragility, the Kurdish 
issue, and political polarization.734 Even though progress is undeniable regarding all these 
matters over the last decade, it seems that especially since 2013, such problems, along with 
regional instability and insecurity, could continue challenging Turkey’s enthusiasm for 
playing a more influential role both regionally and globally.735  
 
Contributions of the Research to Academic and Policy Debates and to the Future Research 
Agenda 
 
With its detailed analysis of Turkey’s changing grand strategic attitude and the motivations 
behind these shifts—especially in the period under the JDP rule—this research has the 
potential to attract a broad audience consisting not only of scholars and policy-makers 
dealing with Turkey’s foreign policy attitude and its grand strategy, but also of scholars 
whose primary focus is IR theory. The research could also address an audience focusing on 
the analyses of how lesser powers acted in the post-Cold War era in general, even if they are 
not studying the particular case of Turkey. This thesis first and foremost tries to offer a 
comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of Turkey’s grand strategy. Even though there are 
other recent large-scale studies on Turkey and its foreign policy written by renowned experts, 
such as Hale’s Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774 and Stein’s Davutoglu, the AKP and the 
                                                          
 734 Altunışık & Tür, 2005, p. 133. 
 735 Özlem Tür, personal communciation, 28/4/2016. 
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Pursuit of Regional Order, there are two key remaining issues that make this thesis a 
necessary further study.  
The first is that due to the vibrant atmosphere and changes in both domestic and 
international dynamics almost on a daily basis, keeping up with the pace of events requires 
new studies on a periodic basis. Focusing on events up to mid to late-2016, this thesis will 
contribute to the literature in this regard. The research, with numerous interviews and the use 
of primary and secondary sources both in English and Turkish, provides extensive empirical 
material for the particular case of Turkey. 
The second and more important motivation behind this research is the continuing 
absence of a comprehensive theoretical analysis of Turkey to date. As Hale mentions, “the 
process of foreign policy-making is one of the least well-studied aspects of Turkish foreign 
policy and suggestions can often only be speculative or illustrated by occasional 
examples.”736 In order not only to study this process but also to provide a generalisable and 
repeatable causal mechanism, it is important to keep an eye on rival theoretical frameworks. 
This study, set within its own specific theoretical framework, namely neoclassical realism, 
offers a comprehensive, holistic and working analysis of internal and external factors and 
their impact not only on the making but also the implementation of particular grand strategic 
choices. Even though several studies have done their best to grasp the full complexity of the 
picture and covered some or all of the factors I have considered, they did not do so by 
referring to a comprehensive theoretical framework. As detailed historical or chronological 
accounts, they represent large scale studies from which I have benefitted vastly. However, 
Hartley argues that without a theoretical framework, the researcher is in severe danger of 
                                                          
 736 Hale, 2013, 148.  
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providing description without meaning.737 My perspective is that theory is what differentiates 
IR from strict historical/chronological accounts. I embrace the view that theoretical 
frameworks offer us what we need to make sense of a particular case in a way that not only 
systematises causal mechanisms, but also identifies causal mechanisms that can be 
generalised to other cases. Thus, it would not be too bold to argue that theory is what makes 
IR a discipline, and without it, this thesis would have gone no further than simply expanding 
the time span covered by other recent studies. 
Numerous studies have attempted to make sense of the case of Turkey theoretically 
through primordialist lenses.738 Hale argues that “Critics of the ruling AKP’s policies 
frequently argued that Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East was part and parcel of its 
supposedly Islamist commitments.” Hale reiterates this opinion in several chapters of his 
Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, but does not provide detailed insights into the arguments 
or the empirical data provided by these critics. Systematic theoretical framework and 
empirical data, as well as effective use of primary and secondary sources, are important in 
showing the weaknesses of existing accounts while providing the reader with a clear 
alternative causal mechanism. Thus, one of the main contributions of this research will be in 
terms of its criticism of these culture- and value-based accounts.  
Neoclassical realism (NCR), a recent strand within the realist school, has not been 
widely utilised in general terms, and this under-utilisation is even more pronounced in terms 
of analyses focusing on rising powers. This results from the fact that rather than standing as a 
monolithic school of thought, NCR is an amalgam of several different approaches to a more 
or less similar causal mechanism with a relatively narrow empirical reach due to its current 
                                                          
737 Jean Hartley, “Case Studies in Organizational Research” in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, eds., 
Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research: A Practical Guide (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 
209–229. 
738 See Hüsna Taş Yetim, “The Role of Identity in Turkey’s New Middle East Policy: The Case of JDP’s Palestine 
Policy”, at <http://www.uli.sakarya.edu.tr/sites/uli/file/1371681227-husnayetim.pdf>, accessed 18/11/2013, 
pp. 83–99, at p. 89–90; Warning and Kardaş, 2011 Onar, 2009. 
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under-utilisation. Therefore, as far as this research’s contribution to neoclassical realist 
literature itself is concerned, two expectations can be identified. Firstly, in terms of empirical 
ammunition for its theoretical framework, this study could play an important role. In order to 
present NCR as a strand that is academically sustainable, credible and valid, its repertoire in 
terms of cases and their comprehensive analyses should be far-reaching. This research has 
focused on the task of addressing Turkey’s situation by analysing three individual 
relationships, and could contribute to future neoclassical research in that regard by expanding 
the concept’s empirical reach. Secondly, in terms of its contribution to the neoclassical realist 
strand itself, this research acknowledges the primary impact of power in an anarchic structure 
connecting two domestic factors, namely coalitions between statesmen and businessmen and 
the autonomy of state apparatus that act as multipliers for a state’s ability to respond to 
international and regional shifts. As stated above, NCR appears to be a diverse rather than a 
unified school of thought, and can thus be applied to analysing different domestic elements 
such as “extraction capability” and “autonomy of the executive branch” (Zakaria), 
“mobilization capability” and “national political power” (Christensen), “elite perceptions” 
(Wohlforth), and “coalition politics” (Snyder). There are diverse views about which 
particular domestic factors have an impact over grand strategy, and in what ways. This thesis 
not only investigates these diverse academic approaches to this new school of thought from 
scholars who are considered to be key representatives of NCR, but also questions which 
domestic factors affect the pursuit of grand strategic shifts and particular foreign policy steps, 
and the extent to which they do so.  
The research’s theoretical stance also positions it within the broader realist debate that 
followed the Waltzian paradigm. By choosing and incorporating domestic factors, this 
research challenges strict “third image” theories such as Waltzian Neorealism and underlines 
the role of domestic factors. By revisiting roles played by relevant domestic factors in 
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classical realist analyses and investigating their impact on more recent neoclassical realist 
literature, Waltzian determinism and the “billiard balls” analogy are challenged.  
NCR’s ability to subsume culturalist arguments and ideologies by incorporating 
domestic politics and groupings into its analysis could also challenge the explanatory power 
of naïve culturalist or primordialist accounts by offering a middle-ground. In terms of the 
incorporation of related ideological and value-based factors into realist analysis, the research 
is quite promising; it shows NCR’s ability to integrate those factors into its analysis because 
of its strong roots in classical realism. However, this research does not seek to argue that 
ideology and/or culture-based assumptions should be completely ignored. Instead, the 
research acknowledges the potential of such analyses and the importance of the factors 
investigated by them, but in contrast to such analyses this thesis—within the context of 
“hierarchy” of motivations that pushes a particular state to make certain foreign policy 
decisions—prioritises interest-driven power-maximisation behaviour over ideology-driven 
concerns.  
By contributing to literature on the links between external dynamics, domestic politics 
and shifting grand strategies, this thesis not only provides an important empirical dataset for 
studies on grand strategy, but also shows parallels between literature on grand strategy-
making and the variables highlighted by neoclassical realist scholarship. Due to important 
similarities in conceptualisations, factors, and variables, the thesis demonstrates the 
explanatory power of NCR regarding grand strategic behaviour. As such, it will contribute 
not only to NCR’s ability to analyse grand strategy-making, but also to the literature on grand 
strategy by theoretically enriching established accounts on the subject.  
By analysing Turkey’s striving for more power and influence abroad in response to 
opportunities it has found in its environs, this research broadens the scope of the literature on 
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the concept of grand strategy. The literature has so far primarily focused on the imperial eras 
of European great powers such as Britain and France or the post-WWII policies of the USA 
and the USSR. Until now, studies on grand strategy (such as Zakaria’s From Wealth to 
Power and Wohlforth’s World out of Balance) have focused either on great powers in 
multipolar and bipolar structures or on the sole superpower, the United States, in a unipolar 
structure. The analysis of the structural circumstances under which Turkey now operates, and 
of its position as a lesser rising power rather than an established great power, will contribute 
to the literature on the configuration and pursuit of grand strategy by challenging the 
widespread “great power obsession” that dominates existing literature.739 For future research, 
BRIC and MINT countries might provide interesting and fruitful areas of study, using the 
structural and regional changes that demarcate the contours of their new roles as the primary 
factor along with, for instance, the important role played by internationalist business 
communities and/or the changing power calculus between particular domestic interest groups. 
Hopefully, this research will encourage similar studies on other rising powers and broaden 
the research agenda of grand strategy-making and the impact of external and internal factors 
in its configuration and application for the future.  
In terms of policy implications, too, the research has the potential to make important 
contributions. Ideologically devised narratives, once received by policy-makers and the 
public, might also cause them remain mired in nostalgia, which could result in irrational and 
destabilising policy choices. With respect to the particular case of Turkey, the Turkish 
domestic audience and the ruling elite could also be given a false sense of emotional 
                                                          
739 Recently, several other studies also aimed at addressing this problem and there is certainly an increase in 
the number of studies focusing on rising powers. For instance, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: 
China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Wang Jsi, 
“China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds its Way”, Foreign Affairs 90: 2 (2011), pp. 68–79; 
David Scott, “India’s ‘Grand Strategy’ for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions”, Asia-Pacific Review 13: 2 
(2006), pp. 97–129; Daulet Singh, “Thinking about an Indian Grand Strategy”, Strategic Analysis 35: 1 (2010), 
pp. 52–70; Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001); Hal 
Brands, Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2010. 
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euphoria, running the risk of causing self-fulfilling prophecies which could result in self-
containment, marginalisation and/or over-stretching capabilities which would have negative 
consequences for regional and international peace and stability. There has been a high risk of 
the political misuse of primordialist arguments to reach a broader constituency, especially 
considering the supporters of extreme right parties. Thus, such approaches can easily feed 
into the ideological baggage of Turco-sceptic audiences abroad. Moreover, they can 
contribute to the emergence of an insecure regional atmosphere plagued with distrust and 
“mutual threat perception”740 in the Middle East, the Balkans and the post-Soviet space due 
to the “imperial tone” of approaches highlighting Islamism and Neo-Ottomanism as the main 
determinants of Turkey’s grand strategy.  
All in all, ten major theoretical and empirical contributions are expected to be made 
after this dissertation has been thoroughly analysed;  
1. To provide the literature on the case of Turkey especially in the JDP era with a 
comprehensive theoretical framework 
2. To contribute to the literature on Turkey with rich and up-to-date empirical data,  
3. To enrich the empirical ammunition of NCR 
4. To modify NCR in a way that a clear theoretical framework and a repeatable causal 
mechanism can be presented 
5.  To revisit the classical realist school and challenge neorealism’s strict “third image” 
approach  
6.  To question and challenge the explanatory power of primordialist accounts 
                                                          
740 Stein, 2011, p. 23. Also see Fox, 2001 and Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Islamic Culture and 
Democracy: Testing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis”, Comparative Sociology 1:3–4 (2002), pp. 235–263. For 
the weaknesses and possible self-fulfilling prophecies of primordialist approaches, also see Katerina 
Delacoura, “Beyond a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Religion and Conflict in the Middle East”, Opendemocracy, 
13/1/2014, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/katerina-dalacoura/beyond-self-fulfilling-
prophesy-religion-and-conflict-in-middle-ea>, accessed 1/5/2014. 
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7.  To offer a theoretical middle ground incorporating material and domestic factors in a 
realist analysis 
8. To theoretically enrich the literature on the concept of grand strategy by showing the 
parallels between the variables widely used by neoclassical realist scholars and the 
literature on grand strategy 
9.  To empirically broaden the scope of the literature on the concept of grand strategy to 
the case of Turkey in particular, which could contribute to opening up a future 
research area on rising powers in general  
10. To question the validity of primordialist arguments coming from either academic or 
political circles. This would hopefully help avoid the risks stemming from potentially 
dangerous domestic euphoria and from possible self-fulfilling prophecies, which 
might not only threaten regional security and stability, but also raise Turco-scepticism 
abroad. 
 
Acknowledging the fact that analysing Turkey—with its frequently changing and vibrant 
external and internal settings—would require more and more studies and pose an important 
challenge for anyone studying the country, it is expected that this study can also make a 
humble but highly useful contribution. Given all the listed expected contributions, this thesis 
will hopefully make its contribution to multiple literatures and research agendas, encourage 
more studies on grand strategy, neoclassical realist scholarship, rising powers and Turkey, 
and open up new and broader paths for future research.  
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